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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 Prosecutors have enormous discretion in the criminal justice system.  
Their decisions can ultimately impact and shape the course of the lives of the 
offenders whom they prosecute.  This is certainly true for juvenile offenders 
considered for transfer to the adult court.  Previous research indicates that 
serious, violent offenders are the most likely to be transferred to the adult court.  
However, very little is known on prosecutors’ views of the role of the juvenile 
court, the process of transfer or the facts that influence their decision to transfer a 
juvenile to the adult court. 
 A statewide survey of 800 Florida prosecutors was implemented using 
factorial vignettes.  The results indicate that prosecutors support the idea of 
transfer generally, particularly when they are making the final determination to 
transfer to the adult court.  Further, prosecutors indicate that juvenile transfer 
should be used sparingly, in extreme cases that are not appropriate to the 
resources of the juvenile court.  
 The data were also examined to determine the effect of juvenile offender 
and juvenile offense characteristics on the decision to transfer a juvenile to the 
adult court.  Analysis revealed several significant predictors of preference for 
transfer:  age, threat to society, presence of a violent offense, ethnicity of 
juvenile, presence of prior adjudications, and amenability to treatment.  
 iv
For my parents, Robert and Mary King 
 v
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 
 
 I would like to thank my committee members Bernard McCarthy, Joseph 
Sanborn, Ross Wolf, and Paul Maiden for their time and consideration.  Special 
thanks to my dissertation chair, Brandon Applegate.  The knowledge and skills I 
have acquired working with him are immeasurable. 
 I would also like to thank the State Attorneys and Assistant State 
Attorneys of Florida who agreed to participate in this research.   
 I would like to thank my family and friends for their encouragement during 
this process. 
 A special thanks to my friend and fellow graduate student, Charles W. 
Otto.  His humor, kindness, and insight motivated the completion of this project. 
 Finally, I would like to thank my husband, Nyle Davis.  His patience, 
encouragement, and love gave me the strength to complete this project.  I love 
you. 
 vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
LIST OF TABLES................................................................................................viii 
CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION ...........................................................................1 
CHAPTER 2:  REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ...................................................4 
THE HISTORY OF THE JUVENILE COURT (1800S-1960)...........................................5 
Early Views of Children..................................................................................5 
For the Good of the Child ..............................................................................6 
MODERN CHANGES TO THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM (1960-PRESENT)..............14 
Two-Stage Processing as Due Process ......................................................15 
Landmark Supreme Court Decisions ...........................................................16 
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act........................................24 
What is the Appropriate Role? .....................................................................26 
TRANSFER PROVISIONS......................................................................................32 
Overview......................................................................................................33 
Prosecutorial Discretion...............................................................................37 
Florida’s Transfer Provisions .......................................................................40 
CORRELATES OF TRANSFER DECISIONS ..............................................................51 
VIEWS OF JUVENILE TRANSFER...........................................................................67 
Public Perceptions of Juvenile Exclusion.....................................................68 
Practitioners’ Views of Juvenile Waiver .......................................................80 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES ..........................................................85 
CHAPTER 3:  RESEARCH PROCEDURES.......................................................89 
OVERVIEW ........................................................................................................89 
RESEARCH SAMPLE ...........................................................................................89 
DATA COLLECTION METHOD ...............................................................................90 
OPERATIONALIZATION OF VARIABLES...................................................................92 
Respondent Demographics .........................................................................92 
General Support for Transfer and the Role of the Juvenile Court ................92 
Agreement with Arguments For and Against Transfer .................................94 
Support For and Opposition to Methods of Certification ..............................95 
Correlates of Exclusion Decisions ...............................................................96 
Youthful Offender Dimensions and Levels...................................................98 
DATA COLLECTION INSTRUMENT .......................................................................104 
THE RESPONDENTS .........................................................................................105 
CHAPTER 4:  RESULTS ..................................................................................106 
SUPPORT OF JUVENILE TRANSFER AND THE ROLE OF THE JUVENILE COURT.........106 
Support for Arguments For and Against Transfer ......................................108 
Prosecutors' Views on Mechanisms of Juvenile Transfer ..........................113 
Correlates of Support for Juvenile Transfer ...............................................115 
DETERMINANTS OF JUVENILE TRANSFER ...........................................................120 
OTHER FACTORS IN TRANSFER DECISIONS ........................................................124 
 vii
Nature of Current Offense .........................................................................125 
Nature of Prior Offenses ............................................................................126 
Prior Commitments ....................................................................................127 
Victim Consideration..................................................................................127 
Educational Factors ...................................................................................127 
Family Issues.............................................................................................128 
Other Juvenile Issues ................................................................................128 
Juvenile Transfer .......................................................................................129 
CHAPTER 5:  DISCUSSION ............................................................................131 
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................131 
OVERVIEW OF RESEARCH QUESTIONS...............................................................132 
Support for Transfer and the Separate Juvenile Court ..............................132 
Arguments For and Against Transfer.........................................................133 
Mechanisms of Transfer ............................................................................133 
OVERVIEW OF HYPOTHESES TESTS...................................................................134 
Age of the Offender ...................................................................................134 
Maturity of Youth........................................................................................135 
Likelihood of Rehabilitation........................................................................135 
Presence of a Violent Offense ...................................................................136 
Severity of Offense ....................................................................................137 
Threat to Society........................................................................................137 
Prior Record of Adjudication ......................................................................138 
Prior Commitment Record .........................................................................138 
Family Support...........................................................................................139 
Ethnicity .....................................................................................................139 
Gender.......................................................................................................140 
History of Family Abuse.............................................................................140 
Socio-Economic Status..............................................................................141 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.................................................141 
LIMITATIONS OF CURRENT RESEARCH ...............................................................145 
FUTURE RESEARCH .........................................................................................146 
CONCLUSION...................................................................................................148 
APPENDIX A:  SURVEY CORRESPONDENCE ..............................................150 
APPENDIX B:  SURVEY INSTRUMENT ..........................................................156 
APPENDIX C:  IRB APPROVAL.......................................................................163 
LIST OF REFERENCES...................................................................................165 
 
 viii
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1.1 – Studies Examining Offense as a Correlate of Juvenile Exclusion ....53 
Table 1.2 – Florida’s Waiver By Offense (2001-2002) ........................................57 
Table 1.3 – Florida’s Waiver By Gender (2001-2002).........................................59 
Table 1.4 – Florida’s Waiver By Age (2001-2002 ...............................................60 
Table 1.5 - Studies Examining Race and Ethnicity as Correlates of Juvenile 
Exclusion ............................................................................................................63 
Table 1.6 – Florida’s Waiver By Race (2001-2002) ............................................66 
Table 1.7 – Public Views of Juvenile Exclusion ..................................................72 
Table 1.8 – Respondent Demographic Correlates of Public Views of Juvenile 
Exclusion ............................................................................................................77 
Table 4.1:  Overall Support for Juvenile Transfer and the Role of the Juvenile 
Court .................................................................................................................107 
Table 4.2:  Prosecutors' Support for Arguments for Transfer of Juveniles to the 
Adult Court ........................................................................................................109 
Table 4.3:  Prosecutors' Support for Arguments Against Transfer ....................112 
Table 4.4:  Prosecutors' Views on Mechanisms of Juvenile Transfer ...............114 
Table 4.5 - Pearson Correlations between Likelihood of Transfer 
Recommendation and Independent Variables ..................................................116 
Table 4.6 - T-test for Dichotomous Variables by Likelihood of Transfer 
Recommendation..............................................................................................117 
Table 4.7 - One-Way Analysis of Variance for Prosecutorial Likelihood of 
Transfer Recommendation by Independent Variables ......................................119 
Table 4.8 - Regression Model for Prosecutorial Preference for Juvenile Transfer
..........................................................................................................................122 
 
 
 
 1
CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION 
 
 Discretion -- a critical element in the criminal justice process -- refers to 
the use of personal decision-making and choice in situations where laws and 
policies do not completely dictate a course of action.  Prosecutorial discretion is 
one example of this significant element of the justice system.  Ultimately, 
prosecutors carry the responsibility of having an enormous influence over the 
criminal justice process as well as the lives of those persons affected by the 
criminal justice system. 
One area of prosecutorial discretion of particular importance concerns the 
recommendation and determination to exclude youthful offenders from the 
juvenile justice system.  Exclusion from the juvenile justice system, also 
sometimes referred to as transferring a youth to the adult court, has received a 
fair amount of attention in the social science literature (Bishop, Frazier & 
Henretta, 1989; Feld, 1997; Frazier, Bishop & Lanza-Kaduce, 1999; Moon, 
Sundt, Cullen & Wright, 2000).  Researchers, however, largely have focused on 
describing the mechanisms of excluding youth from the juvenile court, outlining 
the types of offenders who are excluded, and assessing the impact of exclusion.  
The orientation of prosecutors and the specific process by which prosecutors 
make the crucial decision to exclude juveniles has received relatively little 
scholarly attention. 
Due to the broad influence that prosecutors have on these youthful 
offenders and the flow of justice, this discretionary decision-making process and 
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the perceptions that influence and guide this process should be examined.  This 
research is necessary for several reasons.  First, prosecutorial transfer decisions 
are subject to little or no judicial review (Office of Juvenile Justice and 
Delinquency Prevention, 1999).  Prosecutors have a great deal of authority, 
influence, and impact over the course a juvenile will take through the criminal 
justice system.  However, there are few safety mechanisms with which to check 
and balance this authority (Klein, 1998; Office of Juvenile Justice and 
Delinquency Prevention, 1999). 
Second, once a prosecutor has made the decision to exclude a youthful 
offender from the juvenile justice system, the impact of the decision ensues.  
Juveniles who are transferred to the adult criminal justice system have higher 
rates of re-arrest, more serious re-arrest offenses and shorter periods of time to 
new offenses compared to juveniles who remain in the juvenile justice system 
(Bishop, Frazier, and Henretta, 1989). The Office of Juvenile Justice and 
Delinquency Prevention (1999) reports that 54% of male and 73% of female 
youthful offenders who remain under the umbrella of the juvenile justice system 
will never return to the justice system.  These figures are not so promising among 
transferred youth.  Thus, the decision to exclude a youth from juvenile court can 
have a sweeping impact on the offender, the criminal justice system, and the 
community into which the offenders must reintegrate after their sentence. 
Due to the influence and impact that prosecutors have in the juvenile and 
criminal justice systems, it is essential that a greater understanding of their 
decision-making process is realized.  Specifically, this research seeks to examine 
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three aspects of prosecutorial exclusion of youthful offenders from the juvenile 
justice system.  First, I assess the impact of potentially relevant factors on the 
decision to exclude youth.  Prosecutors will be presented with mock cases, 
describing aspects of a youth, his or her context, and the charged offense.  
Personal and professional characteristics of the prosecutors also will be 
examined.  Second, prosecutors’ views about their role in the transfer process 
and their responsibilities will be explored.  The key issues considered here will be 
to what extent youth should be waived and what role prosecutors believe various 
justice system actors should play in this decision.  Third, I examine prosecutors’ 
views on the future of a separate juvenile system.  By addressing these issues, 
this research seeks to provide clarity and a greater understanding of the 
prosecutors' decisions to exclude a juvenile from the juvenile justice system and 
to prosecute those youths as adults. 
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CHAPTER 2:  REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
  
This chapter provides a thorough examination of the factors relevant to 
researching juvenile exclusion from juvenile court.  Several key concepts and 
areas of the literature are examined.  The historical, political, and ideological 
environment from which the juvenile justice system was born is explored.  This 
frame of reference is necessary in order to ascertain how the current juvenile 
justice system came into existence and currently functions, particularly with 
regard to the response of government to youthful offenders.  Furthermore, 
significant changes in the way juveniles are managed in the criminal justice 
system are identified and discussed.  The chapter reviews the system of juvenile 
justice with regard to its development, its differences from the adult criminal 
justice system, changes in juvenile justice in recent history, and contemporary 
discussions as to the appropriate role of the juvenile court with youths accused of 
serious offenses. 
Youthful offenders can be transferred to the adult criminal court in a 
variety of ways.  These particular methods of excluding juveniles from the 
juvenile court are identified and the process through which juveniles are excluded 
is detailed.  The role of the prosecutor in American criminal justice is discussed, 
particularly with regard to the broad discretionary power of this office.  In 
particular, this section reviews the ways that prosecutorial discretion comes into 
play with transfer by virtually all mechanisms.  A separate section reviews what 
we know about the correlates of exclusion.  Based on official data, some insights 
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can be gained about what types of youths are more likely to be transferred to the 
adult system.  Finally, the existing data concerning perceptions of juvenile justice 
are reviewed.  Special attention in this area is given to studies examining support 
for and opposition to transfer of youthful offenders as a window into what we may 
expect regarding prosecutors’ views of this practice.  
 
The History of the Juvenile Court (1800s-1960) 
 
Early Views of Children 
The manner in which American society has responded to disobedient and 
delinquent children has changed throughout history.  Various restrictions and 
regulations have been implemented in efforts to control, manage, protect, and 
punish children (Bernard, 1992; Binder, Geis, and Bruce, 1997).  The state’s view 
of children--especially regarding their level of culpability, responsibility, and 
maturity--has often framed the response for delinquent behavior (Finckenauer, 
1984).  
 Prior to the 19th century, youthful offenders were treated in the same 
manner as adult offenders (Binder et al., 1997).  At the turn of the century, the 
perspective of children as being equal to adults with regard to culpability and 
responsibility began to change.  Rather than view children and adults as equal 
with regard to responsibility, Puritans in colonial America began to place value on 
the child and the child rearing process.  Specifically, they believed that children, 
while born full of sin, should be molded as productive members of a collective 
family (Binder et al., 1997).    
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For the Good of the Child 
In the early 1800s, a rapid increase in immigration, urbanization, and 
industrialization in the United States resulted in changes in the manner in which 
children were viewed as well as the nature of family life.  Upper-class citizens of 
New York, for example, grew concerned about the increasing number of 
immigrant children who were roaming the streets unsupervised.  During this 
period, it was often necessary for both immigrant parents to maintain 
employment in order to have enough money to provide the necessities of life in 
New York.  
The concerned, upper-class citizens decided that the working, immigrant 
parents were not equipped to provide the supervision necessary to ensure the 
proper upbringing of their children.  As a result, the elitist citizens concluded that 
they needed to take the initiative to provide adequate management and control of 
these youth (Bernard, 1992; Platt, 1969).  These upper-class citizens determined 
that with their help poor, immigrant children could not only be raised properly, but 
made into respectable, productive citizens (Bernard, 1992).   
Thus, the Society for the Reformation of Juvenile Delinquents, originally 
called the Society for the Prevention of Pauperism, was formed in 1817 (Bernard, 
1992).  This upper-class organization was mostly concerned with the 
development of a house of refuge for the poor children of the streets of New York 
(Bernard, 1992).  The Society’s objectives were twofold.  First, they wanted to 
implement a plan that would provide adequate guidance and direction for these 
children.  The members genuinely believed that, without adequate supervision, 
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the youth were destined for misfortune (Bernard, 1992).  The second goal, which 
stems from the first, is far more suspect.  The members believed that poor, 
immigrant children were “potential paupers” (Bernard, 1992, p. 60).  A great deal 
of the problems associated with rapid industrialization and urbanization were 
attributed to the immigrant families moving into the city. In particular, the 
members of the Society blamed poor immigrants for the deterioration and 
disorder in New York City in the early 1800s. Thus, in order to alleviate the 
imminent destruction of society and create a comfortable, respectable and moral 
way of life, the members decided that these poor children of the streets of New 
York had to be dealt with (Bernard, 1992).  
As a result, the House of Refuge, the first juvenile institution, was opened 
on January 1, 1825 as a means to care for the poor, immigrant children of society 
who were labeled as vagrants or who had been convicted of a minor criminal 
offense (Bernard, 1992).  Ostensibly, the first House of Refuge was initiated for 
the welfare of children, and the majority of the youths who were sent to the 
House of Refuge were not criminal but poor (Bernard, 1992). 
Platt (1969) observes that a “child-saving” movement began around the 
middle of the 1800s.  The “child savers” maintained that it was a child’s 
environment that made him or her bad or criminal (Bernard, 1992; Binder et al, 
1997; Platt, 1969).  Supporters of this movement argued that youthful offenders 
should be handled differently than adult offenders.  The primary corrective 
approach, they contended, was to be education and rehabilitation.  This group 
also had ulterior objectives.  The ultimate objective of this movement was to 
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change youth through education (Platt, 1969).  Platt (1969) notes, however, 
harsh discipline was considered to be the most expedient manner in which to 
achieve this goal.  The child savers were determined to instill in youth the 
structure, discipline, and morals of respectable, upper-middle-class members of 
society.    
 The children who were sentenced to the House of Refuge were sentenced 
for an unspecified period of time.  In general, males were confined until their 
twenty-first birthday, and females were held until their eighteenth birthday 
(Bernard, 1992).  These lengthy sentences were justified based on the 
perception that criminality and delinquency were produced by poor parental 
management and weak self-control of children (Bernard, 1992).  Thus, juveniles 
needed supervision until they reached adulthood.  To address the mediocre child 
rearing of their parents, the House of Refuge initiated strict discipline and 
structure in the youths’ lives.  For example, the youths who were sent to the 
House of Refuge were forced to endure long hours of hard labor as well as suffer 
through brutal, corporal punishment on a regular basis (Bernard, 1992).  
Ultimately, the directors of the House of Refuge were attempting to change the 
errant youths into moral, productive members of society. 
In 1826, Boston opened its own House of Refuge, followed by 
Philadelphia in 1828.  The House of Refuge was an attractive policy option for 
the upper-class members of urban society when faced with increasing crime 
rates in their growing cities.  News spread throughout the northeastern United 
States about this new sanction for delinquent and potentially delinquent youth. By 
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1868, over twenty houses of refuge had opened in the United States (Binder et 
al., 1997), all ostensibly pursuing the goal of preventing potential youth crimes 
through strict discipline and harsh punishment. 
The treatment of juveniles in 19th century Houses of Refuge may seem 
unduly punitive by contemporary standards, but it was based on the ostensibly 
benevolent philosophy of parens patriae.  Parens patriae refers to the obligation 
of the government to care for a child whose parents fail to care for him or her.  
The states employing houses of refuge contended that they were merely 
exercising parens patriae.  After all, these were minors who could not possibly be 
expected to care for themselves, nor were their parents viewed as being of the 
moral foundation necessary to ensure the development of a law-abiding citizen 
(Binder et al., 1997).  The state, acting as parent, was going to look out for the 
best interests of youths in trouble. 
Unfortunately, there was no regulatory system in place to ensure that a 
child was being treated fairly.  At this time, children were still viewed as being not 
quite adults (Bernard, 1992).  Consequently, children had yet to be given any 
constitutional or due process protections.  Thus, the poor, immigrant children of 
poor, immigrant parents were vulnerable to the whims of the upper, ruling class.  
These youths could be taken from their parents at any time, and there was no 
legal mechanism functioning to ensure that this placement was righteous. 
The case of Mary Ann Crouse in Pennsylvania clearly demonstrates the 
attitude toward youth during this time period.  Crouse was committed to the 
Philadelphia House of Refuge as per a petition from her mother that she could 
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not manage Mary Ann (Bernard, 1992; Feld, 1999).  The father filed a writ of 
habeus corpus.  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court heard this case, Ex parte 
Crouse.  The legal issue concerned the confinement of a person who had not 
been accused or convicted of any offense.  The Court rejected the father's legal 
concern, ruling that the confinement was legal (Bernard, 1992; Feld, 1999).  
Further, the Court said that the confinement of Crouse was for society's good as 
well as Mary Ann's. 
 In 1870, the Illinois Supreme Court heard a habeas corpus case in the 
matter of a child, Daniel O’Connell (Bernard, 1992).  Daniel, like the majority of 
the children in the houses of refuge, had not committed a criminal offense.  The 
Illinois Supreme Court ordered Daniel O’Connell to be released from the House 
of Refuge because, in the court’s view, Daniel was being punished but not 
helped in any meaningful way (Bernard, 1992). This decision set a precedent 
recognizing that a minor child has an expectation to fundamental due process 
rights (Bernard, 1992).  The upper-class society’s attempt to protect their status 
and class had come to an abrupt halt.  It was now illegal to proactively take poor 
children, who had yet to commit a crime, from their homes (Platt, 1969).  Still, 
child-saving reformers were steadfast in their belief in the necessity of the 
removal and retraining of these youth. 
 The reformers and moralists of the time realized that they had to find 
another means to establish social control over wayward and needy youth.  They 
worked tirelessly to create a social program to deal with the miseries of urban life 
(Platt, 1969).  As a result, in 1899, the first juvenile court was established in Cook 
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County, Illinois (Bernard, 1992; Schwartz, 1989).  This juvenile court was 
developed by the Illinois Juvenile Court Act labeled an Act to Regulate the 
Treatment and Control of Dependent, Neglected, and Delinquent Children.  This 
act was quite broad and achieved the reformers’ intended goals of regaining 
control of errant youth.  Finckenauer (1984, pp. 115-116) identifies five motives 
for the passage of this act: 
1. An interest (on the part of police and other community 
officials) in removing idle youths from the street, where 
they might cause trouble or commit crimes. 
2. A desire (especially among upper-class leaders) for ways 
to remove the child from the home (particularly immigrant 
homes), in order to educate and socialize the young to 
accept American values. 
3. A demand (by businessmen) that young people be taught 
the discipline and minimal skills necessary to permit the 
expanding factory system to absorb them and operate 
efficiently. 
4. A need (on the part of some women in the child-saving 
movement) to find acceptable social and professional 
roles in an industrializing, urbanizing society. 
5. Perhaps least important, a concern that young people be 
given the tools and education needed to earn a living 
within the existing economic and social structure. 
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  Platt (1969) suggests that this legislation was merely a mechanism 
created by the reformers to achieve their ultimate goal:  suppression and control 
of the underclass.  Again, the reformers had found a way to legitimize the 
practice of institutionalizing children without providing them due process.  This 
juvenile court was to be an informal, patriarchal process.  The language of the 
act and the informal nature of the new juvenile court evaded the O’Connell case 
and enabled the deprivation of children’s due process (Schwartz, 1989).  The 
legal principle of parens patriae was used as a justification for the creation of this 
court, which was not a punitive, criminal court.  Thus, the requirement of due 
process was not applicable.  The court was acting under the notion of the best 
interest of the child and, as such, its actions could not technically be considered 
illegal (Bernard, 1992; Schwartz, 1989).  The Act was constructed to provide the 
court with jurisdiction over any youth who violated a law or any poor, neglected or 
abused child (Bernard, 1992).   
This new alternative to achieve social change was appealing.  By 1917, all 
but three states had implemented some form of specialized court for dealing with 
errant, delinquent and pre-delinquent youth (Schwartz, 1989). By 1925, all but 
two states had implemented a juvenile court system (National Research Council 
and Institute of Medicine, 2001). 
 These special courts continued to manage and control delinquent children 
based on the court’s view of what was in the best interest of the child.  Juvenile 
court judges had a wide range of dispositional alternatives available to them 
(Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 1999).  Regardless of the 
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offense committed, judges were often able to sentence juveniles to a period of 
confinement until the youth reached the age of twenty-one (Office of Juvenile 
Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 1999).  Until the early 1960s, juveniles were 
detained, often in jails, and sentenced in a manner that was sometimes more 
punitive than an adult would receive for an equal offense.   
Also during this time period (1920-1960), Americans were beginning to 
grow concerned about the apparent rise in youth crime (Bernard, 1992; Binder et 
al., 1997).  As a result of the perceived crime increase, Americans were growing 
concerned about how young offenders were being managed in the juvenile 
courts.  As public fear of crime escalated, so did criticism of the juvenile courts 
throughout the country (Binder et al., 1997).   
 The President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration 
of Justice (1967a; 1967b) conducted a large investigation on the practices of 
juvenile courts and detention practices throughout the country.  The Commission 
found that juvenile delinquency was not being deterred by the then current 
juvenile court practices.  Rather, the Commission suggested a shift in the manner 
in which juveniles were being managed and sentenced.  The report implied that 
the time had come to examine the philosophy that was driving the juvenile justice 
system. The Commission also made recommendations regarding the 
incarceration and detention of youthful offenders.  Included in these 
recommendations were deinstitutionalization of minor offenders, diversion or 
informal intervention, and implementation of procedural safeguards for youth in 
the juvenile justice system (1967b).  The Commission (1967b) urged that the 
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juvenile justice system develop into a two-tiered system, one system to be 
dedicated to providing social services for neglected youth and children in need of 
services and a social control system for punishing delinquent youth.  In general, 
the Commission noticed unfair and potentially unconstitutional practices 
throughout the juvenile court system in the United States.   
 
Modern Changes to the Juvenile Justice System (1960-Present) 
By the 1960s, there was increasing concern among the legal community 
throughout the United States regarding rights of criminal defendants.  It was at 
this point that child advocates began to scrutinize closely the juvenile court and 
the manner in which delinquent children were being disposed (Mahoney, 1987).  
While juvenile courts may have developed out of a concern for the welfare of 
delinquent youths, the dispositions of these youths were often exceedingly 
punitive and restrictive.  Yet, juveniles were not afforded the same constitutional 
protections as were their adult counterparts. Juveniles were being punished like 
adults but were not afforded the same due process safeguards.  Recognizing 
these inconsistencies between the juvenile and adult courts, two states sought to 
address the lack of due process for juveniles (Binder et al., 1997).  The New York 
and California state legislatures passed laws requiring due process protections 
for juveniles (Bernard, 1992).   
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Two-Stage Processing as Due Process 
 In 1960, the governor of California commissioned a study to evaluate 
juvenile justice in the state.  The commission found that, while the intent of the 
juvenile justice system was immersed in the language of parens patriae, the spirit 
of this creed was hardly being met.  Rather, the study found that the juvenile 
court’s procedures were inconsistent with regard to dispositions of cases, there 
were little or no constitutional or procedural safeguards, and detention was 
utilized to excess (Binder et al., 1997).  Thus, following the governor’s study, the 
state legislature passed into law the California Juvenile Court Act of 1961.  This 
act made certain provisions for due process for delinquent youth.  Specifically, 
the 1961 Act mandated a two-stage process for handling delinquent children.  
The first stage consisted of an adjudicatory hearing similar to an adult criminal 
trial.1  Only after the allegations had been evaluated and the youth was found to 
meet a minimum level of maturity or culpability would the case move to the 
second stage where the judiciary would impose sanctions.  Finally, this act 
provided juveniles who were charged with felonies the right to counsel (Binder et 
al., 1997). 
 Following California’s lead, the New York legislature passed the New York 
Family Court Act of 1962.  Similar to the intent of the California law, the act called 
for the implementation of a statewide family court with power over all cases 
involving youth in the state.  This included criminal youth, neglected and abused 
                                            
1 The initial hearing only required a “preponderance of evidence” standard of proof as opposed to 
the adult “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard (Binder et al., 1997). 
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youth, and difficult, but non-criminal youth.  Like California, this act also required 
a two-stage hearing process.  In addition, this act called for counsel to be 
appointed for all youth brought before the family court (Binder et al., 1997). 
 Despite New York and California’s attempts to address due process 
issues, juveniles throughout the country were still being sanctioned harsher for 
their delinquent behavior than adults would have been had they committed 
similar offenses.  While the aforementioned acts contributed to the much needed 
attention to procedural protections for youth, the United States Supreme Court 
ultimately delivered the opinions which would dramatically alter the mechanisms 
for disposing of delinquent cases and begin ensuring constitutional protections 
for juveniles. 
 
Landmark Supreme Court Decisions  
 In 1961, Morris Kent, a sixteen-year-old on probation, was arrested and 
charged with housebreaking, rape, and robbery.  Kent’s attorney, anticipating a 
waiver from the District of Columbia’s Juvenile Court jurisdiction to the criminal 
system, filed a motion requesting a hearing on the issue of jurisdiction and a 
request for access to Kent’s Juvenile Court Social Service file. The juvenile court 
judge did not rule on these motions.  Rather than responding, the judge issued 
an order waiving original jurisdiction over Kent citing that he had completed a “full 
investigation” as required by the District of Columbia’s Juvenile Court Act. The 
juvenile court judge never explained the details of this investigation nor did he 
provide a written explanation as to the reasons why Kent was waived to the adult 
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criminal court.  Kent was then indicted in the adult criminal court on eight counts 
involving housebreaking, robbery, and rape.  Kent was tried and convicted of six 
counts of housebreaking and robbery.2  He was sentenced to 5 to 15 years on 
each count (30 to 90 years in prison).  It should be noted that had Kent remained 
in the court of original jurisdiction, he would have received no more than five 
years in a juvenile correctional facility.  It appears that juvenile court sanctions for 
minor crimes may be more severe, but for serious crimes, the adult system can 
be considerably more harsh.  At this point, there seemed to be a huge gap in the 
range of punishments, both for minor juvenile offenders kept in the juvenile 
justice system and for serious youthful offenders considered for adult criminal 
justice sanctions. 
 Kent’s attorney challenged the validity of the waiver to the adult criminal 
court because there was not a full investigation and the refusal to provide Kent’s 
juvenile court records.  In 1966, the Supreme Court ruled that the juvenile court 
waiver of jurisdiction was invalid.  The Court held that Kent should have had 
access to all pertinent records and that, minimally, the juvenile court judge should 
have provided a written statement regarding the reasons for the waiver as 
mandated in the District of Columbia’s Juvenile Court Act.  Furthermore, the 
Court found that the presiding judge should have conducted a hearing regarding 
the decision to waive original court jurisdiction.  Specifically, Justice Fortas, 
writing for the majority, offered that “appointment of counsel without affording an 
opportunity for hearing on a ‘critically important’ decision is tantamount to denial 
of counsel. There is no justification for the failure of the Juvenile Court to rule on 
                                            
2 He was acquitted of the two counts of rape by reason of insanity. 
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the motion for hearing filed by petitioner's counsel, and it was error to fail to grant 
a hearing” (Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541).  The Court held that while the 
waiver hearing did not need to conform to the formal requirements of a criminal 
trial, they must conform to the “essentials of due process and fair treatment” (383 
U.S. 541). 
 Thus, the Court specified those due process requirements for juveniles 
facing a waiver.  The Court determined that Kent had been entitled to a waiver 
hearing, that the hearing should have conformed to the essentials of due 
process, Kent’s counsel should have had access to all court service records, and 
a right to counsel itself.  Finally, the Court held that the juvenile court judge 
should have provided a written statement of the reasons for the waiver.   
In the appendix to Kent, the Court issued explicit guidelines that the 
presiding judge should consider when determining whether to waive original 
juvenile court jurisdiction: 
1. The seriousness of the alleged offense to the community and whether the 
protection of the community requires waiver. 
2. Whether the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive, violent, 
premeditated, or willful manner. 
3. Whether the alleged offense was against persons or against property, greater 
weight being given to offenses against persons especially if personal injury 
resulted. 
4. The prosecutive merit of the complaint, i. e., whether there is evidence upon 
which a Grand Jury may be expected to return an indictment (to be 
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determined by consultation with the United States Attorney [prosecuting 
attorney]). 
5. The desirability of trial and disposition of the entire offense in one court when 
the juvenile's associates in the alleged offense are adults who will be charged 
with a crime in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia [criminal 
court]. 
6. The sophistication and maturity of the juvenile as determined by consideration 
of his home, environmental situation, emotional attitude, and pattern of living. 
7. The record and previous history of the juvenile, including previous contacts 
with the Youth Aid Division [social service agencies], other law enforcement 
agencies, juvenile courts and other jurisdictions, prior periods of probation to 
this Court [the court], or prior commitments to juvenile institutions. 
8. The prospects for adequate protection of the public and the likelihood of 
reasonable rehabilitation of the juvenile (if he is found to have committed the 
alleged offense) by the use of procedures, services and facilities currently 
available to the Juvenile Court.  (Kent v. United States) 
  The Kent decision was monumental for a number of reasons.  First, while 
the Court’s decision only applied to the District of Columbia, states across the 
nation adopted the Court’s guidelines (Bernard, 1992).  Failure to adopt the 
considerations for waiver would leave other states vulnerable to appeal to the 
Supreme Court.  Second, this case made it clear that juvenile court cases that 
reached the Supreme Court for review would be considered on a due process 
basis as opposed to the standard parens patriae model (Bernard, 1992).  As a 
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result, greater protection for juveniles under the law began to emerge.  The 
juvenile court and states’ laws regarding juvenile transfer changed with this 
precedent to protect themselves from the problems associated with Kent. 
In 1967, the Supreme Court decided the In re Gault case.   In this 
landmark case, the Supreme Court reviewed the case of Gerald Gault, who was 
taken into custody for making lewd telephone calls.  At a subsequent hearing, 
Gault was not given right to counsel, adequate notification of the charges, nor 
was he able to confront and cross-examine his accusers.3  Gault’s disposition 
ordered him to an institution until Gault reached the age of majority 
(approximately six years).4  The Court ruled that, as a result of the blatant denial 
of Gault’s constitutional right to due process, Gault had been unconstitutionally 
imprisoned.  Specifically, the Court maintained that the denial of due process 
rights for juveniles being adjudicated was unconstitutional, particularly when the 
adjudication could result in a loss of freedom. The Supreme Court ruled that a 
juvenile has the right to adequate and timely notice of charges, the right to 
counsel, the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, and the privilege 
against self-incrimination. The Court had required that juveniles being 
adjudicated be given some of the same procedural protections afforded to adults.  
 Samuel Winship, a twelve-year-old, was charged with stealing $112 from 
a woman’s purse.  In the subsequent juvenile disposition in New York Family 
                                            
3 The woman who made the complaint never even appeared to testify during the hearing. 
4 It should be noted that the offense in question held a maximum penalty of a $5-$50 fine or 
imprisonment not to exceed two months if committed by an adult.  Thus, for merely having a 
status of being a child, the punishment was far more substantial.  Justice Fortas, writing for the 
majority, asserted that “Under the United States Constitution, the condition of being a boy does 
not justify a kangaroo court” (387 U.S. 1). 
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Court, the court determined that Winship had stolen the money.  Winship’s 
lawyer maintained that he had established a reasonable doubt as to Winship’s 
guilt.  The judge acknowledged in the court record that he made a finding based 
on the preponderance of the evidence.5  The juvenile was ordered to a juvenile 
training school for a period up to six years.  The legal issue in this case was 
whether proof beyond a reasonable doubt is included in the “essentials of due 
process and fair treatment” required in juvenile court as provided by Gault. 
 In 1970, the Supreme Court held that the finding of guilt based on a 
preponderance of the evidence was invalid.  Justice Brennan delivered the 
opinion of the Court maintaining that “the constitutional safeguard of proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt is as much required during the adjudicatory stage of 
a delinquency proceeding as are those constitutional safeguards applied in 
Gault” (In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358).  Thus, the standard of proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt was required in proceedings where a juvenile was charged 
with an act that, if committed by an adult, would be considered a crime.   
Not all landmark Supreme Court rulings have resulted in extending due 
process protections for juveniles.  Joseph McKeiver was charged with robbery, 
larceny, and receiving stolen goods.  At the beginning of his juvenile hearing, 
McKeiver’s lawyer requested a jury trial.  The presiding judge refused, and 
McKeiver was ultimately adjudicated delinquent and placed on probation.  This 
case was appealed and joined by three other similar cases where juveniles had 
requested a jury trial.  These cases presented “the narrow but precise issue 
whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment assures the right 
                                            
5 This finding was based in accordance with the New York Family Court Act. 
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to trial by jury in the adjudicative phase of a state juvenile court delinquency 
proceeding” (McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528).  In 1971, the Supreme 
Court issued its opinion maintaining jury trials are not required in juvenile 
adjudications.  The Court maintained that, while juvenile adjudications may have 
their shortcomings, “the trial by jury in the juvenile court’s adjudicative stage is 
not a constitutional requirement” (403 U.S. 528).   
The Court cited a number of justifications for their decision.  First, if the 
jury trial was required as a matter of due process, the Court was concerned that 
the juvenile court process would be completely adversarial, slow and public in 
nature.  Thus, any hope of maintaining an informal, protective environment would 
be expelled. The Court held that “if the jury trial were to be injected into the 
juvenile court system as a matter of right, it would bring with it into that system 
the traditional delay, the formality, and the clamor of the adversary system and, 
possibly, the public trial” (403 U.S. 528).   
Second, the Court maintained that the purpose of the jury in adult criminal 
trials was to enhance and ensure the fact-finding process.  However, there were 
clearly deficits with regard to juries in the adult system.  Thus, there was no 
perceived enhanced fact-finding function in prescribing jury trials to juvenile court 
adjudications.  Conversely, the Court was concerned that the imposition of juries 
on the juvenile court would weaken the juvenile court’s ability to provide 
individualized justice to juveniles.  Rather, juveniles would be in a parallel 
situation as adults in the criminal process. The Court was not convinced that 
criminal and juvenile trials should be the same, particularly with regard to rules of 
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evidence.6   The Court went on to urge for the distinction between the juvenile 
and adult criminal systems.  “If the formalities of the criminal adjudicative process 
are to be superimposed upon the juvenile court system, there is little need for its 
separate existence. Perhaps that ultimate disillusionment will come one day, but 
for the moment we are disinclined to give impetus to it”  (McKeiver v. 
Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528).7 
 The Supreme Court decisions have helped to shift the nature of the 
juvenile court, but the Court does not seem willing to extend all due process 
safeguards.  The Court appears reluctant to completely abolish the parens 
patriae justification for the juvenile court.  Rather, the Court seems to be 
concerned that if juries were a constitutional requirement there would be no point 
in having a separate system of justice.  At this point, the Court seems unwilling to 
make that ultimate decision.  However, the Court did suggest that legislating jury 
trials for unique juvenile court proceedings would be acceptable.  The Court held 
that “if, in its wisdom, any state feels the jury trial is desirable in all cases, or in 
certain kinds, there appears to be no impediment to its installing a system 
embracing that feature.  That, however, is that state’s privilege and not its 
obligation” (McKeiver v Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528). 
 
                                            
6 Of particular concern was the inclusion of the juvenile’s prior record as a matter of public record. 
7 Justices Douglas, Black, and Marshall dissented with the Court’s opinion.  They suggested that 
juveniles are already being punished (as opposed to helped) in the juvenile system.  As such, 
they were entitled to the same due process rights as adults in criminal trials, particularly when the 
youths face loss of freedom. 
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Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act 
 In 1968, Congress passed the Juvenile Delinquency Prevention and 
Control Act.  This act strongly encouraged that youth charged with status 
offenses be removed from the formal juvenile court system (Office of Juvenile 
Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 1999).  The Act also recommended utilizing 
community means rather than formal justice resources when disposing of minor 
offenses (Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 1999).
 Several years later, in 1974, Congress passed the Juvenile Justice and 
Delinquency Prevention Act (JJDP Act) (Office of Juvenile Justice and 
Delinquency Prevention, 1999).  This Act provided two custody requirements.  
First, the act mandated deinstitutionalizaton of status offenders.  Second, the Act 
required that incarcerated juvenile offenders be separated from adult offenders.  
Specifically, the Act directed that, when confined, juvenile offenders must be 
separated from sight and sound of adult offenders.  Later, in 1980, Congress 
amended this Act to include the removal of juvenile offenders from adult jail 
facilities.  Then, in 1992, Congress amended the Juvenile Justice and 
Delinquency Prevention Act, mandating that attention be given to the 
disproportionate detention of minority juveniles (Howell, 1998).  Specifically, this 
amendment required that States assess the nature of the problem of 
disproportionate minority confinement and work to alleviate the problem (Office of 
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 1999).  To encourage compliance 
with this federal act at the state level, the Act’s mandates require all states to 
adhere to the provisions in order to be eligible for Formula Grants from the 
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federal government (Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 
1999).   
The juvenile court has seen great changes since its inception. Not only 
has the United States Supreme Court clarified the manner in which juveniles are 
to be treated in the juvenile justice system, but state and federal legislation 
throughout the country also has shaped the handling of juvenile offenders.  
Arguably, granting juveniles some rights has opened the door for very serious 
sentencing for some youths in some states.  Current sentencing guidelines in 
some states extends to youths age 23 to 25.   
In addition to the actions already mentioned, states have made it easier to 
try juveniles as adults (Bernard, 1999; Bishop, 2000).  For example, many states 
have legislated offense-based, rather than individualized, offender-based waiver 
requirements.  Furthermore, states have altered their state juvenile court acts to 
include punishment as a dispositional goal versus the traditional rehabilitation 
theme (Bernard, 1999; Feld, 1998).  Feld (1998) argues that despite the rhetoric 
of rehabilitation, states have adopted a more punitive approach to dealing with 
youthful offenders.  These philosophical changes in the juvenile court often were 
brought about by the perception of increasing youth crime and a perceived failure 
of rehabilitative efforts (Bernard, 1999; Feld, 1997).  States now view some 
youthful criminals as responsible and deserving of retribution and punishment 
rather than malleable and in need of treatment or rehabilitation (Feld, 1997).  
Some states have split populations into two distinct groups:  juveniles who 
commit less serious (and less chronic) offenses and youth who commit serious 
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(and chronic) offenses.  The former receiving more rehabilitative sentences and 
the latter receiving more retributive and extensive forms of punishment.   
Despite these get tough responses to youth crime, a debate within the 
criminal justice community as to the appropriate role and response to youth crime 
remains.  Are youths criminally responsible, and should they be treated similarly 
to adults?  Are youths criminally less responsible than their adult counterparts, 
and should they be treated with a lesser degree of punitiveness?  More broadly, 
scholars and professionals continue to consider the question, what is the 
appropriate role of the juvenile court? 
 
What is the Appropriate Role? 
As the juvenile court has moved into its second century, scholars and 
practitioners are reconsidering how youthful offenders should be handled (Merlo, 
2000).  When considering the appropriate role and function of the juvenile court 
in responding to youth crime, there are three predominant schools of thought:   
abolish the juvenile court; the juvenile court should remain intact and juveniles 
should not be waived to the adult criminal justice system; or retain the juvenile 
court in a modified form to adhere to the original ideals and philosophy of parens 
patriae recognizing that certain youths should be waived to the adult court due to 
the serious nature of their offenses and the degree of risk they pose to society.   
Feld (1997) is perhaps the most vocal advocate of the first position, 
strongly favoring the abolishment of a separate justice system for juveniles.  
While Feld (1998) recognizes the societal consensus that youths are somehow 
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criminally different from adults (e.g., less responsible or culpable) and should not 
receive the same sentences, he does not concede that this difference is a valid 
argument for the continuation of a binary system.  Rather, he advocates for the 
abolition of the binary system, with the allowance that an offender’s age be used 
as a mitigating factor during sentencing.   In order to allow for any developmental 
differences between youthful and adult offenders, he suggests the 
implementation of a youth sentencing policy specifically designed to address 
those needs (Feld, 1998). 
 This position is based generally on the argument that, because of the true 
nature of the juvenile court system, a separate court does not help and may harm 
youths accused of crimes.  Due to the “get tough” approach to crime prevailing in 
recent decades, youthful offenders are often met with retributive dispositions 
rather than treatment oriented plans based on the offenders’ specific needs 
(Feld, 1997). The growing practice of offense-based sentencing, as opposed to 
individualized, treatment-oriented dispositions, eliminates the distinct purpose of 
a separate juvenile system of justice (Feld, 1993). Furthermore, Feld (1993) 
suggests that, due to the “get tough” nature of sentencing, juveniles are being 
sentenced harshly but not given the same procedural and due process 
protections that an adult offender would receive.  Specifically, he maintains that, 
in many cases, juveniles are not represented by counsel during delinquency 
hearings.  Sanborn (1994a) also questions the degree to which juveniles can get 
an impartial hearing ensuring due process. 
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 While eliminating the binary system may ensure the application of due 
process for all defendants in the criminal justice system, there are several 
criticisms to Feld’s proposal.  Rosenberg (1993) counters Feld’s criticism of due 
process by suggesting that the difference between juvenile and adult court due 
process is very minimal. The minor discrepancies between due process 
assurances in the juvenile court and the adult court do not warrant an elimination 
of the juvenile justice system.  Rosenberg (1993) also notes instances where 
juveniles are afforded more rights and consideration than adults.  For example, 
juveniles are afforded more protections with regard to confessions than are 
adults. Rosenberg (1993) also suggests that abolitionists should take a closer 
look at the rights actually afforded to adult criminal defendants.  For example, 
she notes that Miranda protections and exclusionary rule protections are 
becoming increasingly narrow.  As protections for adults shrink, the due process 
gap between the criminal and juvenile systems is similarly diminished.  Finally, 
she criticizes the idealized view of the adult criminal courts.  Justice is slow and 
crowded in the adult criminal justice system.  Most defendants plead guilty and 
are hardly given individualized justice (Rosenberg, 1993).  Thus, eliminating the 
juvenile court would scarcely eliminate Feld’s concerns of compromised justice 
for juveniles. 
 Another criticism of Feld’s proposition concerns the degree to which 
juveniles can participate and appreciate the nature of the proceedings and take 
an active and effective role in their own defense.  The entire basis for the 
development of the juvenile court was the recognition that youths were not 
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merely small versions of adults.  Due to their young age, juveniles had yet to 
accumulate the life experiences necessary to equip them physically, emotionally, 
and intellectually for the criminal process (Van Vleet, 1999).  If juveniles are still 
viewed as being different by the mere status of their age, then surely the 
abolitionists could acknowledge that those same youth are hardly intellectually, 
physically, and emotionally developed to the point where they can effectively 
participate and understand the proceedings in which they are involved (see 
Grisso, 2000).  In sum, how can youth be distinguished by age for sentencing 
purposes, but assumed to possess the tools necessary to participate in their own 
defense? 
 Redding (1999) identifies other negative consequences of the transfer of 
youth to the adult criminal court.  Specifically, he identifies the legal 
consequences of a felony court conviction that Feld’s proposal seems to 
disregard.  Juveniles convicted of a felony can lose the right to vote, lose the 
right to serve in the United States military, and lose the right to possess or own 
certain firearms.  Furthermore, Redding (1999) observes that trying juveniles in 
adult court means the juvenile’s conviction is public record, the conviction must 
be reported on employment applications, and convictions could possibly be 
considered for future sentencing considerations (e.g. escalating punishment 
under three strikes laws). 
Finally, even if it is accepted that juvenile courts fail to ensure full 
procedural protections for youth, it is not clear how the adult courts would utilize 
age as a mitigating factor in sentencing (Rosenberg, 1993).  Clearly, the 
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suggestion to abolish the juvenile court has some serious problems.  Some 
social scientists and juvenile justice practitioners not only disagree with the 
suggestion but also maintain that no juveniles should be waived to the adult 
criminal justice system.       
This second common perspective regarding the appropriate role of the 
juvenile court favors retention of a separate system of justice for all youthful 
offenders.  A number of arguments are put forth to support this position.  The first 
issue concerns the degree to which exclusion from the juvenile court adversely 
affects those juveniles who are waived to the adult court.  Bishop (2000) has 
maintained that, with increased avenues for waiver, more juveniles will be waived 
to the adult criminal justice system. For example, Puzzanchera (2000) notes that 
in 1988, there were 6,700 juveniles judicially waived into the adult criminal justice 
system.  From 1988 to 1994, there was a 73% increase in juvenile transfers to 
adult court when 11,700 juveniles were transferred in 1994 (Puzzanchera, 2000).  
With a large and increasing number of youth being waived, the possible negative 
effect that adult dispositions can have on juveniles is of great concern.   
Several studies have found that recidivism rates of youths transferred to 
the adult criminal justice system are higher than comparable youths who remain 
in the juvenile court system (Bishop, Frazier, Lanza-Kaduce, and Winner, 1996; 
Fagan, 1996; Winner, Lanza-Kaduce, Bishop, and Frazier, 1997).  Bishop et al. 
(1996), for example, found that recidivism rates for transferred juveniles were 11 
percentage points higher than those for a matched sample of youths handled in 
the juvenile court when they were followed for up to two years after the case was 
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disposed.  In a later analysis that followed these youths for seven years, the 
overall recidivism rates were nearly equal (42% and 43% respectively).  
Multivariate analyses, however, showed that once other factors were controlled, 
transfer was associated with a slightly increased risk of recidivism.  Transfer also 
resulted in a shorter delay until rearrest and a higher total number of rearrests 
(Winner et al., 1997). 
Another concern regarding waiver of youthful offenders is the effect that 
exposure to adult, career criminals may have on young, malleable youth (Bishop, 
2000). Furthermore, Bishop (2000) is particularly concerned about the negative 
impact of youth socializing with adult offenders, potential victimization of youthful 
offenders in adult correctional facilities, and the long-term consequences that 
confinement in an adult correctional facility will have on a youthful offender.  For 
some scholars, the appropriate response to these evident and potential 
deleterious effects of transfer is that no youths should be excluded from the 
juvenile justice system. 
 The final camp in the discussion regarding the appropriate role of the 
juvenile court falls somewhere between the two previous perspectives.  
Proponents of this third perspective acknowledge the problems in the juvenile 
court as well as the original intention of the initial juvenile court.  Further, these 
advocates recognize that the juvenile court has transformed itself into a system 
that no longer reflects the ideals that drove the foundation of this separate 
system of justice.  Van Vleet (1999) urges that abolition of the juvenile court 
would fail to adequately address the needs of the majority of offenders for whom 
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the juvenile system still works.  Furthermore, he disagrees with the position that 
no youth should be transferred to the adult court.  Specifically, he advocates 
excluding those youth who represent the most chronic, violent, serious youthful 
offenders. 
  This perspective seeks to strike some balance regarding the appropriate 
role of the juvenile court.  It recognizes that youthful offenders, because of their 
immaturity, are different from their adult counterparts, yet it takes into account 
societal intolerance for serious youth crime. Proponents acknowledge that the 
juvenile court has serious limitations and is not functioning in the manner in 
which it was created or intended (Butts & Harrell, 1998). These practitioners and 
social scientists, however, hardly encourage total elimination or inclusion of all 
offenders within the juvenile court.  Rather, they view the system as having 
drifted from its intended goals.  The limited resources that exist must be allocated 
to those youths that can still be helped.  Those youth who are no longer 
amenable to treatment and rehabilitative efforts must be waived to the adult 
criminal justice system in an effort to save the system and the majority of the 
youth who would remain (Merlo, Benekos, and Cook, 1999; Van Vleet, 1999).  
 
Transfer Provisions 
 Regardless of the debate over whether all youths, no youths or some 
youths should be excluded from the juvenile court, or whether the juvenile court 
should be abolished, the fact remains that a separate system exists for juveniles 
and certain cases are removed to the adult criminal justice system.  Precise 
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figures on the number of youth transferred are not available.  Rather, several 
authors and agencies have painstakingly produced estimates based on partial 
data.  Puzzanchera (2001), for example, approximates that 8,100 youth were 
judicially waived to the adult court in 1998 (the year for which the most recent 
data were available).  This represents a decline from 1994, when the number of 
judicial transfers reached 12,100.  Notably, these figures include only cases that 
were excluded from juvenile court jurisdiction by a juvenile court judge.  Because 
juvenile cases can be removed to the adult system in several ways, 
Puzzanchera’s (2001) figures represent only a portion of all cases waived.  In 
fact, as Bortner, Zatz, and Hawkins (2000) observe, “by 2000 the vast majority of 
transfers occur through legislative exclusion” (p. 282).  Thus, when all avenues of 
exclusion are considered, estimates such as Bishop’s (2000) – 210,000 to 
260,000 cases waived for 1996 – can be reached.  To better understand how 
some juveniles come under the jurisdiction of the adult court and how 
prosecutors influence this practice, it is necessary to consider the various 
transfer procedures available. 
 
Overview  
 All states have at least one provision or mechanism for transferring 
juveniles accused of a crime into the criminal system for processing as adults  
(Puzzanchera, 2000).  It should be noted that 31 states also have legislated 
“once an adult, always an adult” (Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency 
Prevention, 1999, p. 14).  This provision means that once a juvenile has been 
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transferred, tried, and convicted (and sometimes sentenced) as an adult, that 
juvenile must be tried as an adult for any subsequent offense that he or she 
commits (Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 1999).  
Procedures to handle youthful defendants as adults go by many names:  
transfer, exclusion, certification, and wavier.  Regardless of the particular term 
applied, these mechanisms generally fall into one of two categories:  judicial 
waiver and prosecutorial waiver (Sanborn, 1994b; Griffin, Torbet, and 
Szymanski, 1998). 
Judicial waivers are the most commonly used form of transfer for juvenile 
offenders (Klein, 1998). In comparison to other waiver provisions, commentators 
argue that the judge should be the one to make the decision.  Prosecutorial 
provisions are often viewed as being too easy a way to transfer a youth (Bishop, 
Frazier, & Henretta, 1989). 
  There are two general types of judicial waivers: traditional waiver and 
presumptive waiver (Strom, 2000).  Traditional waivers, also referred to as 
discretionary waivers, allow more discretion to juvenile court judges.8  This type 
of waiver gives juvenile court judges the ability to waive juveniles to the adult 
criminal justice system at their discretion.9  In 1997, laws in 47 states allowed this 
form of judicial waiver (Strom, 2000).   
Exclusion of youth from juvenile court jurisdiction may also occur when 
judges waive youths under presumptive waiver provisions. Under this 
arrangement, certain categories of juvenile offenders – defined by age, instant 
                                            
8 It should be noted that all judicial transfer is discretionary in nature. 
9 These type of waivers are subject to appellate review (Klein, 1998). 
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offense, and past offense history – are to be waived to the adult criminal justice 
system.  This presumption can be overridden, however, if the juvenile can prove 
that he or she is likely to be rehabilitated in the juvenile system (Strom, 2000).  
In general, judicial waivers allow the judge to be the primary decision-
maker with regard to whether or not a juvenile will be tried as an adult (Klein, 
1998).  The judge’s discretion, however, is constrained by legislation and is 
influenced by the actions of the prosecutor.  In general, states limit waivers 
based on the type of the offense, the nature of the offense (level of violence), the 
age of the juvenile, and the past delinquent history of the juvenile (Klein, 1998; 
Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 1999).  As noted earlier, 
the 1966 Supreme Court case, Kent v. U.S., also outlined eight factors that a 
judge should consider before waiving a juvenile to adult, criminal court. These 
considerations include the seriousness of the alleged offense, degree of danger 
that the juvenile poses to the community, whether the offense was violent and 
against person(s), the level of maturity of the juvenile, previous history of juvenile 
delinquency, the level of protection that should be afforded the community, and 
the likelihood that the juvenile can be rehabilitated.  Therefore, judges, while 
maintaining a great deal of discretion, are constrained to some degree with 
regard to which juveniles they can waive to adult court.10    
 Moreover, in practice, prosecutors play an important role in judicial waiver. 
The judge’s decisions to waive juveniles into the adult court are usually initiated 
                                            
10 Despite the individualized consideration given in judicial waivers, there have been considerably 
more juveniles transferred to criminal court in the “get tough” era (Klein, 1998).  Thus, politics 
may play a grossly exaggerated role in the determination if a juvenile will be transferred or waived 
to the adult, criminal court. 
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by a request from the prosecutor (Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency 
Prevention, 1999).  Prosecutors also decide on the offense to charge; as we 
have seen, statute and case law establish the instant charge as a central 
consideration in the judge’s waiver decision. 
Aside from waiver through judicial discretion, youths may be excluded 
from juvenile court by statute.  This type of waiver excludes certain categories or 
types of juvenile offenders from the jurisdiction of the juvenile court system 
(Klein, 1998).  Under this waiver provision, judges also are required to waive a 
juvenile to the adult jurisdiction after finding probable cause for certain crimes 
(Strom, 2000).  There are only 15 states that have statutes that mandate a 
judicial waiver (Strom, 2000).  Still, the very jurisdiction of the juvenile court 
system is a product of legislative statutes.  Therefore, there is no “constitutional 
right to be treated as a juvenile” (Klein, 1998, p. 383) and states have enacted 
legislation establishing the adult criminal court as the court of original jurisdiction 
for certain youthful defendants.  As a result of the “get tough” approach to 
juvenile offenders, legislatures are rapidly increasing the scope of these statutory 
exclusions.  Specifically, 37 states have some form of statute that excludes 
certain juvenile offenders from the jurisdiction of the juvenile court system (Klein, 
1998). 
 There are three factors that are typically included in statutory exclusion 
provisions:  age, severity of the offense the youth is currently accused of having 
committed, and the criminal history of the juvenile (Klein, 1998).  Notably, these 
provisions are among the same factors that must be considered when 
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determining judicial waivers but typically at a higher threshold for prosecutors; 
youths must be older and more serious, chronic offenders.  Still, the discretionary 
influence of the judge is removed.  The statutes abandon the role of the 
individualized judicial process and replace it with a broad exclusion of all juvenile 
offenders who fall within the scope of these statutes.  Notably, however, 
prosecutorial discretion must still adhere.  It is the prosecutor who decides 
whether a youth should be charged with an offense specified for transfer. 
Another avenue for waiving juveniles to the adult criminal justice system is 
prosecutorial direct file also known as concurrent jurisdiction. In this mechanism 
of juvenile waiver, the prosecutor has a great deal of discretion with regard to 
which juveniles will be waived or filed in adult court (Klein, 1998). 
 
Prosecutorial Discretion 
Prosecutors play a powerful role in the criminal justice system.  Ultimately 
prosecutors must review the cases of every offender arrested by the police, 
evaluate the efficiency of every pending case, determine and file charges against 
defendants, and represent the state in criminal adjudications (McCoy, 1998).  As 
it is not feasible to prosecute every criminal case by a jury, prosecutors must 
make this ultimate determination. The limits or checks to this discretionary power 
are few (Davis, 1969; McCoy, 1998).   
Historically, as elected officials, prosecutors were able to apply the laws of 
their jurisdiction as they saw fit.  State (or district) attorneys would prosecute 
behaviors that met both the letter and the spirit of the law as a means of meeting 
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the needs of their constituencies (Jacoby, 1997).  Their decisions to prosecute 
were supported by statutory provisions; yet, the decision to prosecute was not 
legally reviewable (Jacoby, 1997).  While judicial discretion regarding waiver is 
legally reviewable, appellate courts will not extend that mandated review to 
prosecuting attorneys.  It has become customary and accepted that prosecutors 
vigorously pursue cases that reflect societal sentiment regarding crime and 
justice.  In doing so, it is necessary to make decisions based upon the varying 
dimensions of individual offenses and offenders.   
Prosecutors’ discretionary application of the law has been extended to 
juvenile exclusions.  The American Prosecutors Research Institute (1996) argues 
that it is wholly appropriate for the decision to exclude a youth from the juvenile 
system to rest with prosecutors. In support of this position, the APRI makes the 
following seven assertions:  
1. Prosecutors have a responsibility to represent the state in 
court on juvenile cases and therefore, should have the 
right to determine what cases are filed in that court. 
2. Prosecutors are unable to utilize an effective prosecution 
policy or effectively implement prosecution standards 
without control over the charging decision. 
3. Prosecutors are trained on the legal aspects of the 
charging process. 
4. Prosecutors give public safety a high priority in their 
decision making process. 
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5. Prosecutors take into consideration the interests of the 
victim and follow procedures for exchanging information 
with victims. 
6. Prosecutors have access to both the criminal and social 
background of the juvenile. 
7. Prosecutors are more easily accountable to the public 
than are other individuals in the juvenile justice system.  
(p. 5) 
Prosecutors, of course, are often statutorily limited with regard to which 
youthful offenders and which offenses they may file in adult court.  Still, they 
exercise considerable discretion, which some view as potentially problematic 
when it comes to charging.  Opponents of this form of waiver maintain that 
prosecutorial waiver is too arbitrary and may be unduly influenced by the public 
and politics, leading to unfair decisions (Allen, 2000; Klein, 1998).  Others, like 
the APRI (1996) embrace prosecutorial transfer as efficient and acknowledge the 
need to consider the particulars of each case.  As Allen (2000, p. xiv) observes, 
“Discretionary authority is particularly required in situations in which there is a 
multiplicity of factors to be taken into account in decisions to be made, many of 
which factors are peculiar to the particular case under consideration.” 
 Prosecutors, it should be noted, play a critical role in all mechanisms of 
juvenile waiver.  The vast discretion in prosecutorial or direct file waivers is 
certainly clear.  The significant influence prosecutors play in other forms of 
transfer must be acknowledged.  Often, a judicial waiver is initiated by a request 
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from the prosecutor.  Furthermore, the judiciary must detail grounds for refusing 
such a request for transfer.  Prosecutors are also responsible for making 
charging decisions.  They must decide whether or not to seek an indictment or 
file an information. They must also determine which charges (the severity of 
charges) will be filed with the court.  This vast discretion clearly influences how 
juveniles are processed through the justice system.  The largely unchecked 
discretion of prosecutors looms as a profoundly important aspect of American 
justice (Schiraldi, 1999; Walker, 1993). 
 
Florida’s Transfer Provisions  
The general description of exclusion mechanisms provided above varies 
to some degree from one jurisdiction to another.  Because the present study 
focuses on Florida, it is essential to review this state’s particulars.  Florida 
statutes provide three mechanisms by which a juvenile may be waived to the 
criminal justice system for prosecution.  The first mechanism is voluntary waiver.  
As set forth in Fla. Stat. § 985.226, a child can be transferred and certified as an 
adult if the child, joined by a parent, guardian, or guardian ad litem, demands in 
writing to be tried as an adult. 
 The second mechanism utilized to transfer juveniles is called involuntary 
waiver.  This approach is termed “involuntary” because rather than relying on the 
accused juvenile to determine whether he or she wants the case heard in adult 
court, cases are waived through the discretion of judges and prosecutors as 
dictated by statute.  Before enumerating the remaining mechanisms it is 
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important to clarify the language used in the statutes.  Florida's certification 
provisions repeatedly utilize words that imply an if-then relationship, such as 
must and mandatory.  However, the terminology can be misleading.  While the 
statutes utilize these terms, they are often contradicted in the specification of the 
certification method, where it becomes clear that discretion can be exercised.   
As set forth in Fla. Stat. § 985.226, there are two types of involuntary 
waiver:  discretionary waiver and mandatory waiver.  Discretionary allows the 
state attorney to file a motion with the court to request the transfer of the child for 
criminal prosecution if the child was 14 years of age or older at the time of the 
alleged offense.  This can include any offense category, but the child must be at 
least 14 years of age. 
Mandatory waiver occurs:   
1. If the child was 14 years of age or older, and if the child 
has been previously adjudicated delinquent for an act 
classified as a felony, which adjudication was for the 
commission of, attempt to commit, or conspiracy to 
commit murder, sexual battery, aggravated assault, or 
burglary with an assault or battery, and the child is 
currently charged with a second or subsequent violent 
crime against a person; or  
 
2. If the child was 14 years of age or older at the time of 
commission of a fourth or subsequent alleged felony 
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offense and the child was previously adjudicated 
delinquent or had adjudication withheld for or was found 
to have committed, or to have attempted or conspired to 
commit, three offenses that are felony offenses if 
committed by an adult, and one or more of such felony 
offenses involved the use or possession of a firearm or 
violence against a person; 
 
the state attorney shall request the court to transfer and 
certify the child for prosecution as adult or shall provide 
written reasons to the court for not making such request or 
proceed pursuant to § 985.227(1).  Upon the state attorney’s 
request, the court shall either enter an order transferring the 
case and certifying the case for trial as if the child were an 
adult or provide written reasons for not issuing such an 
order.  (Fla. Stat. § 985.226) 
  
In addition, within seven days of a petition alleging that the child has 
committed an offense, but before an adjudicatory hearing and after consideration 
of the recommendation of the juvenile probation officer, the state attorney may 
file a motion requesting the court to transfer the youth for criminal prosecution.  
This is legally defined as a discretionary provision for transfer.  Once the motion 
has been filed, and all parties are summoned, the court must conduct a hearing 
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on the transfer motions.  In making the determination to keep the case in the 
juvenile court or transfer it to the adult system, the court must consider: 
1. The seriousness of the alleged offense to the community 
and whether the protection of the community is best 
served by transferring the child for adult sanctions. 
2. Whether the alleged offense was committed in an 
aggressive, violent, premeditated, or willful manner. 
3. Whether the alleged offense was against persons or 
against property, greater weight being given to offenses 
against persons, especially if personal injury resulted. 
4. The probable cause as found in the report, affidavit, or 
complaint. 
5. The desirability of trial and disposition of the entire 
offense in one court when the child’s associates in the 
alleged crime are adults or children who are to be tried 
as adults. 
6. The sophistication and maturity of the child. 
7. The record and previous history of the child, including: 
a) Previous contacts with the department, the former 
Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, the 
Department of Children and Family Services, other law 
enforcement agencies, and courts; 
b) Prior periods of probation; 
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c) Prior adjudications that the child committed a delinquent 
act or violation of law, greater weight being given if the 
child has previously been found by a court to have 
committed a delinquent act or violation of law involving 
an offense classified as a felony or has twice previously 
been found to have committed a delinquent act or 
violation of law involving an offense classified as a 
misdemeanor; and 
d) Prior commitments to institutions. 
8. The prospects for adequate protection of the public and 
the likelihood of reasonable rehabilitation of the child, if 
the child is found to have committed the alleged offense, 
by the use of procedures, services, and facilities currently 
available to the court. (Fla. Stat. § 985.226) 
 
The last mechanism of transfer is called direct file.  “Direct file” means that 
juveniles are tried as adults because the prosecutor directly files an information 
in the criminal division of the circuit court (Fla. Stat. 985.227).  According to 
Schiraldi and Ziedenberg (2000), Florida leads the nation on this form of juvenile 
transfer.  They report a 7.8% increase in prosecutorial waiver from 1981 to 1987.  
Schiraldi and Ziedenberg (2000) also observe that the number of youths 
transferred by prosecutors to adult court in Florida nears the total number of 
judicial waivers in the United States.  Given Florida’s extensive use of this 
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method of exclusion, an explanation of Florida’s provisions for prosecutorial 
waiver or direct file are necessary.  There are two types of direct file:  mandatory 
direct file and discretionary direct file.  Mandatory direct file provisions are set 
forth in Fla. Stat. 985.227 as follows:  
a) With respect to any child who was 16 or 17 years of age 
at the time the alleged offense was committed, the state 
attorney shall file an information if the child has been 
previously adjudicated delinquent for an act classified as 
a felony, which adjudication was for the commission of, 
attempt to commit, or conspiracy to commit murder, 
sexual battery, armed or strong-armed robbery, 
carjacking, home-invasion robbery, aggravated battery, 
or aggravated assault, and the child is currently charged 
with a second or subsequent violent crime against a 
person. 
b) With respect to any child 16 or 17 years of age at the 
time an offense classified as a forcible felony, as defined 
in § 776.08, was committed, the state attorney shall file 
an information if the child has previously been 
adjudicated delinquent or had adjudication withheld for 
three acts classified as felonies each of which occurred 
at least 45 days apart from each other.  This paragraph 
does not apply when the state attorney has good cause 
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to believe that exceptional circumstances exist which 
preclude the just prosecution of the juvenile in adult 
court. 
c) The state attorney must file an information if a child, 
regardless of the child’s age at the time of the alleged 
offense was committed, is alleged to have committed an 
act that would be a violation of law if the child were an 
adult, that involves stealing a motor vehicle, including, 
but not limited to, a violation of § 812.133, relating to 
carjacking, or § 812.014(2)(c)6., relating to grand theft of 
a motor vehicle, and while the child was in possession of 
the stolen motor vehicle the child caused serious bodily 
injury to or the death of a person who was not involved in 
the underlying offense.  For purposes of this section, the 
driver and all willing passengers in the stolen motor 
vehicle at the time such serious bodily injury or death is 
inflicted shall also be subject to mandatory transfer to 
adult court.  “Stolen motor vehicle,” for the purposes of 
this section, means a motor vehicle that has been the 
subject of any criminal wrongful taking.  For purposes of 
this section, “willing passengers” means all willing 
passengers who have participated in the underlying 
offense. 
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d) 1.  With respect to any child who was 16 or 17 years of 
age at the time the alleged offense was committed, the 
state attorney shall file an information if the child has 
been charged with committing or attempting to commit an 
offense listed in § 775.087(2)(a)1.a.-q., and, during the 
commission of or attempt to commit the offense, the 
child: 
a) Actually possessed a firearm or destructive device, as 
those terms are defined in § 790.001. 
b) Discharged a firearm or destructive device, as described 
in § 775.087(2)(a)2. 
c) Discharged a firearm or destructive device, as described 
in § 775.087(2)(a)3., and as a result of the discharge, 
death or great bodily harm was inflicted upon any person.  
 
What Florida statutes term “mandatory” direct file still allows 
some discretion from prosecutors – such as what offense to charge 
and whether “exceptional circumstances” exist – but their decision 
making is more restricted than under provisions for “discretionary” 
direct file. 
  Discretionary direct file is waiver at the option of the 
prosecutor.  The statute outlines when prosecutors may exercise 
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this discretion.  As provided in Fla. Stat. § 985.227 directly filing a 
juvenile case in adult court is allowed: 
a) With respect to any child who was 14 or 15 years of age 
at the time the alleged offense was committed, the state 
attorney may file an information when in the state 
attorney’s judgment and discretion the public interest 
requires that adult sanctions be considered or imposed 
and when the offense charged is for the commission of, 
attempt to commit, or conspiracy to commit: 
1. Arson; 
2. Sexual battery; 
3. Robbery; 
4. Kidnapping; 
5. Aggravated child abuse; 
6. Aggravated assault; 
7. Aggravated stalking; 
8. Murder; 
9. Manslaughter; 
10. Unlawful throwing, placing, or discharging of a 
destructive device or bomb; 
11. Armed burglary in violation of § 810.02(2)(b) or specified 
burglary of a dwelling or structure in violation of § 
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810.02(2)(c), or burglary with an assault or battery in 
violation of § 810.02(2)(a); 
12. Aggravated battery; 
13. Any lewd or lascivious offense committed upon or in the 
presence of a person less than 16 years of age; 
14. Carrying, displaying, using, threatening, or attempting to 
use a weapon or firearm during the commission of a 
felony; 
15. Grand theft in violation of § 812.014(2)(a); 
16. Possessing or discharging any weapon or firearm on 
school property in violation of § 790.115; 
17. Home invasion robbery; 
18. Carjacking; or 
19. Grand theft of a motor vehicle in violation of § 
812.014(2)(c)6 or grand theft of a motor vehicle valued at 
$20,000 or more in violation of § 812.014(2)(b) if the child 
has a previous adjudication for grand theft of a motor 
vehicle in violation of § 812.014(2)(c)6 or § 
812.014(2)(b). 
b) With respect to any child who was 16 or 17 years of age 
at the time the alleged offense was committed, the state 
attorney may file an information when in the state 
attorney’s judgment and discretion the public interest 
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requires that adult sanctions be considered or imposed.  
However, the state attorney may not file an information 
on a child charged with a misdemeanor, unless the child 
has had at least two previous adjudications or 
adjudication withheld for delinquent acts, one of which 
involved an offense classified as a felony under state 
law. (Fla. Stat. § 985.227) 
 
  The plethora of offenses and offenders who are eligible for transfer to the 
criminal court system demand that a greater understanding of waiver decisions 
be achieved.  Specifically, while the Florida statutes provide specific guidelines 
framing discretion, a greater understanding is needed about the reality of how it 
is exercised by prosecutors in their transfer decisions.  The power of 
prosecutorial discretion was reinforced by a recent decision of the Florida 
Supreme Court.  In its 1998 decision in State of Florida v. J.M., the appellate 
Court ruled that the criminal court had exceeded its authority when it dismissed 
the prosecutor’s pre-trial petition against a minor.  The decision stated that even 
when the case involves a juvenile, “the state attorney possesses complete 
discretion in determining whether to prosecute, which includes the authority to 
continue to prosecute” (State of Florida v. J.M., a child, filed September 16, 
1998). 
Clearly prosecutors have a great deal of influence on which cases are 
transferred for adult prosecution.  However, relatively little is known about the 
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factors that are most influential in prosecutors’ decisions to waive youth to the 
adult court.  The following section helps to frame this question by reviewing what 
is known about the correlates of transfer decisions.  
 
Correlates of Transfer Decisions 
 It is clear that prosecutors have vast discretion when determining the 
course of potential criminal sanctions against an offender within the criminal and 
juvenile justice systems.  The critical decision to charge or not charge an 
offender will have an immense effect on the offender, the criminal justice system, 
and society.  As we have seen, prosecutors can influence whether a youth is 
tried as a juvenile or as an adult even when they do not make the decision on 
transfer directly.  To gain insight on how this discretion is exercised, we must 
consider what types of cases are excluded from juvenile jurisdictions. 
 Two preliminary observations about the available evidence on the 
correlates of transfer will help to clarify what we know.  First, the data are 
somewhat spotty, often being drawn from individual jurisdictions and disparate 
time periods.  Second, and more important, often the information presented 
represents indirect evidence.  Rather than determining the differential probability 
of being transferred for different demographic groups, some researchers present 
the characteristics of those who have been transferred.  Discriminatory decisions 
are therefore inferred from the end result.  Despite these limitations, some 
generalizations about who gets transferred and for what charges are possible. 
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The key correlates of transfer have been explored and four common areas 
surfaced:  offense, gender, age, and race.  The following sections will discuss 
broadly three areas concerning these correlates.  First, general patterns in who 
gets transferred are identified.  Second, any significant shifts in these patterns 
over time are distinguished.  Finally, original analyses of Florida transfer data are 
presented.  While other studies provide indirect evidence of decision making, the 
Florida data directly assess the relationships between offense and demographic 
variables and transfer.11 
Table 1.1 provides an overview of the research in studies examining the 
instant offense as a correlate of juvenile exclusion.  Generally, personal offenses 
tend to make up roughly 40-45% of the transfers to the adult criminal justice 
system (Bortner, 1986; McNulty, 1995; Podkopacz & Feld, 1995; Puzzanchera, 
2000; Snyder et al., 2000).  Most of the remaining cases for which a youth had 
been certified to the adult court involved property offenses (Bortner, 1986, 
McNulty, 1995; Puzzanchera, 2000).  Thus, while person or violent offenses have 
emerged as the most serious offense waived, there does not appear to be a 
substantial distinction between the percentage of property and person offense 
cases waived to adult court.   
 
                                            
11 These data were obtained from the Florida Department of Juvenile Justice website 
(http://www.djj.state.fl.statesnresearch/0002prof/profile.html).  Rates of transfer were computed 
by dividing the number of youths transferred by the number of youths referred in corresponding 
categories. 
 53
Table 1.1 – Studies Examining Offense as a Correlate of Juvenile Exclusion 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
          Offense Distribution 
Study    Sample   Personal  Property  Drugs    Other 
 
 
Bortner (1986)   1980-81 all transfers  47%   61%   *   * 
    In S.W. state   
 
McNulty (1995)   552 transferred youth in 45%   39%   *   * 
    1994 (Arizona)  
 
Podkopacz & Feld (1995) Studied all waiver decisions 42%   25%   *   33% 
(330) btwn 1986-1992 in 
Hennepin County, MN 
 
Puzzanchera (2000)  Judicial Waiver 
   National sample 
1989       28%   53   11   8 
1994       44   37   11   8 
1997       40   38   15   7 
 
Puzzanchera (2001)  Judicial Waiver 
    National Sample 
 1998       36   40   16   8 
 
Snyder et al.  (2000)  South Carolina  57   17   11   1512 
    All youth who waiver was           
    requested from 1985-1994 
    (595 requests) 
                                            
12 This includes other person offenses, other property offenses (other than “serious”) and public order offenses.  It should also be noted that of 
these public order offenses, only 39% were approved for waiver.  As opposed to the majority, 65-85%, being approved for other more serious 
offense categories. 
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_________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
          Offense Distribution 
Study    Sample   Personal  Property  Drugs    Other 
 
 
Snyder et al.  (2000)  Utah 1988-1995  42   20   5   3313 
 (continued)  All cases where prosecutor 
    requested juvenile waiver 
    (225 Cases) 
 
  Pennsylvania 
    Looked at changes in waiver 
    From year 1986 to year 1994. 
 1986       46   46   6   3 
 1994       49   25   22   4 
 
  Pennsyulvania   49   46      4 
    3 counties in 199614 
    (statutory exclusion) 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
                                            
13 Same as S.C.  58% of all public order requests for waiver were approved. 
14 Tracked all youth who had a prelim hearing between March 18, 1996 and December 31, 1996 and met new exclusion criteria.  Tracked youth 
until January 1998.  Legislation concerned use of weapons during offense. 
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Two trends in transfer across offense have emerged over the last 15 or so 
years.  First, juvenile exclusions for drug offenses as the most serious charging 
offense have increased from the mid-1980s to the late 1990s (Puzzanchera, 
2000; Snyder et al., 2000).  The increase in waiver for drug offenses is not 
surprising due to the “war on drugs” as well as the emergence of zero tolerance 
policies on drug use across the country.  The second discernable change is in 
“other” offenses being the most serious charge for juvenile exclusions.  As 
represented in the studies in Table 1.1, "other offenses" generally include non-
serious person and property offenses and public order offenses.  While the 
representation of "other" offenses among transferred youths has remained 
relatively constant nationally (Puzzanchera, 2000), some jurisdictions have 
noticed a marked increase in this offense-category for waiver (Snyder et al., 
2000).  This shift may reflect legislative trends that have tended to be more 
inclusive of juvenile offenders eligible for juvenile exclusion (Snyder et al., 2000). 
Offense history also impacts the waiver decision.  Poulos and Orchowsky 
(1994) found that the most important predictor of waiver was the number of prior 
adjudications that an offender had.  Indicating that while the most serious offense 
is a significant determinant of transfer, so too is the number of prior offenses.  
Dawson (2000) provides insight into how this relationship emerges.  He found 
that prior offense information interacts with the seriousness of the current charge.  
When the instant offense is a serious charge, prior offenses do not play a role in 
the determination to transfer a youth.  However, when the current charging 
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offense is not as serious, particularly for property offenses, prior record plays a 
significant role in the determination to waive a youth.   
 General observations about the proportion of youth being waived and 
changes over time are readily available in the existing data on juvenile waivers.  
More difficult to ascertain is the rate or probability of transfer across the identified 
variables.  In order to clarify this issue, bivariate analyses were conducted on 
aggregate data from the Florida Department of Juvenile Justice 
(http://www.djj.state.fl.statesnresearch/0002prof/profile.html).  Table 1.2, which is 
based on youths processed in 2001-2002, separates the data by offense 
category.  Columns show the number of youth transferred to the adult court, the 
percentage of transfer, the number of youth referred, and the rate of transfer. 
 It is important to note that upon initial inspection, Florida mirrors research 
in other settings.  The percentages of transfers by offense-type are consistent 
with prior research both nationally and at local and state levels.  Serious personal 
offenses account for the largest portion of transfers, with serious property 
offenses running a close second.  The rate of transfer by offense-type, however, 
paints a different picture of the nature of the impact of the instant offense on the 
exclusion decision.  For example, serious property offenses make up a large 
percentage of youth excluded from juvenile court; yet, they are not the most likely 
offense to be excluded.  In contrast, drug offenses account for only 15% of all 
excluded youths because of the relatively small number of referrals for drugs.  
Taking this base into consideration reveals that drugs are the offense for which 
transfer is the most likely in Florida.  One in every ten youths referred for drugs in 
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2001-2002 was waived to the adult court.  Following close to drug offenses are 
serious person offenses with a rate of transfer of 9.16%. 
 
Table 1.2 – Florida’s Waiver By Offense (2001-2002)15 
________________________________________________________________ 
   Number  Percent   Number   Rate 
   Transferred      of   Referred     of 
      Transfers              Transfer 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Serious Person  1,344   40.4%   14,669   9.16% 
Offenses 
 
 
Serious Property 1,218   36.6%   21,811   5.58% 
Offenses 
 
Drug Offenses  514   15.4%    5,133  10.01% 
 
Other Offenses  251    7.5%    6,896   3.64% 
 
 
 When gender is examined as a correlate of waiver decisions, findings 
across studies are highly consistent. Males are considerably more likely to be 
requested for waiver, and they are waived more often than females (Bishop, 
Frazier, and Henretta, 1989; Bortner, 1986; Puzzanchera, 2000; Snyder et al., 
2000).  Bortner (1986) looked at all waived youths in a county in a southwestern 
state.  She found that nearly 97% of those youths were male.  Similarly, Bishop, 
Frazier and Henretta (1989) report that 92% of direct file cases from 1981 to 
                                            
15 For the purposes of this analysis, “serious person offenses included murder/manslaughter, 
attempted murder, sexual battery, other felony sexual offenses, armed robbery, other robbery, 
and aggravated assault/battery.  “Serious property offenses” includes arson, burglary, auto theft, 
and grand larceny.  “Drug offenses” include felony non-marijuana drug and marijuana felony.  
“Other offenses” include receiving stolen property, concealed weapon, forgery, escape, resisting 
arrest with violence, shooting/throwing missiles, felony traffic offenses, and other felony.  
Misdemeanor offenses utilized as the most serious offense for exclusion were not included in this 
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1984 in Florida involved male youths.  Nationally, Puzzanchera (2000) found that 
95% of all juvenile waivers involved males.  Snyder et al.  (2000) found similar 
rates of males represented among youths waived in South Carolina, Utah, and 
Pennsylvania (95%, 96%, and 99%, respectively).  Notably, they found a 
decrease in female waiver from 1986 to 1994 in Pennsylvania.  In 1986, female 
offenders made up four percent of the waived youths.  In 1994, they only 
constituted one percent of the youths transferred to the adult court.   
Clearly, there are more male than female youths being transferred to the 
adult court.  However, the existing research merely reports the gender 
distribution of cases already waived.  To gain a better understanding of the true 
nature of the effect of gender on transfer decisions, the rate of waiver by gender 
must be ascertained.  Looking at Table 1.3, we gain a better understanding of the 
impact of gender on waiver.  In 2001-2002, 93.5% of all transfers in Florida were 
male.  So, among those transferred, males outnumber females 14 to 1, but the 
rate at which males are transferred is only about 5 times that of females.  Thus, 
when the substantially larger number of male youths referred is taken into 
account (110,413 versus 39,245 female referrals), the disparity between males 
and females transferred is much smaller than what the distribution of transferred 
cases indicates.  Florida’s data suggest that sex does have an effect on the 
waiver decision, although we still have to consider the possibility that the sex 
effect can be explained away by offense or something else. 
 
                                                                                                                                  
analysis, nor were other non-serious “other” offenses as categorized by Florida Department of 
Juvenile Justice due to the relatively small number of cases. 
 59
 
 
Table 1.3 – Florida’s Waiver By Gender (2001-2002) 
 
 
   Number  Percent   Number   Rate 
   Transferred      of   Referred     of 
      Transfers              Transfer 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
MALE   3,489   93.5%   110,413 3.160% 
FEMALE     243    6.5%    39,245  0.619% 
 
 
A youth's age also seems to figure prominently in decisions to exclude.  
The results from prior studies are consistent:  older youths are waived more often 
than youger youths.  Puzzanchera (2000) found that, nationally, the vast majority 
of youth waived to adult court were 16 or older (87% in 1997).  Research on 
individual jurisdictions parallels Puzzanchera’s national figures.  Generally, most 
youths transferred to the adult system are 16 or 17 years old  (Kinder, 
Veneziano, Fichter and Azuma, 1995; McNulty, 1996; Poulos and Orchowsky, 
1994; Snyder et al., 2000).  
While the majority of youth transferred are 16 or older, there has been a 
slight increase in the representation of youth under 16 years of age among those 
waived to the adult court.  Puzzanchera (2000) reports national figures showing 
that, in 1988, 93% of all juveniles waived to the adult courts were 16 or older.  By 
1997, waived juveniles 16 or older accounted for only 87% of cases.  Frazier et 
al.  (1999) reported a similar pattern in Florida.  With the authorization of direct 
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file in 199416, the number of youths age 14 and 15 transferred increased between 
1992-1993 and 1995-1996 from 731 youths to 921 youths.17 Similarly, 
Pennsylvania saw an increase in younger youths waived as a result of their 
legislative reforms.  The number of youth 15 or younger waived to the adult court 
increased from 10% in 1986 to 20% in 1994 (Snyder et al., 2000). 
 Turning to analysis of Florida data, an overwhelming majority of the youths 
waived to the adult court in 2001-2002 were 16 or older.  Almost none were 
under 14 years old.  The rate of transfer also follows this pattern (see Table 1.4).  
Older youths are considerably more likely to be transferred than are younger 
youths.     
 
Table 1.4 – Florida’s Waiver By Age (2001-2002) 
 
   Number  Percent   Number   Rate 
   Transferred      of   Referred     of 
      Transfers               Transfer 
 
AGE  
0-9          0          0%     1,606  0.00%  
 
10          0          0%     1,517  0.00% 
 
11          0          0%     3,459  0.00% 
 
12          3     0.08%     7,793  0.04% 
 
13        11     0.29%   14,066  0.08% 
 
14      104     2.27%   21,367  0.49% 
 
15      250     6.69%   28,126  0.89% 
 
16   1,068   28.62%   33,315  3.20% 
 
                                            
16 Known as the Juvenile Justice Reform Act, these 1994 reforms made several changes to the 
mechanism of transfer for youth, including direct file for 14 and 15 year old youths charged with a 
range of person or property offenses. 
17 The rate of transfer went from 2.6% in 1992-1993 to 2.7% in 1994-1996.  Yet in 1996-1997, the 
rate of transfer for youths 14 and 15 decreased to 2.2%. 
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   Number  Percent  Number Rate 
   Transferred       of   Referred     of 
      Transfers              Transfer 
 
AGE 
17   2,090   56.00%   35,100  5.95% 
 
18+      206     5.52%     3,309  6.23% 
 
 
 
 Race, above all the other characteristics of waived and waive requested 
youthful defendants, has been at the heart of most research and debate about 
certification of juveniles.  The issue of race as a correlate of transfer is not as 
uncomplicated as offense, gender and age as correlates.  Rather, explaining the 
effects of race on criminal justice outcomes is complex (see Bortner et al., 2000).  
Typically, the research on race and juvenile justice decision-making suffers from 
two primary flaws.  First, the research often examines race as a black-white 
dichotomy and does not attend to other races or ethnicities.  In some studies, 
Latinos, American Indians, and Asian/Pacific Islanders are simply excluded from 
analysis.  The research that does attempt to make a distinction between race and 
ethnicity also falls short. Latinos and American Indians may be included within 
the analysis, but are classified as white (Bortner et al., 2000).   
Second, findings and discussions regarding race tend to oversimplify the 
relationship.  Specifically, looking at race and its effects in the justice system 
does not typically include a more salient aspect of this dimension – social 
classifications or status.  While identifying race and ethnicity are often plausible 
for researchers, data on the social status of an offender, particularly a juvenile 
offender, is not readily available (Bortner et al., 2000).  As a consequence, the 
 62
possible intercorrelation of race and social status is largely ignored.  Discussions 
and implications regarding racial biases within the system, therefore, can be 
misleading.  These limitations must be considered when examining the existing 
literature on the nature of race and juvenile transfer.   
Table 1.5 identifies the research regarding race and transfer.  Several 
general observations can be made.  Nationally, whites represent a little over half 
of all youth waived (Puzzanchera, 2000).  Blacks represent a little less than half 
of those transferred.  While the national pattern is somewhat clear, the findings 
do not differentiate by ethnicity.  Moving away from national data, the issue of 
race becomes more fragmented.  Research that focuses on more specific 
geographic areas paints quite a different picture of the demographics of waived 
youth.  For example, Thomas and Bilchick (1985) looked at 844 waived youth in 
Dade County, Florida, through direct file and judicial waiver.  They found that 
67% of waived youth were non-white.  In South Carolina, blacks represented 
80% of youth requested for waiver between 1985 and 1994 (Snyder et al., 2000).  
In Utah between 1988 and 1995, whites made up 57% percent of all youth 
requested for transfer (Snyder et al., 2000).  More telling, blacks only 
represented 5%; while, Hispanic and “other” youth made up 37%.  At least in 
Utah, it is important to distinguish Hispanic youths from black and white youths.   
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Table 1.5 - Studies Examining Race and Ethnicity as Correlates of Juvenile Exclusion 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
           Race  Distribution 
Study    Sample   White   Black   Hispanic  Other 
 
 
Thomas and Bilchick (1985) 844 waived youth;     67% non-white18 
    Dade County, FL 
    Direct file and judicial waiver      
 
Bortner (1986)   1980-81 all transfers 
In AZ county (214 waived 
    Youth) judicial waiver  52.2%   23.5%   20.6% (Mexican) 3.5% 
 
Barnes & Franz (1989)  NC County (1978-83) 
    206 considered for waiver    55% black or Hispanic considered unfit 
    through judicial waiver    for juvenile court 
                
 
Podkopacz & Feld (1995) Studied all waiver decisions 28%   55%      17% 
(330) between 1986-1992 in 
Hennepin County, MN 
Judicial Waiver 
 
Puzzanchera (2000)  Judicial Waiver 
   National sample 
1988       55%   43%      2% 
1994       48%   48%      4% 
1997       50%   46%      4% 
 
 
 
 
                                            
18 Note S.W. State demographics.  Large Hispanic population, depending on the county (more southern) will have larger numbers of Hispanic 
residents. 
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____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
           Race  Distribution 
Study    Sample   White   Black   Hispanic  Other 
 
 
Puzzanchera (2001)  Judicial Waiver 
    National Sample 
 1998       55%   42%      3% 
 
Snyder et al.  (2000)  South Carolina  20%   80%      1% 
    All youth who waiver was           
    requested from 1985-1994 
    (595 requests) 
 
Snyder et al.  (2000)  Utah 1988-1995  57%   5%   27%   10% 
    All cases where prosecutor 
    requested juvenile waiver 
    (225 Cases) 
 
Snyder et al.  (2000)  Pennsylvania 
    Looked at changes in waiver 
    From year 1986 to year 1994. 
 1986       38%   50%   12%   3% 
 1994       28%   60%   10%   4% 
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____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
           Race  Distribution 
Study    Sample   White   Black   Hispanic  Other 
 
 
Snyder et al.  (2000)  Pennysylvania      81%19       
    3 counties in 199620 
 
    (statutory exclusion) 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
                                            
19 This study looked at juveniles excluded based on new legislation regarding weapons used during the commission of the instant offense.  
Researchers only reported the percentage of blacks being excluded. 
20 Tracked all youth who had a prelim hearing between March 18, 1996 and December 31, 1996 and met new exclusion criteria.  Tracked youth 
until January 1998. 
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Looking at changes over time, it appears that blacks are a growing portion 
of excluded youths.  Puzzanchera (2000) found that blacks represented 43% of 
waivers in 1988 and increased to 46% of the waivers in 1997 nationally.  Snyder 
et al.  (2000) found similar results in Pennsylvania.  From 1986 to 1994 blacks 
went from 50% of juveniles waived to 60% of waived youth. 
Table 1.6 shows the original analysis of Florida data.  In terms of all 
youths transferred, blacks made up nearly 57% of the transferred youth in Florida 
between 2001-2002.  This figure is fairly consistent with many of the studies 
shown in Table 1.5.  More telling is the rate of transfer by ethnicity (see Table 
1.6).  Not only are blacks -- at a rate of nearly 3.5% -- more likely to be 
transferred to the adult court than whites, but all other ethnicities in Florida are 
more likely to be transferred than are whites. 
 
Table 1.6 – Florida’s Waiver By Race (2001-2002) 
 
 
   Number  Percent   Number   Rate 
   Transferred      of   Referred     of 
      Transfers              Transfer 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
White   1,606   43.03%   87,620  1.83% 
Black   2,103   56.35%   61,221  3.44% 
Asian        15     0.40%        525  2.86% 
Other21          8     0.21%        292  2.74% 
 
 
 
In summary, the existing research on the correlates of juvenile exclusion 
suggest that transfer is more likely for youths who are older, black or hispanic, or 
male and for those who have prior offenses or are currently facing charges for 
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drug or serious personal crimes.  Two aspects of the aforementioned studies, 
however, should be noted.  First, the relationship between race and transfer has 
often been explained away by other factors such as prior offenses and age 
(Poulos and Orchowsky, 1994), current offense type (Podkopacz and Feld, 
1996), and prosecutor's emphasis on violent crime (Podkopacz and Feld, 1995).  
Second, all of the studies reviewed have relied on official data.  Thus, they are 
restricted in the types of variables they can examine and in how the 
characteristics of interest are operationalized.  As Applegate et al.  (2000) have 
observed, the salient considerations influencing juvenile justice decision-making 
frequently are missing from or are operationalized poorly in official data (also see 
Sanborn, 1996).   
While there are some striking results regarding race and gender, 
particularly in Florida, the geographic location for the current study, conclusions 
regarding these findings should be drawn cautiously. Disparity does not 
necessitate discrimination.  The interactions between race or gender and other 
dimensions of this issue may not be readily available or were not considered in 
past studies.  The determinants of juvenile waiver, particularly regarding extra-
legal variables need to be further explored using other data sources. 
  
Views of Juvenile Transfer 
 The discussions reviewed earlier demonstrate some facts essential to 
framing the current study.  Waiver may occur in several ways, alternative visions 
for the future of juvenile justice have been offered, and we know some of the 
                                                                                                                                  
21 “Other” includes Native Americans, Pacific Islanders, and Other (not defined in data provided). 
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correlates of decisions.  As scholars and professionals weigh possible changes 
to the way serious juvenile offenders are treated, a central concern is the policy 
space that exists for alternatives.  The degree of support for or opposition to 
transferring juveniles to adult court can constrain policy choices.  It is also likely 
that the correlates of transfer may reflect professional sentiments.  It, therefore, is 
essential to consider what views are held regarding this issue.  
 Broadly, this discussion is divided into two parts.  First, this section will 
review available research on the public’s perception of the juvenile court, 
sanctioning of youthful offenders, and juvenile exclusion.  Second, practitioners’ 
views will be examined regarding the issue of transfer.  Although public attitudes 
are not the focus of the current research, they are relevant in two ways.  Because 
prosecutors ostensibly represent "the people," broadly construed, public 
preference may help shape their decisions.  Also, the available research on 
practitioners' opinions on juvenile exclusion is extremely sparse.  Reviewing 
studies of the public, therefore, helps to flesh out what we may expect in 
assessing prosecutors. 
 
Public Perceptions of Juvenile Exclusion 
 Consensus theory contends that criminal justice policies generally reflect 
commonly held societal views about how to deal with offenders.  As noted in 
previous discussions, the philosophy of the juvenile court has undergone several 
shifts or changes.  Recent legislation tends to reflect a more punitive response 
toward youthful offenders.  However, most of these legislative efforts are geared 
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toward serious, violent youthful offenders.  According to consensus theory, public 
attitudes regarding youth crime would mirror these initiatives.   
Table 1.7 depicts the salient research in public attitudes toward 
certification of youthful offenders to the adult criminal justice system.  Based on 
the review of this literature, several findings emerge.  First, in general, the public 
supports transferring serious, youthful offenders to the adult criminal justice 
system (King-Davis, Applegate, & Cullen, 2003; Sprott, 1998).  The research 
findings indicate that people support transferring youth when given global 
questions or statements about transferring serious, youthful offenders.   
Using a nationally representative sample, for example, Triplett (1996) 
looked at public support for waiver of juvenile offenders to the adult criminal 
justice system. An overwhelming majority of the respondents agreed or strongly 
agreed that youths charged with a serious property crime, serious drug crime, or 
serious violent crime should be tried as adults (62%, 69%, and 87%, 
respectively).  The response to these offenders tends to indicate that the public is 
still in a “get tough” mentality and has relatively little patience with certain 
categories of offenders. 
Second, the level of support varies depending on the type of offense 
presented to the respondent.  Public support for transfer is highest for serious, 
violent offenses.  Selling large quantities of drugs and property offenses tend to 
elicit somewhat lower levels of preference for exclusion (Bouley and Wells, 2001; 
Mears, 2001; Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz, Guo, and Kerbs, 1993; Triplett, 1996; 
Wu, 2000).  Thus, the public is generally quite supportive of transfer and the level 
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of support for transfer is related to the type of offense presented to the 
respondent.  
  Third, some distinction can be made between public views on trying 
youths as adults and punishing youths as adults.  The salience of separating 
these issues is raised by Feld's (1992) assertion that youths should be tried by 
the adult system but their age should result in mitigated sentences.  The 
evidence on public preferences is equivocal.  
Sprott (1998) investigated Canadian public opinion regarding transfer of 
juveniles to the adult criminal justice system and the degree to which the public 
supported a separate youth system.22  Sixty-eight percent of her respondents 
were opposed to a separate court for juvenile justice.  Of those who opposed the 
separate system, nearly 94 percent maintained that the current juvenile court 
dispositions were not as harsh as they needed to be. Those who opposed the 
separate juvenile court system believed that juvenile sanctions should be similar 
to adult sanctions.  That is, they maintained that the punishment should fit the 
crime irrespective of age.  Generally, they believed that youth should be 
sentenced like adults.  However, the support for more severe treatment of youth 
crime did not extend far beyond this point. There was little support for sentencing 
youth with adults.   
In contrast, Schwartz's (1992) analysis revealed little support for 
sentencing juveniles as adults or to adult prisons.  More broadly, Moon, Sundt, 
Cullen, and Wright (2000) sought to develop a better understanding of the 
                                            
22 Canada has similar transfer provisions to the United States regarding certification of juveniles 
to the adult criminal justice system. 
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degree to which the public perceives juveniles as being distinct from adults and 
deserving distinct treatment from the justice system.  Mail-out surveys were sent 
to 1,500 people in Tennessee with 539 usable surveys being returned.  Almost 
two-thirds of the respondents indicated that they believed the goal of imprisoning 
juveniles is rehabilitation. This ideology is indicative of the individualized 
adjudication intended in the inception of the juvenile justice system.  Yet, 
respondents were also quite supportive of punitive or just deserts oriented 
approaches to youthful offenders.  There was little support for incarcerating 
juveniles for long periods of time without some underlying rehabilitative purpose; 
suggesting that, while the public supports punitive treatment of youthful 
offenders, they seem to view most youth as being distinct from adult offenders.   
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Table 1.7 – Public Views of Juvenile Exclusion 
 
 
Study      Question Asked23       % Favoring Transfer 
 
 
King-Davis et al. (2003)    Juveniles who commit violent crimes should be tried as adults  73.2% 
       
      Scenarios describing specific youthful offender with varied  40.3%  
      attributes.  Should case should be handled in juvenile or 
adult court?  
 
 
Bouley  & Wells (2001)    Should juveniles who commit the following crimes  
be tried as adults:  
 
       Serious property crime      64.8%  
       
       Violent offenses      71.3%  
    
       Selling illegal drugs      90.0%  
 
Wu (2000)     “Juvenile tried as adult for property crime”    68.3%    
 
      “Juvenile tried as adult for drug crime”     73.5% 
  
      “Juveniles tried as adult for violent crime”    90.8%  
       
Schwartz (1992)    How should juveniles who commit X be handled: 
 
      Serious property crimes       almost 50% 
       
      Selling large amounts of drugs      62% 
 
                                            
23 Some questions asked have been paraphrased.  Exact questions are in quotations. 
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Study      Question Asked       % Favoring Transfer 
 
 
      Serious violent crimes       68% 
 
      Juveniles found guilty of committing X crime should be 
      punished: 
       
      Serious property crimes       97% 
 
      Selling large amounts of drugs      97% 
 
      Serious violent crimes       99% 
  
Schwartz, Guo, Kerbs (1993)   Do you strongly agree or strongly disagree to trying juveniles 
in adult court? 
       
      Serious violent crimes (Part I violent crimes)    67% 
   
      Part I property crimes       50% 
 
      Sale of illicit drugs in large quantity     62% 
 
Schiraldi & Soler (1998)    “Current law gives federal judges the authority to decide whether  
a juvenile will be prosecuted in juvenile or adult criminal court.  
This bill would give federal prosecutors total discretion, not  
subject to review by a federal judge, to try juveniles as adults 
for all felonies.  Would you agree strongly, agree somewhat,  
disagree somewhat, or disagree strongly that federal prosecutors 
should have total discretion to try juveniles as adults for all  
felonies?”        41%  
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____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Study      Question Asked       % Favoring Transfer 
 
 
Sprott (1998)     “Do you think that young persons charged with criminal offenses 
Ontario, Canada    should continue to be handled in a separate youth justice 
      system, or do you think that they should be dealt with in the adult 
      justice system?”       64% oppose 
               separate system 
 
Triplett (1996)     “Tell me for each of the following statements whether you  
strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, 
or strongly disagree:”       
 
“A juvenile charged with a serious property crime should be tried 
as an adult”        62%  
 
“A juvenile charged with selling illegal drugs should be tried as an 
 adult”         69% 
 
“A juvenile charged with a serious violent crime should be tried as 
 an adult”        87% 
 
Mears (2001)     “Juveniles should be tried as adults if charged with” 
       
      Selling illegal drugs       70% 
 
      Committing a property crime      64% 
 
      Committing a violent crime      87% 
 
Stalans and Henry (1994)   Specific scenarios varying homicide-offender characteristics  25-76.4% 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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In the abstract, the public wants violent youthful offenders to be tried as 
adults.  Closer inspection of the available data, however, yields variation on 
support for juvenile exclusion.  While this type of research is hardly exhaustive, 
several studies have identified the ways people’s attitudes vary and variables 
correlated with the degree of support for juvenile exclusion.    
 The extant research was examined to identify how the demographics of 
youthful offenders may affect public support of waiver.  Schwartz (1992) 
examined the degree to which the public varied in support for trying youth as 
adults across age.  The question posed was:  “At what age do you think a person 
accused of a crime should be brought before an adult criminal court rather than a 
juvenile court?” (Schwartz, 1992, p. 222).  Support for excluding youth who were 
fifteen or younger was 16 percent.  Youths sixteen and older accused of a crime 
received 84 percent support for transfer.  Stalans and Henry (1994) reported 
similar results.  For both first-time and repeat offenders, respondents were 
significantly more likely to recommend adult court for 16-year-old youth than for 
14-year-old youth.  King-Davis et al. (2003) did not find significant differences in 
preferences for transfer by age, but exclusion was endorsed more strongly for 
youths who were perceived as more mature.  Relatedly, Moon, Wright, Cullen, 
and Pealer (2000) looked at support for the death penalty for youthful offenders; 
the ultimate juvenile certification.  They found that the public who supports capital 
punishment are generally willing to sentence relatively young offenders to death.  
For example, they found that nearly 25% of capital punishment supporters did 
not think there should be a minimum age to sentence a youth to death.  Almost 
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half (43.8%) supported capital punishment for twelve-year-olds, and an 
overwhelming 85.6% of those who favored the death penalty for at least some 
juveniles supported capital punishment for youths aged sixteen and older. 
 The juvenile's age is not the only factor that has been examined.  The 
more exhaustive research on how offender characteristics affect support of 
juvenile waiver was done in Georgia with randomly selected adult residents 
through telephone interviews.  Stalans and Henry (1994) conducted a study 
examining effects of offender and offense characteristics on support for transfer.  
They found that prior convictions of the youth were significantly related to support 
for recommending adult court for youth charged with a killing.  Youths with two 
relatively serious prior convictions (a conviction of theft and a conviction of 
breaking an arm of another teenager) received significantly more support for 
waiver.  Past abuse of the youthful offenders was also significant in predicting 
support for transfer.  Respondents were significantly more supportive of transfer 
to the adult court for both first-time offenders and youth with prior convictions 
who were not abused as compared to the same youth who had a history of 
abuse.  Stalans and Henry (1994) suggest that their findings are contrary to 
certain provisions of juvenile certification.  The researchers suggests that this is 
one example of how legislative provisions are contrary to public sentiment. 
The above research demonstrates that variations in the youthful offender’s 
characteristics influence support of waiver.  Other research has examined the 
extent to which the respondent’s demographics influence support of juvenile 
transfer.  Table 1.8 presents the extant research in this area.   
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Table 1.8 – Respondent Demographic Correlates of Public Views of Juvenile Exclusion 
 
 
Study Male White Age Conservative Married Education Income Fear 
Of 
Crime 
Have  
Children 
 
Schwartz,  
Guo, and Kerbs 
(1993) 
          Drugs 
          Property 
          Violent 
 
 
 
 
+ 
+ 
0 
 
 
 
 
0 
0 
0 
 
 
 
 
0 
+ 
0 
 
 
 
 
NA 
NA 
NA 
 
 
 
 
NA 
NA 
NA 
 
 
 
 
- 
- 
0 
 
 
 
 
NA 
NA 
NA 
 
 
 
 
+ 
+ 
+ 
 
 
 
 
0 
0 
0 
 
Bouley and  
Wells (2001) 
          Drugs 
          Property 
          Violent 
 
 
 
0 
0 
0 
 
 
0 
0 
+ 
 
 
0 
0 
0 
 
 
NA 
NA 
NA 
 
 
- 
0 
0 
 
 
0 
0 
0 
 
 
0 
- 
0 
 
 
0 
0 
0 
 
 
NA 
NA 
NA 
Triplett (1996) 
          Drugs 
          Property 
          Violent 
 
 
0 
0 
0 
 
0 
0 
0 
 
+ 
0 
0 
 
+ 
0 
0 
 
NA 
NA 
NA 
 
0 
0 
0 
 
0 
0 
0 
 
NA 
NA 
NA 
 
NA 
NA 
NA 
Wu (2000) 
          Drugs 
          Property 
          Violent 
 
0 
+ 
0 
 
0 
0 
0 
 
+ 
0 
0 
 
0 
0 
0 
 
0 
0 
0 
 
0 
- 
0 
 
0 
0 
0 
 
0 
0 
0 
 
NA 
NA 
NA 
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Study Male White Age Conservative Married Education Income Fear 
Of 
Crime 
Have  
Children 
King-Davis et al. 
(2003)                 
 
 
+ 
 
 
 
0 
 
0 
 
+ 
 
NA 
 
0 
 
NA 
 
NA 
 
- 
 
Mears (2001) 
          Drugs 
          Property 
          Violent 
 
 
0 
+ 
0 
 
 
0 
0 
0 
 
 
0 
+ 
0 
 
 
0 
0 
0 
 
 
+ 
+ 
+ 
 
 
- 
- 
- 
 
 
+ 
0 
0 
 
 
NA 
NA 
NA 
 
 
0 
0 
0 
 
 
 
+ = positively related 
-  = negatively related 
NA = not examined 
0 = not related 
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The majority of the research in this area has found that demographics of 
respondents and support for transfer are unrelated.  The public's characteristics 
addressed in this area of research are respondent gender, race, age, political 
affiliation, marital status, level of education, income, fear of crime, and having 
children.  Male respondents are much more likely than female respondents to 
support transfer of youth to the adult court, particularly for property offenders 
(King-Davis et al., 2003; Mears, 2001; Schwartz, Guo, and Kerbs, 1993; Wu, 
2000).  The race of the respondent was significantly related to support of transfer 
in only one identified study; whites were more favorable toward exclusion (Bouley 
and Wells, 2001).  Older members of society tend to be more supportive of 
transfer of drug offenders (Triplett, 1996; Wu, 2000).  Mears (2001) and 
Schwartz, Guo, and Kerbs (1993) also report a positive relationship between age 
and support for transferring property offenders.  Political ideology was found to 
be significant in predicting support of waiver in two studies (King-Davis et al., 
2003; Triplett, 1996).  Findings regarding martial status were not as consistent 
across these studies.  Mears (2001) found that people who were married were 
significantly more likely to support waiver than those who were unwed.  However, 
Bouley and Wells (2001) found a negative relationship between being married 
and support for waiver for drug offenders.  Level of education also tends to be 
negatively related to support for transfer.  Less educated members of the public 
are more supportive of waiver of youth than people with higher levels of 
education.  Finally, having children yielded no significant predictions of support 
for juvenile waiver.  Although not entirely consistent, the findings suggest that 
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people who are older, single, less educated, non-minority, and male hold more 
favorable views toward transferring juveniles. 
 Several common conclusions can be drawn from the research on public 
opinion toward juvenile justice issues.  There is an underlying sense that 
punishment must be served.  Furthermore, it seems apparent that citizens 
typically favor juveniles being waived to the adult court for particularly serious 
offenses.  Even for juveniles accused of serious offenses, however, the public 
acknowledges differences between youths and adults.  The public has not 
become so disenchanted with the idea of malleability as to demand the same 
punishments for juveniles as for adults. 
 
Practitioners’ Views of Juvenile Waiver 
The previous section examined the public’s view of juvenile certification to 
the adult court.  In an effort to better understand current and future directions of 
the juvenile court and the appropriate role of juvenile waiver, scholars have 
examined practitioners’ views of juvenile justice.  Only a few studies have 
examined specific approaches and decision-making by juvenile justice 
practitioners in an effort to better understand the ideology of those practitioners 
as well as how those ideologies impact dispositions of youth.  Applegate, Turner, 
Sanborn, Latessa, and Moon (2000) mailed questionnaires to 106 juvenile court 
judges in Ohio in an effort to determine the characteristics of a juvenile court 
case that has the most impact on the judge’s decision to commit an offender to a 
state facility.  Specifically, the authors sought to determine whether judges use 
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social as well as legal factors when making commitment decisions.  Sixty-five 
percent (N = 69) of the judges participated in the study.  The respondents were 
provided with a factorial vignette and asked to indicate how likely it was that they 
would commit the juvenile offender to a state facility on a scale of zero to 100 
percent.   
Analysis indicated that several legal and social factors are significant in 
explaining the decision to commit a youth to a state facility.  The legal factors that 
influenced the judges’ decision to commit included the seriousness of the 
offense, measured by both the degree of felony and harm caused to or loss 
suffered by the victim, whether or not the youth had a prior felony on his or her 
record, and the number of times the youth had been adjudicated prior to the 
current offense.  The social factors that were predictors of commitment were the 
age of the youth (older youth being more likely to be committed) and whether 
families were willing to participate and cooperate with the court.  Although the 
decision to commit a youth is distinct from the decision to transfer, Applegate et 
al.  (2000) asserted that the dominance of legal factors in explaining judges’ 
decisions suggests an orientation closer to the adult criminal justice system than 
the parens patriae guided juvenile system envisioned at the turn of the 20th 
century. 
The above study implies that practitioners may support handling at least 
some youthful offenders as adults.  A more direct assessment, however, is 
necessary before such a conclusion is warranted.  Bishop, Frazier, and Henretta 
(1989) conducted telephoned interviews with the key prosecutor in charge of 
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transfer policy in each of Florida's judicial districts.  Their research focused on 
several attitudes toward the juvenile justice system, perspectives on avenues of 
juvenile certification, why youth are certified, and why youth are not certified.  
The majority of the prosecutors, as indicated through close-ended questions, 
thought that transfer provisions were adequate.  However, through open-ended 
questions, half thought the law should have been more far-reaching, particularly 
with regard to the ability to certify youth younger than 16 years of age.  The other 
half of respondents were concerned that too much discretion might open the door 
for instances of abuse.  Specifically, prosecutors opposed to greater expansion in 
juvenile certification criteria were concerned that less ethical prosecutors may 
use the direct-file provision inappropriately.  The reason for this concern was the 
lack of formal standards concerning direct-file.24  A slight majority of the 
respondents supported the principles of the juvenile justice system, while the 
remainder expressed disdain for a separate youth system.  Virtually all of the 
prosecutors, regardless of their opinion regarding the juvenile justice system, 
reported an increase in juvenile certification after the change in law enacting 
direct-file provisions. 
Prosecutors were also asked to cite the criteria used for determining 
whether to file in criminal court.  All respondents indicated a large emphasis on 
two variables:  seriousness of the offense and a youth's prior adjudications of 
delinquency.  Age of the youth was also cited as figuring heavily into the transfer 
decision.  In Florida, the juvenile court jurisdiction over most youthful offenders 
                                            
24 Bishop et al.  (1989) note that only one jurisdiction (Miami-Dade County) has formal policies 
concerning juvenile certification through direct-file provisions. 
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ends at age 19.  Prosecutors indicated a propensity to transfer youths who were 
close to their 18th birthdays, because they were uncomfortable with the brief 
jurisdiction the system would have otherwise.  Prosecutors also indicated an 
inclination to file charges in the criminal court when, during the commission of the 
crime, the youth was accompanied by an adult accomplice.  To these 
respondents, the presence of an adult accomplice indicated that the youth was 
more mature and criminally sophisticated.   Finally, prosecutors indicated that 
once a transfer decision had been made on one youth, for severity of offense or 
prior record, any juvenile accomplices also would be seriously considered for 
transfer to ensure equitable treatment. 
Prosecutors were then asked to indicate reasons for making the decision 
not to transfer a youth to criminal court.  Prosecutors indicated that "boyish" 
youth or young defendants are not good candidates (Bishop et al., 1989, p. 189).  
They reasoned that acquittal of such defendants was probable in the adult 
system due to juror biases.   
The only other study specifically on the issue of professionals’ views of 
excluding youth from the juvenile court is provided by Sanborn (1994b).  Sanborn 
sought to gain a better understanding of whether juvenile court workers, including 
judges, assistant district attorneys, public defenders, social workers assisting 
public defenders, and probation officers, perceived juvenile waiver to be an 
appropriate response to juvenile crime, what they believed were the appropriate 
reasons for certification (e.g. beyond rehabilitation, protection of society, 
seriousness of offense, deterrence, and conserve resources), and who they 
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thought were appropriate candidates for waiver or certification.  He conducted 
interviews with 100 workers in three juvenile court settings (one large urban area, 
one suburban area, and one rural area). 
An overwhelming 88% of the workers interviewed indicated that waiver to 
the adult court was needed.  The respondents were asked to identify appropriate 
candidates for waiver.  Respondents indicated an overwhelming agreement with 
the jurisdictional age of the juvenile court (89%).  The majority of respondents 
(91%) also agreed that the minimum age of transfer should be 14 years.  
Seventy-five percent of the respondents agreed that certification should be 
considered for “felonies only.”  Twenty-one respondents were more restrictive, 
indicating that they would like to see youths eligible for certification only for 
second and first-degree felonies.   
Juvenile court workers were then asked to provide information about why 
this system should certify any youth.  Conceptually, this issue can be approached 
two ways.  First, why don’t juvenile court workers want these particular youthful 
offenders in the juvenile court?  Second, what do the juvenile court workers 
expect from certification?  The majority (77.3%) indicated that certification to the 
adult court was appropriate as a response to a juvenile being beyond 
rehabilitation.  When asked what waiver to the adult court represented, the 
majority of respondents indicated that certification was a reflection of a lack of 
resources in the juvenile justice system as well as the inability of the court to 
handle certain youthful offenders.  Deterrence, a need to conserve resources, 
protection of society from certain offenders, and belief that certain crimes were 
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too heinous to be handled in the juvenile court were also cited as reasons for 
transfer.  Generally, respondents indicated that certification to the adult court was 
a rational and practical response for a certain range of offenses and offenders.   
Finally, Sanborn (1994b) asked the workers to indicate whether they 
agreed with the methods for certifying a juvenile as an adult.  It is noteworthy that 
among this broad sample of juvenile court workers, there was relatively little 
support for prosecutors making the decision about transfers to the adult criminal 
justice system.  Respondents indicated that judicial transfers were better suited 
to promote due process and neutrality.  It is unclear whether prosecutors also will 
favor vesting transfer power with judges. 
 
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
 The previous examination has illuminated four key areas of juvenile justice 
and juvenile certification in particular:  the history of juvenile justice, the role of 
the prosecutor, correlates of juvenile waiver, and attitudes toward waiver, both 
those of the public and of practitioners. 
Within philosophic, scholarly discussions, there is little agreement in the 
literature regarding the appropriateness of transfers of youth to the adult criminal 
justice system.  There seems to be little cohesiveness regarding who should 
make the transfer decision.  Furthermore, only two studies exist that specifically 
ask practitioners about their perspectives regarding certification.  There is also a 
clear gap in the research regarding the process by which prosecutors use their 
discretion and authority in making the waiver decision and the factors that 
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influence their decision to transfer or request a transfer to the adult criminal 
justice system.  Existing research gives us merely a pattern of the youth being 
waived.  Yet, official data can only illuminate so much on the subject of waiver.  A 
more comprehensive examination of the factors affecting juvenile waiver is 
necessary.  Specifically, analyzing the factors associated with the decision to 
waive youth from prosecutors’ perspectives is required to begin remedying this 
knowledge gap.  The handling of serious youthful offenders is guided largely by 
legalistic considerations.  Among criminal justice practitioners, however, transfer 
is widely supported for at least some youth.  Yet, there is no clear understanding 
about the basis for this general support.  Further, there is clearly concern, both 
scholarly and professionally, about the appropriateness of transfer decisions 
being predominately dictated by prosecutors.  As the future of the juvenile court 
is debated, understanding the views of these prosecutors is essential.  
 The reviewed literature provides a good deal of insight into the current 
state of affairs regarding juvenile exclusion.  However, much remains to be 
learned in this area of juvenile justice.  The majority of the research in this area 
has relied on official data.  As a result, policy implications, interpretation of data, 
and suggestions for future directions of juvenile exclusion are restricted to what 
can be gleaned from court records.  To begin addressing these limitations, the 
following research questions are examined here: 
RQ1:       To what extent do prosecutors support the option of transfer   
generally? 
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RQ2: Relatedly, to what extent would prosecutors favor abolishing the 
juvenile court, maintaining it as is with some youths being excluded, 
or handling all juveniles in the juvenile court? 
RQ3: To what extent do prosecutors agree or disagree with the   
arguments for and against transfer? 
RQ4: To what extent do prosecutors support or oppose the various  
mechanisms of transfer (judicial, legislative, prosecutorial, 
mandatory, discretionary)? 
 
  The prior literature establishes that transferring decisions vary as do 
attitudes regarding the appropriateness of transfer.  Based on these studies, a 
series of expectations about prosecutors' views can be extended.  The current 
project tests the following hypotheses: 
H1:  Prosecutorial preference for exclusion will be positively related to 
the youth's age. 
H2:  Prosecutorial preference for exclusion will be positively related to 
the perceived maturity of a youth. 
H3:  Prosecutorial preference for exclusion will be negatively related to 
the perceived likelihood of rehabilitation. 
H4:  Prosecutorial preference for exclusion will be positively related to 
presence of a violent offense. 
H5:  Prosecutorial preference for exclusion will be positively related to 
the severity of the offense charged. 
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H6:  Prosecutorial preference for exclusion will be greater when the 
youth is perceived as a threat to society. 
H7:  Prosecutorial preference for exclusion will be greater for youth with 
a record of prior adjudications in the juvenile court. 
H8:  Prosecutorial preference for exclusion will be positively related to 
prior commitment to a residential facility. 
H9:  Prosecutorial preference for exclusion will be greater for youth 
whose family is not supportive than for youth with supportive 
families. 
H10:  Prosecutorial preference for exclusion will be greater for minority 
youth than for non-minority youth. 
H11:  Prosecutorial preference for exclusion will be greater for male youth 
than for female youth. 
H12:  Prosecutorial preference for exclusion will be greater for youth who 
have not been abused than for those who have. 
H13:  Prosecutorial preference for exclusion will be negatively related to 
socio-economic status. 
 
  The next section provides the research methodology constructed to 
examine these questions.  Details on the sample, operationalization of variables, 
the survey instrument, and data collection procedures are provided.  
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CHAPTER 3:  RESEARCH PROCEDURES 
 
Overview 
 The purpose of this research is to better understand juvenile certification 
to the adult criminal justice system in Florida.  While previous research has 
looked at official data, empirical inquiry into the factors that influence prosecutors 
to certify youth is lacking.  This research will contribute to the overall body of 
juvenile justice literature.  More importantly it will create a foundation for a greater 
understanding of the current policies and procedures available to transfer youth 
to the adult criminal justice system.  Specifically, this study examines attitudes of 
prosecutors regarding the appropriate role of the juvenile court, the degree to 
which prosecutors agree with transferring youth to the adult criminal justice 
system and the various mechanisms of transfer, and the factors that are most 
influential in a state attorney’s decision to certify a youth to the adult criminal 
justice system.  
This chapter provides a detailed description of the research methodology 
and specific procedures to be employed, including the methods of sampling from 
the research population, operationalization of variables, the data collection 
instrument, and data collection strategy. 
 
Research Sample 
 The respondents in this research were randomly selected from a sampling 
frame obtained by the researcher.  Several sources were considered for this 
sampling frame.  The respondents in this research are in professional, legal 
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positions, and it was important to obtain the most current and accurate list of 
prosecutors from which to draw the sample.  The sampling frame was the 
Judicial Administration Commission's most current list of State Attorneys and 
Assistant State Attorneys in Florida.  The Judicial Administration Commission 
receives updated lists from all judicial districts in Florida on a monthly basis.  On 
the third week of every month, the Judicial Administration Commission receives a 
current list of the State Attorneys and Assistant State Attorneys from each of 
Florida's twenty judicial districts.  The researcher requested the most recent list 
two weeks prior to implementation of the survey.25  Because this list is regularly 
updated, coverage error should be negligible.  The sampling frame consisted of 
1808 prosecuting attorneys.  A sample of 800 State Attorneys and Assistant 
State Attorneys was randomly selected.  Based on the number sampled and the 
response rate of 37 percent, the sampling error is + 5%. 
 
Data Collection Method 
 Mail-out surveys were utilized for data collection.  The data collection 
process was based on Dillman's (2000) Tailored Design Method.  The survey 
involved four of Dillman's  (2000, p. 150) five suggested elements for achieving 
high response rates in survey implementation:  respondent friendly 
questionnaire, multiple contacts by first-class mail, return envelopes with real 
first-class stamps, and personalization of correspondence.  The fifth element, a 
token prepaid financial incentive, was not appropriate for the population under 
                                            
25 The researcher needed this time to adequately prepare mail-out lists, labels, and database 
construction prior to the initial mailing. 
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study.   State Attorneys in all judicial districts in Florida were mailed a pre-notice 
letter three days prior to the initial mail-out.  This pre-notice letter was only mailed 
to State Attorneys, not Assistant State Attorneys.  The purpose of this letter was 
to inform the supervisors of those who would be contacted for the study, to 
garner support for participation in this research, and to convey the significance of 
the project. 
  Questionnaires, including a detailed cover letter explaining the importance 
of this research, were mailed with return envelopes with first-class stamps to all 
members of the sample on May 27, 2005.  Five days later, a thank-you postcard 
was mailed expressing sincere thanks for completing the survey.  The postcard 
also expressed the hope that if the respondent had yet to return the completed 
survey, he or she would do so soon.  Two weeks after the mailing of the initial 
questionnaire, a replacement questionnaire was sent to the non-respondents.  
The cover letter included in this mail-out indicated that the respondent's 
completed questionnaire had yet to be received and politely urged the 
respondent to complete and return the survey as soon as possible.  Finally, non-
respondents were sent a final contact.  Non-respondents received a second 
postcard that requested the completed survey.  All written correspondence had 
original signatures from this researcher.  (Copies of the pre-notice letter and all 
cover letters are included in Appendix A.)  
  The analyses presented here includes all responses that were received by 
July 27, 2005.  There were 58 surveys that were returned to the researcher from 
the post-office as being undeliverable.  There were also 4 ineligible surveys 
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returned to the researcher.  This researcher received 272 usable, completed 
surveys for a response rate of 36.6%.  
 
Operationalization of Variables 
Respondent Demographics 
  Respondents were asked to answer a few demographic questions for 
statistical analysis purposes.  The following are the demographic measures used 
and the answer options provided.  Age was measured by asking each 
prosecutor, "How old are you?"  Ethnicity was measured by asking each 
respondent to indicate whether he or she was white/caucasion, black, Hispanic, 
Asian/Pacific Islander, Native American, or other.  Data were also collected on 
each respondent's professional experience.  First, the questionnaire measured 
tenure as a prosecutor:  "To the best of your recollection, how many years and 
months have you been a prosecutor?"  Each respondent was also asked, "In 
what division of the state attorney's office do you currently work?"  They were 
asked mark "felony," "misdemeanor," or "other."  Finally, the judicial district in 
which each attorney worked was determined using the addresses from the 
sampling frame. 
 
General Support for Transfer and the Role of the Juvenile Court 
 The appropriate role and necessity of the juvenile court has been 
challenged in recent years.  As reviewed in the previous chapter, there are three 
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major perspectives regarding the direction and future of the juvenile court and 
transfer:   
1. all youths should stay in the domain of the juvenile court; 
2. certain youthful offenders should be transferred to the jurisdiction of the adult 
criminal justice system, and some the some youthful offenders should stay in 
the juvenile system; and 
3. all youths should go to the adult court, the juvenile court should be abolished, 
and age should be a mitigating factor in sentencing decisions. 
  Prosecutors were given a series of statements concerning the appropriate 
role of the juvenile court and asked to indicate the degree to which they agreed 
or disagreed with each statement.  The answer options were strongly agree, 
agree, neutral, disagree, and strongly disagree.  The following statements 
measured the respondents' level of support for the role of the juvenile court. 
• All youthful offenders age 17 and under should be adjudicated in a separate 
juvenile court, not in the adult court. 
• Most juvenile offenders should stay under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. 
• In general, I support transferring some youths to the adult court. 
• In general, serious, violent juvenile offenders should be transferred to the 
adult court. 
• The juvenile court's jurisdiction on a juvenile should end once he or she turns 
eighteen. 
• The juvenile court should be abolished. 
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Agreement with Arguments For and Against Transfer 
 Seventeen statements were given to prosecutors regarding the arguments 
for and against transfer.  Respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which 
they agreed or disagreed with each statement using the same Likert scale 
described above, where the answer options were agree strongly, agree, neutral, 
disagree, and disagree strongly.  The following statements measured the 
respondents' level of support for the arguments in favor of transfer: 
• Some juveniles are beyond the rehabilitation capacities of the juvenile justice 
system. 
• For the protection of society, it is necessary to transfer some juveniles to the 
adult court. 
• Some offenses are serious enough to warrant transfer to the adult court. 
• Resources in the juvenile justice system are too scarce to warrant spending 
them on juvenile offenders who are habitually offending. 
• Transferring certain juveniles to the adult court will deter other juveniles from 
committing crime. 
• Juveniles that commit serious offenses have a significant negative influence 
on other youth in the juvenile justice system. 
• Juveniles that repeatedly commit crimes have a significant negative influence 
on other youth in the juvenile justice system. 
• The due process rights of juvenile offenders are better protected in the adult 
court. 
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The following statements were utilized to ascertain prosecutors' support for 
arguments against transfer. 
• Juvenile offenders get more individualized attention in the juvenile court 
compared to the adult court. 
• Transferring youths to the adult court may jeopardize their futures by having a 
record open to the public rather than a confidential record. 
• Juvenile offenders should not be exposed to adult offenders. 
• Juvenile offenders cannot get the proper treatment and rehabilitative services 
they need in the adult system. 
• Juvenile offenders can be influenced to change easier than adult offenders. 
• Juvenile offenders do not need the same due process protections as adult 
offenders because the juvenile justice system is not adversarial. 
• Juvenile offenders are less responsible for their actions than adult offenders. 
• Juvenile offenders are less mature than adult offenders. 
 
Support For and Opposition to Methods of Certification 
  Eleven statements were given to prosecutors concerning support for or 
opposition to various methods of certification of juvenile offenders.  Respondents 
were asked to indicate the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with each 
statement, given the answer options agree strongly, agree, neutral, disagree, and 
disagree strongly.  The following three statements measured who the 
respondents believed should be responsible for certification decisions - judges or 
prosecutors: 
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• Judges alone should be responsible for making transfer decisions. 
• Prosecutors alone should be responsible for making transfer decisions. 
• Prosecutors should make the transfer recommendation, but judges should 
make the final transfer decision. 
  The juvenile court workers interviewed by Sanborn (1994b) expressed 
more specific views on the various mechanisms of transfer.  They pointed out 
problems with waiver by legislation, prosecutors, and judges.  The following eight 
statements were also presented to the prosecutors in the present study to assess 
their level of agreement or disagreement with these arguments. 
• A judicial waiver hearing promotes protection of youths' due process rights. 
• Mandatory transfer set out by the legislature takes away the subjective quality 
of transfer. 
• Judges are inconsistent in their decisions to transfer a juvenile to the adult 
court. 
• Judicial waiver is too subjective. 
• Judges are too hesitant to waive appropriate juveniles to the adult court. 
• Prosecutorial direct file is influenced by political decisions. 
• Prosecutorial direct file leads to abuse of power. 
• Statutes mandating transfer are too automatic. 
 
Correlates of Exclusion Decisions 
 A factorial survey approach was used to examine the correlates of 
prosecutors' waiver decisions.  The factorial survey approach involves the 
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creation of a story or a vignette that contains personal and situational 
characteristics that are randomly assigned to each vignette.  The factorial survey 
approach depicts lifelike complexities (Rossi and Anderson, 1982).  This 
approach enables researchers to distinguish the individual influence of 
characteristics on attitudes (Rossi and Anderson, 1982). 
This method was appropriate for two reasons.  First, prior research has 
looked only at official data to determine the factors that are most influential in 
certification decisions.  Use of official records limits the types of variables that 
can be examined and the manner in which they are operationalized. In contrast, 
a factorial vignette survey uses hypothetical scenarios to examine the 
determinants of decision-making.  Thus, a researcher is free to construct the best 
operationalization of all salient variables, rather than being constrained to 
whatever is available in official records. 
Second, some criminal justice processing characteristics are highly 
correlated in reality (Rossi and Anderson, 1982).  Using data from official records 
of actual cases, therefore, limits our ability to assess the independent effects of 
these variables.  In contrast, factorial vignettes are constructed by randomly 
selecting one level from each dimension.  The result is that each dimension is 
orthogonal (within the limits of probability sampling) and their effects on decision 
making can be separated.  Thus, factorial vignette analysis can disentangle the 
effects on transfer of race and economic status, gender and offense, and other 
salient variables. 
  
 98
Youthful Offender Dimensions and Levels 
 Each survey contained one factorial vignette, formatted as a charging 
sheet.  The following are the variables or dimensions included in the factorial 
vignette.  The possible values for each dimension, called levels, are also 
presented.  Using the Vigwrite Software Program, one level for each dimension 
was randomly assigned in each vignette.  
Age 
 Ages were provided in increments of individual years ranging from 12 to 
17 years old.  The lower range of this dimension was determined based on the 
data from Florida (2001-2002).  No youths under twelve were transferred to the 
adult court.  Thus, while it is possible that a youth younger than twelve might be 
transferred to the adult court, it is a rare occurrence in Florida; most youths 
waived to the adult court are much older (see Table 1.4).  The upper limit of 
seventeen years old was established because he or she has reached the age of 
majority in Florida and would be under the jurisdiction of the adult court. 
Gender 
 The gender of the youth was given as male or female. 
Ethnicity 
 Ethnicity was presented as three possibilities:  white, black, or Hispanic.  
Ethnicity, as opposed to race, was used for a couple of reasons.  First, prior 
research looking at correlates of transfer has predominantly looked at race as a 
correlate to transfer. The attributes are often presented in terms of either white or 
non-white.  Hispanics could potentially be coded as white or non-white using 
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available data in which the researcher had no control over the operationalization 
of the variables.  Second, as presented in Chapter 1, ethnicity may be more 
relevant as a variable depending on the geographic location of the research.  
Florida does have a large Hispanic population.  Thus, whites and Hispanics were 
distinguished. 
Family Environment 
 Prior research by Applegate et al.  (2000) suggests that perceptions about 
a youth's family can substantially influence juvenile court decisions (also see 
Sanborn, 1995).  Three separate dimensions operationalized aspects of the 
youth's home environment.   
Prior History of Abuse: 
  No prior history of abuse by family member(s) 
  Prior history of abuse by family member(s) 
Family Socio-Economic Status 
  Upper-income family 
  Middle-income family 
  Lower-income family 
Level of Family Support 
Family appears willing and able to participate in any special 
requirements that might be imposed by the court. 
Family appears neither willing nor able to participate in any special 
requirements that might be imposed by the court. 
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Prior Adjudications and Commitments 
 Youth has no prior adjudications in the juvenile court and no prior 
commitments 
 Youth has one prior felony adjudication in the juvenile court and no prior 
commitments 
 Youth has three prior felony adjudications in the juvenile court and no prior 
commitments 
 Youth has one prior felony adjudication in the juvenile court and one prior 
commitment to a juvenile residential facility 
 Youth has three prior felony adjudications in the juvenile court and one 
prior commitment to a juvenile residential facility26 
Maturity 
Youth's maturity is appropriate to age 
Youth is less mature than same-age peers 
Youth is more mature than same-age peers 
Current Offense 
 The vignette also included current offense as a dimension for assignment.  
Three broad offense types were included for consideration:  person, property, 
and drug.  These offenses were included because prior research, using official 
data, has identified differences in transfer rates for these types of offenses.  
Other offenses, as noted in Table 1.2, only represent a small portion of total 
cases transferred to the adult court.  Further, the type of offenses included as 
                                            
26 The selection of these levels was weighted so that approximately one-third of the vignettes 
described a youth with no priors, one prior, or three prior adjudications in the juvenile court. 
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other are quite varied and relatively minor, such as a violation of probation.  
Thus, other offense types were not included. 
 Variations within offense type were also included to manipulate the 
offense and the severity of the offense.  The items were constructed to vary the 
extent of harm.  Warr's (1989) research has shown that offenses that cause 
greater harm are perceived as more serious.  All of the levels, however, include 
offenses for which youth may be certified to the adult court under Florida law.  
Finally, the offense possibilities were those for which youth are relatively 
commonly referred to the juvenile court (e.g. burglary, not identity theft). 
Person Offenses 
Robbery 
• The youth is accused of threatening to beat up a young girl unless she 
gave up her money.  The victim gave up $20 dollars and was not 
physically harmed. 
• The youth is accused of threatening to stab a young girl with a large 
knife unless she gave up her money.  The victim gave up $20, and was 
not physically harmed. 
Aggravated Battery 
• The youth is accused of intentionally cutting another youth with a 
knife during an argument.  The victim had a small cut on the arm, 
requiring three stitches. 
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• The youth is accused of intentionally cutting another youth with a 
knife during an argument.  The victim was cut badly on both arms, 
requiring more than 20 stitches.  
Property offenses 
Burglary 
• The youth is accused of breaking into a residence and stealing about 
$100 worth of merchandise. 
• The youth is accused of breaking into a residence and stealing about 
$1,000 worth of merchandise. 
Auto Theft 
• The youth is accused of stealing an automobile.  The car was located 
and returned undamaged to the owner. 
• The youth is accused of stealing an automobile.  The car was located 
and was damaged beyond repair. 
Drug offenses 
Felony Marijuana 
• The youth is accused of possessing one plastic baggy containing 
approximately one ounce of  marijuana and drug paraphernalia.     
• The youth is accused of possessing twelve plastic baggies filled with 
marijuana.  The youth also had $400 cash in a jacket pocket. 
Felony Non-Marijuana  
• The youth is accused of possessing 1 rock of crack cocaine for 
personal use. 
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• The youth is accused of possessing 15 individually wrapped rocks of 
crack cocaine.  The youth also had $400 cash in a jacket pocket. 
Amenability to Treatment 
 After reading the vignettes the prosecutors were given statements to 
determine their perceptions about the youth's amenability to treatment.  This 
question was constructed to determine the degree to which prosecutors think the 
described youth is able to change.  The answer options were agree strongly, 
agree, neutral, disagree, and disagree strongly.  The following statements 
measured the respondents' perceptions about the youth's ability to change. 
• Given the proper care and individualized treatment, this youth can 
change for the better. 
Threat to Society 
 Prosecutors were then given a measure to determine whether or not they 
perceived the youth to be a threat to society.  Respondents were given a 
statement then asked to indicate the degree to which they agreed or disagreed 
using the same five-point Likert scale as above.  The following statement was 
used to measure perceived threat to society: 
• This youth poses a significant threat to society. 
Prosecutorial Preference for Exclusion 
  The purpose of this study is to examine the factors that influence 
prosecutorial decision-making.  In order to achieve this goal, prosecutors were 
asked to render a judgment on what they would want to see actually happen with 
the youth in the vignette.  Prosecutors were given the following item: 
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• Regardless of what the law currently allows, we would like to know your own 
views on the best way to handle this juvenile's case.  Based on the 
information provided, what are the chances that you would want to certify this 
youth to the adult court? ______% (0% means the youth would stay in the 
juvenile court, and 100% means the youth would go to the adult court.  You 
can also choose any number in between). 
 
Data Collection Instrument 
  The survey questionnaire, which is provided in Appendix B, was pre-
tested in two ways recommended by Dillman (2000).  First, the research 
instrument was given to knowledgeable colleagues.  This was done to ensure 
that all of the necessary questions were included and to eliminate duplicate, 
unclear, or unnecessary measures.  Second, using cognitive interviews, the 
instrument was tested with 2 Assistant State Attorneys from the Ninth Judicial 
District.  Structured, cognitive interviews were conducted to determine whether 
respondents would understand each question and whether they could answer 
each question accurately (Dillman, 2000).  The pre-test procedure followed the 
"think-aloud" method explained by Dillman (2000, p. 142).  Based on the pre-
testing, some changes were made to simplify statements in order to improve 
comprehension and enhance reliability of items.   
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The Respondents 
 Two hundered and seventy-two prosecutors completed the survey 
instrument.  The majority of the respondents were males (61%).  The 
respondents' ages ranged from 24 to 65, with a mean of 40 years.  The vast 
majority of the respondents were white (87.6%), followed by Hispanic (6%), then 
black prosecutors (4.1%).  Most of the prosecutors that participated in the 
research worked in their Felony division (58%) and had at some point been 
involved in the decision-making process to transfer a juvenile to the adult court 
(64%).  The prosecutors in this study were fairly experienced (M = 9 years, 5 
months), ranging from 10 months to 32 years of experience.  The following 
chapter provides the results of their participation in this research. 
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CHAPTER 4:  RESULTS 
 
  Chapter 3 reported the methods that were employed to collect the data 
for this research.  This chapter presents the results of this research effort.  
Generally, this discussion is divided into two sections: a descriptive analysis of 
prosecutors' attitudes toward transfer and an assessment of the predictors of 
transfer decisions.   
 
Support of Juvenile Transfer and the Role of the Juvenile Court 
 In order to address the first two research questions, prosecutors were 
given statements to assess their views on the concept of juvenile transfer in 
general.  Further, they were given a series of statements constructed to measure 
the extent to which they would favor handling all juveniles in the juvenile court, 
abolishing the juvenile court, and maintaining the juvenile court as it is, with some 
youths being excluded.  As shown in Table 4.1, almost all prosecutors agreed 
with the statement that, in general, some youths should be transferred to the 
adult court.  Further, more than three-fourths of prosecutors agreed with the 
statement that most juvenile offenders should remain under the jurisdiction of the 
juvenile court.  Taken together, these results indicate considerable support for 
transfer as an option for handling juvenile cases but a belief that it should not be 
applied in a blanket manner.  This interpretation is reinforced by prosecutors' 
responses to two other items. 
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Table 4.1:  Overall Support for Juvenile Transfer and the Role of the Juvenile Court 
 
 
Item 
 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
 
Disagree 
 
Neutral 
 
Agree 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
Mean
In general, I support transferring some youths to 
the adult court (n=272) 
 
 
4.4% 
 
1.1% 
 
0.7% 
 
33.1% 
 
60.7% 
 
4.44
Most juvenile offenders should stay under the 
jurisdiction of the juvenile court (n=272) 
 
 
5.9% 
 
8.5% 
 
8.5% 
 
59.6% 
 
17.6% 
 
3.75
All juvenile offenders age 17 and under should 
be adjudicated in a separate juvenile court, not in 
the adult court (n=272) 
 
 
54% 
 
31.6% 
 
4.4% 
 
6.3% 
 
3.7% 
 
1.74
The juvenile court should be abolished (n=271) 
 
58.7% 32.8% 3.7% 1.8% 3.0% 1.58
The juvenile court's jurisdiction on a juvenile 
should end once he or she turns eighteen 
(n=272) 
 
 
 
20.6% 
 
 
33.8% 
 
 
11.8% 
 
 
21.7% 
 
 
12.1% 
 
 
2.71
In general, serious, violent juvenile offenders 
should be transferred to the adult court (n=272) 
 
 
2.2% 
 
5.9% 
 
4.8% 
 
33.7% 
 
53.5% 
 
4.30
_________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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  Eighty-five percent of Florida's prosecutors disagreed with handling all 
juveniles in a separate juvenile court.  At the same time, nearly ninety-two 
percent of prosecutors disagreed with the statement that the juvenile court 
should be abolished.  Prosecutors appear to agree with a more moderate view of 
juvenile transfer.  That is, most juvenile offenders should be adjudicated in the 
juvenile court and some juveniles should be transferred to the adult court.  
Beginning insight into which juveniles prosecutors believe ought to be removed 
from juvenile court jurisdiction is provided by the final item reported in Table 4.1.  
When prosecutors were asked whether serious, violent juvenile offenders should 
be transferred to the adult court, almost nine in ten agreed.  It is important to note 
that prosecutors do not support the elimination of the juvenile court.  
 
Support for Arguments For and Against Transfer 
 As reviewed in Chapter 2, several arguments for and against the idea of 
juvenile transfer have developed in the literature.  Prosecutors were given 
statements to measure the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with these 
positions.  Table 4.2 illustrates prosecutors' extent of agreement with arguments 
offered in favor of transferring juveniles to the adult court.   
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Table 4.2:  Prosecutors' Support for Arguments for Transfer of Juveniles to the Adult Court 
 
 
Item 
 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
 
Disagree 
 
Neutral 
 
Agree 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
Mean
 
Some offenses are serious enough to warrant transfer 
to the adult court (n=272) 
 
 
0.4% 
 
0.4% 
 
1.1% 
 
22% 
 
76.2% 
 
4.73
For the protection of society, it is necessary to 
transfer some juveniles to the adult court (n=272) 
 
 
0.4% 
 
1.1% 
 
0.7% 
 
24.9% 
 
72.9% 
 
4.69
Some juveniles are beyond the rehabilitation 
capacities of the juvenile justice system (n=272) 
 
 
1.5% 
 
0.7% 
 
2.9% 
 
35.3% 
 
59.6% 
 
4.51
Juveniles that repeatedly commit crimes have a 
significant negative influence on other youth in the 
juvenile justice system (n=272) 
 
 
 
0.4% 
 
 
4.4% 
 
 
25.7% 
 
 
51.5% 
 
 
18% 
 
 
3.82
Juveniles that commit serious offenses have a  
significant negative influence on other youth in the 
juvenile justice system (n=272) 
 
 
 
0.4% 
 
 
5.1% 
 
 
32% 
 
 
46.7% 
 
 
15.8% 
 
 
3.72
Transferring certain juveniles to the adult court will 
deter other juveniles from committing crime (n=272) 
 
 
4.8% 
 
20.6% 
 
28.7% 
 
36.4% 
 
9.6% 
 
3.25
Resources in the juvenile justice system are too scarce 
to warrant spending them on juvenile offenders who are 
habitually offending (n=270) 
 
 
 
5.6% 
 
 
24.8% 
 
 
27.4% 
 
 
28.1% 
 
 
14.1% 
 
 
3.20
The due process rights of juvenile offenders are better 
protected in the adult court (n=272) 
 
9.2% 
 
34.9% 
 
44.9% 
 
8.5% 
 
2.6% 
 
2.60
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 Nearly all of the arguments for transfer of juvenile offenders to the adult 
court received strong support from Florida prosecutors.  As shown in Table 4.2, 
virtually all of the prosecutors surveyed believe that transfer of some juveniles is 
justified by the seriousness of some offenses and by the need to protect society.  
Over ninety percent agree that some juveniles are beyond the rehabilitation 
capacities of the juvenile justice system.  Strong consideration for transfer was 
also given to the influence serious or repeat juvenile offenders may have on 
other youth in the juvenile justice system.  Nearly half of the prosecutors agreed 
that transferring certain juveniles to the adult court would deter other juveniles 
from committing crime.  However, two arguments for the support of juvenile 
transfer to the adult court did not receive much support.  One argument is the 
idea that resources in the juvenile system are too scarce to warrant spending 
them on habitual offenders.  This argument received only mild support (42.2% 
agreed or strongly agreed with this statement).  Prosecutors also showed little 
enthusiasm for supposed differences in due process protections.  Only 11.1% of 
prosecutors agreed that the adult court provides better protection of due process 
rights than the juvenile court, and more than 44% disagreed with this contention.   
 The data in Table 4.3  illustrate prosecutors' views on the arguments that 
have been offered against transfer of juvenile offenders to the adult court.   In 
general, arguments against juvenile transfer did not receive the strong support 
seen in the arguments for juvenile transfer.  Only three arguments against 
transfer received a strong degree of support:  juvenile offenders get more 
individualized attention in the juvenile court, juvenile offenders are less mature 
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than their adult counterparts, and juvenile offenders can be influenced to change 
easier than adult offenders.  A majority of prosecutors disagreed that juveniles 
are less culpable than adults are and that transferring them to the adult system 
would compromise juveniles' chances at rehabilitation.  The degree of support for 
arguments against transfer appears consistent with prosecutors' views on 
transfer in general. 
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Table 4.3:  Prosecutors' Support for Arguments Against Transfer 
 
 
Item 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
Disagree 
 
Neutral 
 
Agree 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
Mean
Juvenile offenders are less mature than adult 
offenders (n=270) 
 
 
2.2% 
 
6.7% 
 
14.1% 
 
65.6% 
 
11.5% 
 
3.77
Juvenile offenders get more individualized attention in 
the juvenile court compared to the adult court (n=271) 
 
 
1.8% 
 
19.9% 
 
26.9% 
 
42.1% 
 
9.2% 
 
3.37
Juvenile offenders can be influenced to change easier 
than adult offenders (n=271) 
 
 
2.2% 
 
23.2% 
 
30.6% 
 
38.0% 
 
5.9% 
 
3.22
Transferring youths to the adult court may 
jeopardize their futures by having a record open 
to the public rather than a confidential record (n=270) 
 
 
 
4.8% 
 
 
25.6% 
 
 
28.1% 
 
 
39.3% 
 
 
2.2% 
 
 
3.09
Juvenile offenders should not be exposed to 
adult offenders (n=271) 
 
 
6.6% 
 
31.7% 
 
26.6% 
 
 
28.8% 
 
6.3% 
 
2.96
Juvenile offenders cannot get the proper treatment 
and rehabilitative services they need in the adult 
system ( (n=272) 
 
 
 
10.3% 
 
 
57.4% 
 
 
19.9% 
 
 
11.0% 
 
 
1.5% 
 
 
2.36
Juvenile offenders are less responsible for their 
actions than adult offenders (n=270) 
 
 
18.9% 
 
47.4% 
 
17.4% 
 
13.3% 
 
3.0% 
 
2.34
Juvenile offenders do not need the same due  
process protections as adult offenders because 
the juvenile justice system is not adversarial (n=270) 
 
 
 
21.9% 
 
 
53.3% 
 
 
15.9% 
 
 
7.4% 
 
 
1.5% 
 
 
2.13
 
 113
Prosecutors' Views on Mechanisms of Juvenile Transfer 
 Prosecutors were given a series of statements intended to measure their 
support for the various mechanisms of juvenile transfer.  Specifically, prosecutors 
were asked about who (judges, prosecutors, or legislature) should make the 
transfer decisions.  Further, prosecutors were asked to respond to several 
statements about potential benefits and problems with various mechanisms of 
transfer.  Table 4.4 illustrates the responses.  
 As shown by the results on the first set of items in the table, prosecutors 
did not support judges being responsible for the transfer decision.  Nearly ninety-
two percent of respondents strongly disagreed or disagreed with the statement 
that "judges alone should be responsible for making transfer decisions."  
Moreover, almost two-thirds opposed a process where prosecutors would 
recommend transfer but judges would make the final decision.  Some insight into 
the basis for this lack of enthusiasm regarding judicial transfer is provided by the 
responses to the next three items listed in Table 4.4.  As shown in the table, 
prosecutors indicated strong support for the idea that judges are too inconsistent 
in their transfer decisions and that judicial waiver is too subjective.  One final 
explanation for this lack of support was that judges are too hesitant to waive 
youth who are appropriate for the adult court.  This perspective only received 
mild support from prosecutors.  
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Table 4.4:  Prosecutors' Views on Mechanisms of Juvenile Transfer 
 
Item 
 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
Disagree 
 
Neutral 
 
Agree 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
Mean
Judges alone should be responsible for making 
transfer decisions (n=271) 
 
 
57.2% 
 
33.2% 
 
7.0% 
 
1.1% 
 
1.5% 
 
1.56
Prosecutors should make the transfer 
recommendation, but judges should make the final 
transfer decision (n=269) 
 
 
 
32.3% 
 
 
33.1% 
 
 
14.1% 
 
 
19.3% 
 
 
1.1% 
 
 
2.24
Judges are inconsistent in their decisions to transfer 
a juvenile to the adult court (n=269) 
 
 
0.7% 
 
10.0% 
 
50.6% 
 
27.5% 
 
11.2% 
 
3.38
Judges are too hesitant to waive appropriate 
Juveniles to the adult court (n=270) 
 
 
1.9% 
 
14.1% 
 
54.4% 
 
21.9% 
 
7.8% 
 
3.20
Judicial waiver is too subjective (n=268) 
 
1.9% 
 
15.3% 53.4% 22.0% 7.5% 3.18
A judicial waiver hearing promotes protection of youths' 
due process rights (n=268) 
 
 
4.9% 
 
14.9% 
 
55.6% 
 
23.9% 
 
0.7% 
 
3.01
Prosecutors alone should be responsible for making 
transfer decisions (n=271) 
 
 
6.3% 
 
20.7% 
 
12.9% 
 
32.5% 
 
27.7% 
 
3.55
Prosecutorial direct file is influenced by political 
Decisions (n=271) 
 
 
21.4% 
 
42.4% 
 
19.2% 
 
15.9% 
 
1.1% 
 
2.33
Prosecutorial direct file leads to abuse of power 
(n=271) 
 
 
43.2% 
 
48.3% 
 
7.0% 
 
0.7% 
 
0.7% 
 
1.68
Mandatory transfer set out by the legislature takes 
away the subjective quality of transfer (n=270) 
 
 
3.7% 
 
15.6% 
 
24.8% 
 
45.2% 
 
10.7% 
 
3.44
Statutes mandating transfer are too automatic (n=270) 8.1% 25.2% 36.3% 27.0% 3.3% 2.92
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Not too surprisingly, prosecutors indicated moderate to strong support for 
prosecutors being the sole decision-makers in transfer decisions (60.2% agreed 
or strongly agreed).  Further, when asked about potential problems with 
prosecutors making transfer decisions, few respondents believed these were 
valid concerns.  Specifically, almost two-thirds of prosecutors disagreed that 
prosecutorial direct-file is influenced by political decisions and nearly all of the 
respondents thought that prosecutorial direct-file does not lead to abuse of 
power.  By and large, prosecutors do not believe that their involvement in transfer 
decisions is problematic in the ways that others have suggested.   
Finally, prosecutors were asked about their perceptions of mandatory 
transfer as set out in legislation.  A slight majority of prosecutors agreed with the 
argument that mandatory transfer takes away the subjective quality of transfer 
decisions (55.9%) and did not seem to perceive mandatory transfer as being too 
automatic.  This somewhat divided response may be indicative of the fact that, 
while legislation may "mandate" transfer to the adult court, prosecutors ultimately 
have the authority and discretion to file in adult or juvenile court by deciding on 
the final charges. 
 
Correlates of Support for Juvenile Transfer 
 In order assess whether the findings support the thirteen hypotheses 
posed in Chapter 2, bivariate and multivariate analyses were performed.  The 
predictors of transfer decisions focused on the responses of the prosecutors to 
the juveniles described in the vignettes.  As described in the previous chapter, 
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the factorial vignettes allowed for assessment of the impact of multiple case 
characteristics on prosecutors' support for transfer.  Initially, three bivariate tests 
were employed to determine associations between the dependent variable, 
"Chance you would want to transfer this youth," and the independent variables 
introduced in the hypotheses.  This section presents the results of these tests. 
 Pearson product-moment correlations were utilized to assess the 
relationship between the dependent variable and three independent variables:  
vignette offender age, perceived chance of rehabilitation, and perceived threat to 
society.  The correlation coefficients for the measures are presented in Table 4.5. 
 
Table 4.5 - Pearson Correlations between Likelihood of Transfer 
Recommendation and Independent Variables 
 
   Correlation 
 
n M (SD) 1 2 3 4 
1 - Likelihood of Transfer 
Recommendation  
 
 
269 
 
22.11 (29.76) 
 
1.00 
 
 
  
2 - Vignette Offender Age 
 
272 14.51 (1.71) .266** 1.00   
3 - Chance of Rehabilitation 
 
269 3.86 (.76) -.321** -.022 1.00  
4 - Threat to Society 
 
270 3.10 (2.70) .142* .051 -.344** 
 
1.00 
* p < .05, ** p < .001 
 
Prosecutorial preference for exclusion was significantly related to vignette 
offender age, perceived chance of rehabilitation, and perceived threat to society.  
Specifically, prosecutorial preference is positively related to both the offender's 
age and the degree to which prosecutors think the juvenile poses a future threat 
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to society.  Further, preference for exclusion is negatively related to the degree to 
which prosecutors believe the juvenile can be rehabilitated.  
 T-tests were used to test the effects of gender, history of abuse, and 
family support on prosecutorial preference for exclusion.  As shown in Table 4.6, 
there was no significant difference in prosecutorial preference for transferring 
males versus females.  Further, there was no significant difference in 
prosecutorial preference for exclusion for those youth who had an established 
history of family abuse and those who did not.  No significant differences in 
preference for exclusion were detected for those juveniles whose families were 
willing and able to participate in any special requirements imposed by the court.  
 
Table 4.6 - T-test for Dichotomous Variables by Likelihood of Transfer 
Recommendation 
 
Independent Variable Mean Likelihood of Transfer Recommendation t value p 
Vignette Offender Gender 
 Female 
 
 Male 
 
 
21.96 
 
22.23 
 
-.074 
 
 
.941 
 
Prior History of Abuse 
 No Prior History of Abuse 
 
 Prior History of Abuse 
 
 
19.36 
 
24.60 
 
-1.446 
 
 
.149 
 
Family Support and Participation 
 No 
 
 Yes 
 
 
22.21 
 
22.01 
 
.055 
 
 
.957 
History of Prior Juvenile Commitments 
 No 
 
 Yes 
 
 
 
18.73 
 
27.46 
 
 
-2.362 
 
 
 
.019 
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A t test was also used to test the effect of prior commitment record on 
prosecutorial preference for exclusion (see Table 4.6), revealing a significant 
difference in preference for exclusion between the two histories.  On average, 
preference for exclusion was about nine percentage points higher for juveniles 
who had a prior juvenile commitment. 
 Prosecutorial preference for exclusion was analyzed on five additional 
variables using One-Way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA).  The results of the 
analysis are provided in Table 4.7. 
 A one-way ANOVA revealed no significant differences in prosecutorial 
preference for exclusion across the three levels of socio-economic status for the 
juvenile described in the vignette (lower-income family, middle-income family, or 
upper-income family).  Further, no significant differences were found to exist in 
preference for exclusion across the three levels of youth's maturity (youth is less 
mature than same-age peers, youth's maturity is appropriate to age, or youth is 
more mature than same-age peers). 
 ANOVA revealed a significant difference in prosecutorial preference for 
exclusion across the six levels of offense type.  To further assess the differences 
among the six levels of offense type (battery, assault, breaking and entering, 
auto theft, marijuana possession, and crack cocaine possession) on the main 
effect for prosecutorial preference, the Scheffe post hoc procedure was 
performed.  The results indicate that prosecutorial preference for exclusion for 
battery offenses differs significantly from breaking and entering (p = .008), auto 
theft (p = .000), marijuana possession (p = .015), and crack cocaine possession 
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(p = .000).  Prosecutorial preference for exclusion for battery did not significantly 
differ from assault offenses (p = .087), and there were no other significant 
differences among the theft, drug, or assault offenses. 
 
Table 4.7 - One-Way Analysis of Variance for Prosecutorial Likelihood of 
Transfer Recommendation by Independent Variables 
  
 Likelihood of Transfer 
Recommendation 
  
Correlate Mean Standard Deviation F Sig 
Offense Type 
 Battery 
 Assault 
 Breaking and entering 
 Auto theft 
 Marijuana possession 
 Crack cocaine possession 
 
44.18 
25.78 
20.37 
12.23 
20.52 
9.87 
 
 
37.88 
31.67 
28.08 
20.78 
26.51 
18.23 
 
 
7.613 
 
.000 
Prior Offenses 
 No prior adjudication 
 One prior adjudication 
 Three prior adjudications 
 
 
9.39 
20.79 
30.79 
 
21.00 
30.27 
30.94 
 
 
10.880 
 
.000 
Ethnicity 
 White 
 Black 
 Hispanic  
 
 
18.72 
17.17 
30.92 
 
28.63 
25.83 
32.86 
 
 
5.697 
 
.004 
Maturity 
 More mature than same-age peers 
 Maturity appropriate to age 
 Less mature than same-age peers 
 
 
19.52 
27.84 
19.40 
 
 
27.52 
33.99 
27.21 
 
 
2.323 
 
.100 
SES 
 Upper-income family 
 Middle-income family 
 Lower-income family 
 
 
18.06 
23.00 
24.79 
 
 
28.05 
29.86 
30.96 
 
 
1.273 
 
.282 
 
 
 
 ANOVA revealed a significant difference in prosecutorial preference for 
exclusion by history of prior offenses (no priors, one prior, three priors).  Post-hoc 
 120
analysis indicates significant differences in prosecutorial preference for exclusion 
for youth with three priors from youths with no priors (, p = .000) and one prior (p 
= .044).  The chances a prosecutor would want to exclude a youth from the 
juvenile court were not significantly different when youths with one offense were 
compared to those with no prior offenses. 
 Prosecutorial preference for exclusion by ethnicity was also analyzed 
using one-way ANOVA.  Results indicate a significant difference in preference for 
exclusion by ethnicity.  To further assess the differences across race, post hoc 
procedures were employed.  Scheffe analysis indicates that prosecutorial 
preference for exclusion differs significantly for Hispanic youth from white youth 
(p = .019 ) and black youth (p = .011), but preference for transferring whites 
versus blacks was not significantly different. 
 
Determinants of Juvenile Transfer 
 A multiple regression analysis was performed between likelihood of 
transfer and the independent variables that the bivariate analyses had revealed 
to be significantly related to preference for exclusion:  offense type, age of 
juvenile, presence of prior offenses, severity of offense, prior commitments, 
ethnicity of juvenile, threat to society score, likelihood of rehabilitation score, 
ethnicity of respondent, age of respondent, number of years as a prosecutor, 
respondent's gender, and whether the respondent has ever been involved in 
making a transfer decision.  Assumptions of regression were tested using normal 
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probability plots of residuals as well as scatter diagrams of residuals by predicted 
residuals.  No violations of regression assumptions were detected. 
 Regression analysis revealed that the model significantly predicated 
likelihood of juvenile transfer, F (13, 242) = 10.924, p < .001.  R2 for the model 
was .370, and adjusted was R2 .336.  Table 4.8 provides the unstandardized 
regression coefficients (B) and standardized coefficients (β). 
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Table 4.8 - Regression Model for Prosecutorial Preference for Juvenile 
Transfer 
 
Predictor Variable 
 
Coding 
 
B Coefficient β t  
 
Sig. 
 
Age of Juvenile 
 
 
 
4.377 
 
.255 
 
4.913 
 
.000 
 
Threat to Society 
Score 
 
 
 
 
6.313 
 
 
.244 
 
 
3.886 
 
 
.000 
 
Presence of 
Violent Offense 
 
 
1 = Violent  
0 = Non 
Violent  
 
 
10.927 
 
 
.173 
 
 
3.048 
 
 
.003 
 
Ethnicity of 
Juvenile 
 
1 = Hispanic 
0 = Non 
Hispanic 
 
 
9.798 
 
 
.151 
 
 
2.867 
 
 
.005 
 
Presence of Prior 
Adjudications 
 
 
 
 
3.620 
 
 
.146 
 
 
2.496 
 
 
.013 
 
Likelihood of 
Rehabilitation 
Score 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-4.922 
 
 
 
-.128 
 
 
 
-2.221 
 
 
 
.027 
 
Severity of 
Offense 
 
1 = More 
Severe 
0 = Less 
Severe 
 
 
6.170 
 
 
.102 
 
 
1.873 
 
 
.062 
 
Prior 
Commitments 
 
1 = Priors 
0 = No Priors 
 
 
 
.307 
 
 
.005 
 
 
.090 
 
 
.928 
 
Years as a 
Prosecutor 
 
 
 
 
 
.415 
 
 
.122 
 
 
1.433 
 
 
.153 
 
Respondent's Age 
 
 
 
-.301 
 
-.112 
 
-1.401 
 
.163 
 
Respondent's 
Ethnicity 
1 = White 
0 = NonWhite 
 
 
-4.801 
 
 
-.052 
 
 
-.969 
 
 
.334 
 
Respondent's 
Gender 
 
1 = Male 
0 = Female 
 
 
-.254 
 
 
-.004 
 
 
-.076 
 
 
.939 
 
Ever Been 
Involvement in 
Transfer Decision 
1= Yes 
0 = No 
 
 
 
-.182 
 
 
 
-.003 
 
 
 
-.052 
 
 
 
.959 
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 Six variables contributed significantly to prosecutorial preference for 
exclusion.  Most important in the model was in the individual effect of the age of 
the juvenile. Prosecutorial preference for exclusion rose a predicted 4.4 
percentage points for each year of increase in the juvenile’s age. Perceived 
threat to society was the second most important predictor of prosecutorial 
preference for transfer; the greater the perceived threat to society, the more likely 
a prosecutor would prefer transfer to the adult court. For every point higher a 
juvenile was scored on the five-point threat scale, prosecutorial preference for 
exclusion rose by 6.3 percentage points.  The presence of a violent offense was 
also a significant predictor of prosecutorial preference.  Prosecutorial preference 
for transfer to the adult court was nearly 11 percentage points higher for youth 
who were accused of violent offenses (i.e., assault or battery) than for those 
facing other charges.     
The juvenile’s ethnicity also contributed significantly to explaining 
variations in the preference to exclude a juvenile to the adult court.  Preference 
for transfer to the adult court was 9.8 percentage points higher among 
prosecutors when they considered a Hispanic rather than a Non-Hispanic youth.  
Further, the standardized regression coefficient suggests that the ethnicity of the 
juvenile explained approximately fifteen percent of the variance in prosecutorial 
preference for juvenile transfer.  The presence of a prior offense was also a 
significant predictor of prosecutorial preference for exclusion.  Those juveniles 
who had prior adjudications were somewhat, though not dramatically, more likely 
to be recommended for transfer to the adult court.  Finally, the perceived 
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likelihood of rehabilitation contributed to the preference for transfer to the adult 
court.  This negative relationship indicates that prosecutors are less likely to 
recommend transfer to the adult court for juveniles who they believe are more 
amenable to treatment.  The severity of the vignette offense was not significant in 
the model at explaining prosecutorial preference for transfer to the adult court.   
Prosecutors' demographics were also included in the regression model.  
As seen in Table 4.8, none of the prosecutors' characteristics were significant in 
the model.  Thus, there is no evidence of particular kinds of prosecutors being 
more or less in favor of transfer to the adult court.  
The overall model explains over one-third of the variation in prosecutorial 
preference for exclusion.  While this model explains a moderate amount of 
variation in the decision to transfer juveniles to the adult court, the fact that a 
majority of the variation remains unexplained suggests a question for further 
exploration:  What other information would prosecutors use to ultimately make 
this transfer decision? 
 
Other Factors in Transfer Decisions 
 Prosecutors were asked to report any additional information, above and 
beyond that reported in the vignette, would have helped them to make the 
transfer decision.  Most of the respondents (n = 211) provided further insight into 
factors that influence the decision to transfer a juvenile to the adult court.  The 
two most important factors identified by prosecutors were the nature of the 
current offense and the nature of any prior offenses. 
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Nature of Current Offense   
Repeatedly, prosecutors indicated that further detail on the nature of the 
current offense would be helpful in making a transfer determination.  For 
example, if the vignette included a violent crime (battery or assault), prosecutors 
wanted to know more detail on the events leading up to the offense, the location 
of the offense (e.g., did offense occur on school property or in the community), 
and the relationship between the victim and the offender.  In vignettes including 
property offenses, prosecutors wanted greater details on the type of property that 
was stolen (e.g., guns or clothing).  For auto theft property offenses, prosecutors 
wanted greater detail as to how the auto was stolen.  For example, did the 
offender steal car keys or was the automobile "hot-wired."  Prosecutors also 
indicated that they wanted additional information on the degree of property 
damage.  For drug offenses, many prosecutors indicated concern with how and 
where the drugs were seized.   Across all types of offenses, prosecutors wanted 
details on the level of sophistication surrounding the crime, whether the offender 
acted alone or in collusion with other juveniles, and whether there was any 
indication of premeditation. 
  Further, prosecutors indicated that input from other criminal justice 
professionals would be helpful in making the transfer decision regarding the 
nature of the present offense.  Respondents indicated that law enforcement 
could be a useful source of information when considering transfer.  Specifically, 
prosecutors indicated a need to know whether the juvenile was cooperative with 
law enforcement and if the juvenile had admitted guilt to law enforcement.  The 
 126
Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) was also mentioned as a criminal justice 
resource that would be useful in making in the transfer decision.  Prosecutors 
indicated that input from DJJ would be helpful as well as any counselor input. 
Nature of Prior Offenses 
The nature of the juvenile's prior involvement in criminal activity was 
another consideration provided by prosecutors.  Prosecutors wanted further 
detail on the nature of the prior offenses (e.g., violent, drug, or property), the age 
that the criminal activity was known to begin, whether the juvenile had a history 
of weapons or violent offenses, and the number of prior arrests (regardless of 
whether they resulted in a juvenile adjudication).  Prosecutors also indicated that 
the time intervals between criminal justice contacts might be helpful in making 
the transfer decision.  Further, respondents indicated a need to identify whether 
there was a history of escalating behaviors.  For example, if the juvenile began 
with relatively minor offenses and graduated to more serious offenses, this would 
weigh heavily on the prosecutor's decision to transfer.  This was of particular 
concern if there was a pattern of violent offenses and if the violent behavior was 
escalating.   
 Prosecutors also indicated that prior performance and compliance in the 
criminal justice system would be helpful in making transfer decisions.  
Prosecutors wanted to know if the juvenile contested any prior convictions and 
the level of compliance with any prior sanctions.  Specifically, respondents 
wanted to know how the juvenile performed while under DJJ supervision. 
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Prior Commitments 
In vignettes where the juvenile had a prior commitment to a juvenile 
facility, prosecutors wanted additional information on the type of facility to which 
the juvenile was committed.  Prosecutors indicated that the level of the 
commitment facility could influence their transfer decisions.  Further, respondents 
wanted additional details on the length of time from commitments to the current 
offense.  Prosecutors wanted to know if the juvenile was currently on some form 
of juvenile supervision.  Finally, prosecutors wanted additional information on the 
types of services that were previously offered to the juvenile offender. 
Victim Consideration  
Prosecutors listed several victim considerations as being influential in 
making the transfer decision.  The age of the victim as well as victim, or victim's 
family, input would be important components in the decision to transfer.  
Respondents also wanted additional information on the relationship between the 
victim and offender (e.g., strangers or classmates). 
Educational Factors 
Prosecutors identified educational factors as being important 
considerations for transfer decisions.  Specifically, respondents wanted to know 
whether the juvenile attended school.  If the juvenile did regularly attend school, 
prosecutors wanted to know more information on the juvenile's grades as well as 
his or her behavior at school.  Respondents also indicated a need to know 
whether the juvenile was involved with any extra-curricular activities such as 
organized sports.  Finally, prosecutors indicated that input from the educational 
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professionals with regular contact with the juvenile might be helpful.  For 
example, respondents indicated they wanted to know if the juvenile had any 
teacher or educational support. 
Family Issues 
Prosecutors cited the family environment as being relevant in making 
transfer decisions.  Respondents wanted additional information on the parents 
and any siblings in the home.  For example, prosecutors wanted to know whether 
the parents or siblings in the home had any criminal history, particularly for 
violent offenses, and whether the family had any history of contacts with the 
Department of Children and Families.  Respondents wanted to ensure that the 
family could provide adequate supervision of the juvenile.  For example, several 
prosecutors wanted to know if the juvenile could benefit from a treatment facility 
rather than continue to reside in the family environment. 
If the vignette provided a history of physical abuse in the home, 
prosecutors wanted additional information on the type, extent, and duration of the 
abuse.  The overall consideration regarding family factors was whether the 
parent(s) could provide a safe and stable home environment for the juvenile.  
Prosecutors indicated a desire for additional information on the immediate 
neighborhood as well.  
Other Juvenile Issues 
Prosecutors also listed other important considerations when making the 
decision to transfer a juvenile to the adult court.  They wanted to know if the 
juvenile was known to be in a gang or to affiliate with known gang members.  
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They wanted to know if the juvenile had a history of drug or alcohol use or abuse.  
The attitude of the juvenile toward society and the community was well as their 
attitude in court may also influence a prosecutor's decision to transfer.  For 
example, if the juvenile seems remorseful and willing to change or is willing to 
cooperate in other prosecutions (e.g., identifying drug sources), some 
prosecutors indicated they would be less inclined to push for juvenile transfer. 
 Prosecutors also identified psychological issues as important in their 
transfer decisions.  Specifically, respondents want access to mental health 
histories, I.Q. tests, and psychological evaluations.   
Juvenile Transfer 
Finally, prosecutors provided some additional issues that may contribute 
to the decision to transfer juveniles to the adult court.  Prosecutors indicated that 
the preference of the juvenile would determine whether a juvenile is transferred 
as an adult.  For example, several prosecutors indicated that they would give the 
charged juvenile a choice:  plead guilty and remain in the juvenile court or plead 
not guilty and have an adult trial.  Another consideration was whether the juvenile 
court and the juvenile justice system had exhausted all possible remedies.  
Prosecutors also indicated that the availability of an appropriate residential 
treatment facility might work to keep juveniles in the juvenile court.  The 
respondents suggested that these commitment facilities might be able to provide 
the individualized services and programs necessary to protect society and 
ensure that juveniles do not return to the criminal justice system. 
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Finally, prosecutors identified plausible court sentences or sanctions being 
a determinant of juvenile transfer.  The present study did not ask prosecutors 
about preferred sanctions or sentences that the juvenile in the vignettes should 
receive; yet, this concern is clearly a deciding factor when making the transfer 
decision.  Several prosecutors identified the juvenile in their vignettes as being a 
threat to society.  However, these same prosecutors indicated a reluctance to 
transfer the juvenile to the adult court.  Ultimately, concern for public safety 
appeared to be the deciding factor.  These prosecutors all reported that in the 
juvenile court system, the youth would be placed in an appropriate commitment 
facility.  Respondents indicated that these same juveniles in the adult court, 
receiving adult sanctions, would merely receive probation with little or no 
supervision in the community and, therefore, would pose a greater threat to 
society. 
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CHAPTER 5:  DISCUSSION 
 
Introduction 
 Prosecutors are important and powerful in the criminal justice system, 
particularly because of their discretion (Davis, 1969, Walker, 1993).  Not only do 
they have the power to act on behalf of the state, but they also have "negative 
power" (Davis, 1969, p. 188).  Negative power refers to their ability to withhold 
prosecution (Davis, 1969).  This negative and positive discretionary power is 
particularly important and relevant in the area of juvenile transfer to the adult 
court.  Ultimately, prosecutors will determine the final charges, and in many 
instances, the court of jurisdiction for juvenile offenders.  While there are several 
mechanisms in Florida by which a juvenile can be transferred to the adult court, 
each procedure is influenced by prosecutorial decision-making (Klein, 1998; 
Schiraldi, 1999).  
The aim of this research was to address the limitations in the current 
research regarding juvenile transfer to the adult court.  A survey instrument was 
sent to a random sample of 800 State Attorneys and Assistant State attorneys in 
Florida.  This chapter discusses the findings from the current research, the policy 
implications of the research, and suggests important and necessary areas of 
future juvenile justice research.  Further, limitations of the current study are 
presented. 
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Overview of Research Questions 
 To begin addressing the limitations in juvenile transfer research, four 
research questions were examined.  Prosecutors were given a series of 
statements to assess their views on these concepts of juvenile transfer and the 
role of the juvenile court. 
 
Support for Transfer and the Separate Juvenile Court 
 The first research question examined was to what extent do prosecutors 
support the option of transfer generally.  Almost ninety-five percent of the 
respondents agreed or strongly agreed with this criminal justice option. 
 The second research question examined the extent to which prosecutors 
would favor abolishing the juvenile court, maintaining it as is with some youths 
being excluded or handling all juveniles in the juvenile court.  Nearly two-thirds of 
the respondents strongly opposed the abolishing the juvenile court and most 
others were somewhat opposed.  Less than five percent of the prosecutors 
studied favored trying all juveniles in the adult criminal court.  This did not mean, 
however, that the respondents felt the juvenile court was right for all juvenile 
defendants.  Rather, prosecutors agreed that most juveniles should be handled 
in the juvenile court, but that some juveniles should be transferred to the adult 
court.  The responses indicate a relatively conservative position by prosecutors 
on the idea of transfer.  While prosecutors are supportive of the idea of transfer 
generally, this support seems to be contingent on the specific crime and juvenile 
offender.  Most wanted serious, violent youths to be handled by the adult court.  
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In short, the results revealed here suggest that prosecutors' preferences are 
largely consistent with current practices.  They favor neither of the extreme 
positions that have been extended - complete abolishment of the juvenile court or 
full retention of all juveniles in the juvenile justice system.  Instead, prosecutors 
support a system where some discretion can be exercised. 
 
Arguments For and Against Transfer 
 The third research question examined the extent to which prosecutors 
agreed or disagreed with the arguments found in the literature for and against 
transfer.  The majority of the arguments for transfer of juveniles to the adult court 
received support from Florida prosecutors. However, prosecutors were more 
reserved in their attitudes towards the arguments against transfer.  The findings 
suggest that while prosecutors support transfer in general, their support is 
contingent upon the specific youth, criminal history, and nature of the current 
offense.  Further, responses to the arguments against transfer would suggest 
that prosecutors are not as influenced by the items found in the arguments 
against transfer.  
 
Mechanisms of Transfer 
 The final research question examined the extent to which prosecutors 
support or oppose the various mechanisms of transfer.  Not surprisingly, the 
mechanism of transfer that received the strongest support was where 
prosecutors alone make the transfer decision.  Further, most prosecutors did not 
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agree with any mechanism of juvenile transfer where the decision to transfer is 
determined solely by the judiciary.  Prosecutors did, however, give moderate 
support to a mechanism of transfer in which prosecutors recommend transfer 
and judges make the final decision. 
 
Overview of Hypotheses Tests 
 Thirteen hypotheses were tested in this research.  In order to test these 
hypotheses, each prosecutor received a hypothetical case summary on a 
juvenile offender.  Prosecutors were then asked to rate or score the likelihood 
that the current juvenile could be rehabilitated and the threat that the youth posed 
to society.  Finally, prosecutors were asked to provide the chance that they would 
want to transfer that juvenile to the adult court.   The following presents the 
summary of the level of support for each of the hypotheses tested in this 
research. 
 
Age of the Offender 
 Hypothesis 1 predicted that prosecutorial preference for exclusion would 
be positively related to the youth's age.  A Pearson Correlation revealed a 
significant difference between the age of the offender in the vignette and 
prosecutorial preference for exclusion.  Older juveniles were significantly more 
likely to be recommended for transfer to the adult court (r = .266, p <.001).  This 
significant relationship was confirmed in regression analysis.  The age of the 
juvenile was one of the strongest predictors of prosecutorial preference for 
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exclusion.  Based on the regression model prediction, the preference for 
excluding a seventeen year old youth was nearly 22 percentage points higher 
than for a twelve year old youth.  The salience of the juvenile's age is consistent 
with past research showing that people generally favor harsher handling of older 
juveniles (Applegate & Davis, 2006; Moon, Wright, Cullen & Pealer, 2000; Vogel 
& Vogel, 2003).   
 
Maturity of Youth 
 Hypothesis 2 predicted that prosecutorial preference for exclusion would 
be positively related to the perceived maturity of a youth.   A One-way ANOVA 
was run to determine the relationship between maturity and likelihood of transfer.  
Analysis revealed no significant relationship between the juvenile's maturity and 
likelihood of transfer.  Based on the bivariate analysis, maturity of youth was not 
included in the regression analysis.   
 
Likelihood of Rehabilitation 
 Hypothesis 3 predicted that prosecutorial preference for exclusion would 
be negatively related to the perceived likelihood of rehabilitation.  A Pearson 
Correlation revealed a significant inverse relationship between these two 
variables (r = .321, p<.001).  That is, prosecutorial preference for exclusion was 
significantly lower for those juveniles who were viewed as being more amenable 
to rehabilitation.  Similar results were seen in the regression analysis, where a 
one-point increase on the likelihood of rehabilitation scale produced a nearly five-
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percentage point decrease in preference for transfer.  Notably, the use of 
rehabilitation potential in decisions about transfer is consistent with legal 
mandates (Kent v. US; Fla Stat. §985.226).   
 
Presence of a Violent Offense 
 Hypothesis 4 predicted that prosecutorial preference for exclusion would 
be positively related to the presence of a violent offense.  A One-Way ANOVA 
was run to determine the relationship between offense type and preference for 
transfer.  This bivariate analysis indicated that offense type was significantly 
related to prosecutorial preference for transfer (F = 7.613, p<.001).  Post hoc 
analysis revealed that preference for exclusion was significantly different for 
cases in which the offense was a violent crime.  Based on these analyses, this 
variable was recoded into a dichotomous variable (1 = violent offense, 0 = non-
violent offense).  This recoded variable was entered into the regression.  Results 
indicated a significant increase in preference for transfer when the juvenile was 
accused of a violent offense.   
 These results indicate that prosecutorial preferences regarding what 
offenses are most deserving of transfer to the adult court are more or less in line 
with public views.  Prior research has indicated that the public favors transfer of 
juveniles that commit serious, violent crimes (Bouley & Wells, 2001; King-Davis 
et al., 2003; Schwartz, 1992; and Wu, 2000).   
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Severity of Offense 
 Hypothesis 5 predicted that prosecutorial preference for exclusion would 
be positively related to the severity of the offense charged.  In order to test this 
hypothesis, a new dichotomous variable was created for offense severity (1 = 
more severe, 0 = less severe).  This new variable was entered into the 
regression analysis.  With all other variables in the regression model held 
constant, severity of offense was not a significant predictor of prosecutorial 
preference for exclusion.  Thus, Hypothesis 5 was not supported by the data. 
 
Threat to Society 
 Hypothesis 6 predicted that prosecutorial preference for exclusion would 
be greater when the youth was perceived as a threat to society.  A Pearson 
Correlation was run to examine the relationship between these two variables.  
Results indicated a significant, moderate relationship (r = .344, p<.001).  
Prosecutorial preference for exclusion was significantly higher for those youths 
that were perceived as being a greater threat to society.  Further regression 
analysis yielded similar results.  The threat to society was significant in the 
regression model and explained nearly one-quarter of the variance in preference 
for transfer.  Prosecutors' personal preferences, therefore, support statutes and 
case law that require consideration of dangerousness in making transfer 
decisions (Kent v. US; Fla. Stat. §985.226). 
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Prior Record of Adjudication 
 Hypothesis 7 predicted that prosecutorial preference for exclusion would 
be greater for youth with a record of prior adjudications in the juvenile court.   A 
One-Way Anova was run to examine the relationship between prior adjudications 
and prosecutorial preference for transfer.  Analysis revealed a significant 
relationship between prior offenses and transfer.  Specifically, juveniles having 
one or three prior adjudications were significantly more likely to be preferred for 
transfer to the adult court compared to those with no priors.  Further, juveniles 
with three adjudications were significantly more likely than were juveniles with 
one prior to be transferred to the adult court.  To further examine the impact of 
prior adjudications on prosecutorial preference for transfer, the present variable 
was recoded into a continuous variable (0, 1, and 3 priors).  Prior adjudications 
was significant in the regression model, explaining approximately 15% of the 
variance in preference for transfer. 
 
Prior Commitment Record 
 Hypothesis 8 predicted that prosecutorial preference for exclusion would 
be positively related to prior commitment to a residential facility.  A t-test was 
utilized to examine the bivariate relationship between prior commitments and 
preference for transfer to the adult court.  Results indicated a significant 
difference for prosecutorial preference for transfer for juveniles with a history of 
one prior commitment to a residential facility (p<.019).  Yet, when controlling for 
all other variables in the regression, prior commitments was not significant in 
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explaining the variance in the dependent variable.  Thus, Hypothesis 8 was not 
supported. 
 
Family Support 
 Hypothesis 9 predicted that prosecutorial preference for exclusion would 
be greater for youths whose families were not supportive than for youths with 
supportive families.  A t-test revealed no significant relationship between family 
support and preference for transfer to the adult court.  It should be noted, 
however, that as discussed in Chapter 4, prosecutors often mentioned other 
family issues as important considerations in transfer.  For example, prosecutors 
wanted additional information on criminal history on family members. 
 
Ethnicity 
 Hypothesis 10 predicted that prosecutorial preference for exclusion would 
be greater for minority youth than for non-minority youth.  A One-Way ANOVA 
was run to examine the relationship between ethnicity and preference for 
transfer.  Analysis revealed a significant relationship between ethnicity and 
prosecutorial preference for transfer.  However, post-hoc analysis revealed that 
this significant relationship did not apply to all minorities.  Preference for transfer 
was higher for Hispanic juveniles, but was not significantly difference between 
black and white youths.  Based on the bivariate analysis, ethnicity was recoded 
into a dichotomous variable for entry into the multiple regression (1 = Hispanic, 0 
= Non-Hispanic).  Ethnicity was significant in the regression model, where, net of 
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the other characteristics in the model, being Hispanic increased preference for 
transfer by more than nine percentage points.  Thus, the hypothesis is only 
partially supported.  The condition of being a minority was not uniformly 
significant, but the condition of being Hispanic was supported. 
 
Gender 
 Hypothesis 11 predicted that prosecutorial preference for exclusion would 
be greater for male youth than for female youth.  A t-test was run to examine this 
relationship.  Analysis indicated no significant relationship between gender and 
prosecutorial preference for transfer.  Thus, gender is not a significant predictor 
of preference for exclusion. 
 
History of Family Abuse 
 Hypothesis 12 predicted that prosecutorial preference for exclusion would 
be greater for youth that have not been abused than for those who have.  A t-test 
was run to examine the relationship between history of abuse by a family 
member and prosecutorial preference for transfer.  While analysis revealed no 
significant relationship between abuse and preference for transfer, prosecutors 
often indicated a desire to have more information where history of abuse was 
present.  For example, respondents often wanted to know greater detail on the 
duration and nature of the abuse.  Thus, while the hypothesis was not supported, 
some prosecutors' open-ended responses indicated that this might contribute to 
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the overall decision to seek more individualized treatment options in the juvenile 
court. 
 
Socio-Economic Status 
 Hypothesis 13 predicted that prosecutorial preference for exclusion would 
be negatively related to socio-economic status.  One-Way ANOVA indicated that 
while the mean of preference for transfer was lower for upper-income juveniles, 
this relationship was not significantly different.  Thus, Hypothesis 13 was not 
supported by the data. 
 
Policy Implications and Recommendations 
 Based on the findings of the current research several important areas of 
juvenile transfer policy must be considered.  As addressed in Chapter 2, 
prosecutors have a great deal of discretion in juvenile transfer.  They ultimately 
have the authority to determine the charges for which the juvenile will stand trial 
and, as provided in Florida statutes, have considerable discretion in determining 
the court of jurisdiction for this criminal process.  Because of this power, it is 
imperative to gain a better understanding of prosecutors' views on the role of the 
juvenile court as well as the process of juvenile transfer.  The research questions 
in this dissertation were designed to better understand their perspectives.  
Generally, prosecutors support the idea of transfer of juveniles to the adult court.  
However, their responses to the items addressing the research questions yield 
several important policy considerations.   
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First, prosecutors appear to support transfer in isolated circumstances.  
Prosecutors seem to be somewhat restrained in their support for transfer, 
supporting transfer in those isolated circumstances where the juvenile's criminal 
history or current offense warrants this process.  This restraint may be fueled by 
the recognition that transfer to the adult court can have significant consequences 
for the transferred juvenile. Further, they disagreed with the notion of abolishing 
the juvenile court, indicating their recognition of the value of this separate court.  
Second, and not surprisingly, prosecutors strongly support prosecutorial direct 
file as a mechanism of transfer.  However, they also support a process by which 
prosecutors make a recommendation for transfer and judges make the final 
determination.  These responses also indicate some deal of restraint on their 
discretionary power to transfer a juvenile to the adult court.   
The vignette portion of the survey also yielded some important policy 
considerations.  The preference for transfer to the adult court (M = 22.11) was 
consistent with the responses to the items addressing the research questions.  
That is, most prosecutors were quite conservative in their estimates of the 
chance that they would want to transfer the youth described in the vignette.  Most 
important in these decisions were the age of the youth, the potential threat to 
society, and the presence of a violent offense.  The fact that the age of the youth 
was a significant predictor in the preference for transfer may reflect two 
considerations.  First, prosecutors may attribute other characteristics to a youth 
when reading the age.  For example, an older youth may be associated with 
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greater maturity27, greater accountability, or greater criminal sophistication.  The 
long-standing justification for a separate juvenile justice system is the relative 
immaturity and diminished culpability of most juveniles (Bernard, 1992).  Second, 
the results reported here may reflect Bishop et al.'s (1989) finding that 
prosecutors prefer to transfer older juveniles because they realize such youths 
will soon age out of the juvenile court jurisdiction.  Transfer to the adult system 
may allow for much longer terms of supervision by justice agencies. 
  Most troubling in the results is the role of ethnicity in the preference for 
transfer.   Ethnicity explained fifteen percent of the variance in prosecutorial 
preference for transfer.  Hispanic youths were significantly more likely to be 
preferred for transfer than were whites or blacks.  These findings are not 
consistent with Florida's rate of waiver of youth by race presented in Chapter 2.  
The Florida data revealed that blacks, at a rate of nearly 3.5%, are more likely to 
be transferred to the adult court than whites.  Further, the Florida data revealed 
that all other ethnicities (Asian and Other) are more likely to be transferred.  Prior 
research has generated similar findings to Florida's data (Barnes & Franz, 1989; 
Podkopacz & Feld, 1995; Puzzanchera, 2000; Snyder et al., 2000; Thomas & 
Bilichick, 1985).  However, not all prior research has isolated the ethnic effect on 
transfer, but rather the effect of race with Hispanics being categorized as white.  
The current research did test the effect of ethnicity and found a significant 
relationship to transfer preference.  This relationship to preference for transfer is 
                                            
27 While the maturity of the juvenile was not a significant predictor of preference for transfer, the 
initial bivariate test did approach significance (F=2.343, p=.100). 
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particularly important due to the large Hispanic population in Florida.  This 
disparity in preference for transfer needs to be further explored. 
 Based on the findings, this research would make the following  
recommendations.  First, the juvenile justice system should be maintained as it 
is, with most juvenile offenders being handled in the juvenile court and relatively 
few juvenile offenders being transferred to the adult court.  All of the juveniles 
described in the vignettes were eligible under Florida law to be excluded from the 
juvenile court.  Notably, however, the overall likelihood of transfer in the current 
study was 22%, suggesting that prosecutors seem to view exclusion as the 
appropriate response in only some cases.  Moreover, they appeared to make 
rational decisions, removing the most serious, dangerous, and least likely to be 
rehabilitated offenders from the juvenile court.  This approach helps preserve the 
nature of juvenile justice for the remainder of juvenile offenders.  Further, there 
were no significant differences in prosecutorial preference for transfer by 
prosecutor characteristics, suggesting that there are no "camps" into which 
prosecutors are divided.   
Second, the current structuring of prosecutorial discretion for juvenile 
transfer should remain.  With the exception of ethnicity, decisions are based on 
appropriate, legal criteria.  This suggests that, mostly, there is a legitimate 
foundation for the preference to transfer.  However, further research must be 
conducted to gain a better understanding of the role that ethnicity plays in the 
process of juvenile transfer to the adult court.  
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Limitations of Current Research 
There are limitations to the current research that must be acknowledged 
when considering the findings and policy implications.  First, the policy issues 
discussed are based solely on the observations of 272 State Attorneys and 
Assistant State Attorneys in Florida.  Unique characteristics of Florida 
prosecutors as well as Florida law regarding transfer may limit the generalizability 
of the findings to prosecutors in other states.   
Second, nonresponse error may have occurred.  There were three 
instances where a large portion of an entire judicial district's prosecutors did not 
respond to the survey.  While the pre-notice letter was intended to foster a 
mutual relationship between the researcher and State Attorney, as well as detail 
the importance of the current study, the reaction to the letter may have been 
counter-productive.  In one judicial district, upon receiving the pre-notice letter, 
the State Attorney instructed prosecutors not to respond to the survey until he 
had time to review it.  Unfortunately, all of the surveys were returned with a letter 
indicating that none of the prosecutors would be completing the survey.   
While the initial phase of the study yielded a modest response rate, 
prosecutors informed me during the second phase that they had been instructed 
by their superiors not to complete and return the survey.  In addition, several 
prosecutors contacted this researcher to indicate a general loathing of social 
science research in the juvenile justice field as well as to express suspicion for 
the current research goals.  In these instances, the prosecutors were convinced 
of some sort of bias by this researcher against prosecutors and juvenile transfer.  
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While assured that this was not the case, many of these prosecutors could not be 
convinced of the value of their responses and the ultimate contribution of their 
efforts. 
Finally, some prosecutors indicated that it would not be appropriate for 
them to complete the survey instrument.  This group of non-respondents believed 
that they work at the pleasure of the State Attorney and should not express their 
own opinions, as they might be inconsistent with their State Attorney.   
Unfortunately, the prosecutors described above may be important and 
different from those who responded to the survey, particularly if they make 
juvenile transfer decisions. 
One final limitation concerns the survey instrument.  Based on the open-
ended questions, some additional, contextual detail could have provided greater 
insight into the factors that affect the decision to transfer juveniles to the adult 
court.  Specifically, greater vignette detail regarding the nature of the prior 
offenses and the nature of the current offense were continually cited as being 
influential. Unfortunately, while this information was said to be important by 
prosecutors, the impact of this additional information is unknown.  
 
Future Research 
This research was implemented to gain a better understanding of the 
factors affecting the decision to transfer a juvenile to the adult court and 
prosecutors views on transfer.  Based on the findings, it is recommended that 
several areas of future research be explored.  First, this research should be 
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replicated in different states.  Looking at data from other states, with laws similar 
to Florida's laws, may yield important information.  Specifically, replication may 
provide greater insight on the issue of race.  Second, additional research should 
be conducted utilizing an updated survey instrument.  Specifically, additional 
information should be provided to prosecutors on the nature of the prior offenses 
as well as changes to the maturity variable.  Further, each prosecutor should 
receive three vignettes - one for each offense category (violent crime, property 
crime, and drug crime.  The current research indicated that the presence of a 
violent offense was a significant predictor of transfer preference.  However, this 
finding is not consistent with what we know about Florida's rate of transfer by 
crime category.  Drug offenses yielded a higher rate of transfer than did violent 
offenses as described in Chapter 2.  Having prosecutors respond to three 
vignettes, each involving a different type of offense, would allow for examination 
of whether other factors differentially affect preferences for transfer within each 
crime type. 
Finally, qualitative research should be employed to provide greater detail 
to the process of transfer of juvenile offenders to the adult court.  Two methods 
are most appropriate.  First, semi-structured interviews should be conducted with 
prosecutors in Florida who currently work in their respective Juvenile Divisions.  
This method would provide greater insight into how discretion is exercised and 
why the decisions are made.  Prosecutors in the current study often indicated 
that the ultimate sentence or disposition possibilities for juveniles would be a 
critical factor in their decisions to transfer to the adult court.  Interviews would 
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provide the forum to better understand the degree to which this issue, among 
other known predictors, contributes to the transfer process.  Further, these 
interviews would allow the researcher to ask for greater details on issues of the 
process of transfer.  Specifically, the researcher would be able to identify other 
social and political factors that may influence the prosecutors' decisions.  Finally, 
these interviews would allow the researcher to further clarify who is making the 
transfer decision. 
  The second qualitative research approach is far less intrusive.  The use of 
social artifacts could be an invaluable tool in better understanding transfer of 
juvenile offenders to the adult court.  While state data provides quantitative 
information on the juveniles being transferred, accessing the casefiles of 
transferred juveniles could potentially provide other contextually important 
information that is not provided by the state or that can not be captured in a 
survey.  
 
Conclusion 
 Discretion is a critical component of the criminal justice system.  
Throughout the system discretion is utilized by gatekeepers to ensure the 
continual criminal justice process.  Without it, the system would be overtaxed and 
fail to function.  This dissertation provides a modest empirical contribution to the 
area of juvenile transfer research.  Specifically, this research contributes to our 
understanding of the factors affecting transfer of youth to the adult court as well 
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as a better perspective of the attitudes of prosecutors upon whose discretion we 
rely.   
 The hypotheses tests reveal that prosecutors are greatly influenced by the 
juvenile offender as well as the offense in making transfer decisions.  These 
findings are consistent with their responses to the research question items, 
indicating that while transfer is viewed as an important criminal justice 
component, it should be used sparingly.  At least from prosecutors, the future of 
the juvenile court is safe.      
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APPENDIX A:  SURVEY CORRESPONDENCE 
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PRENOTICE LETTER 
June XX, 2004 
State Attorney Name 
State Attorneys Office 
Nth Judicial District 
City, State 30000 
Dear State Attorney Name: 
A few days from now, prosecutors within your judicial district will receive in the mail a request to 
fill out a brief questionnaire for an important research project being conducted by the University of 
Central Florida.  These prosecutors were randomly selected from a list of Florida's State 
Attorneys and Assistant State Attorneys.  
 
This questionnaire concerns the certification of juveniles to the adult court and the role of the 
juvenile court in Florida.  We are asking prosecutors for their opinions regarding these issues. 
I am writing in advance because I am sure that you would like to be notified ahead of time of the 
correspondence between us and your attorneys.  I am also writing in advance to ask you to 
support your prosecutors' participation in this study.  Their intimate knowledge of the judicial 
system is invaluable.  This  is the first study to try to understand the certification process from the 
perspective of prosecutors. 
 
Once this study has been completed, we will send you a copy of our findings, and we hope that 
you will share them with others who may be interested. 
 
It is only with the help of you and your office that our research can be successful.  Thank you for 
your time and consideration. 
 
Sincerely, 
Robin King Davis 
Project Director 
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COVER LETTER #1 
 
 
June XX, 2004 
Dear Mr. _________ or Ms. ___________: 
I am writing to ask for your help in a study being conducted by the University of Central Florida.  
You were one of several hundred state attorneys randomly selected to be included in this study.  
The objective of our study is to understand the process of certification of juveniles to the adult 
criminal justice system from the prosecutor's perspective.  Regardless of your current position in 
the State Attorney's Office, we are asking for your participation.  As a prosecutor in Florida, you 
have invaluable knowledge and insight into this issue. 
 
Please fill out the enclosed questionnaire.  Your answers are completely confidential and 
demographic information will be used for statistical purposes only.  Also included is a self-
addressed stamped envelope for your convenience once you have completed the survey.  When 
you return your questionnaire, your name will be deleted from our mailing list and database and 
will not be connected to your responses in any way.  Participation in this study is completely 
voluntary.  However, I would like to stress the importance of your participation in this study.  While 
previous studies have looked to rates of certification as a means to explain juvenile transfer, no 
study has surveyed state attorneys to understand their unique perspective and experience 
regarding this issue.  If for some reason you choose not to participate in this study, please let me 
know by returning the blank questionnaire in the enclosed stamped envelope. 
 
If you have any questions or comments about this study, I would be happy to speak with you.  I 
can be reached at the address on this letterhead, by telephone at (407) 823-3739, or by e-mail at 
ro770882@pegasus.cc.ucf.edu. 
 
Thank you for your participation and time. 
Sincerely, 
Robin King Davis 
Project Director 
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THANK YOU/REMINDER POST CARD 
 
 
Last week we mailed you Florida State Attorney Survey, seeking your views about the juvenile 
court and certification of youthful offenders.  Your response is very important to us. 
 
If you have already completed and returned the survey to us, please accept our sincere thanks.  If 
not, please do so today.  Participation in this study is voluntary, but because we sent the 
questionnaire to only a small but representative sample of State Attorneys, it is extremely 
important that you also be included in the study if the results are to accurately represent the views 
of prosecutors in Florida. 
 
If by some chance you did not receive the questionnaire, or it got misplaced, please call right now 
(407-823-3739) and I will get another one in the mail to you immediately. 
 
Sincerely, 
 
 
 
Robin King Davis 
Project Director 
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COVER LETTER #2 
 
 
 
June xx, 2004 
 
Dear Mr.  ________ or Ms. ________: 
 
About three weeks ago, I sent a questionnaire to you that asked for your views on the juvenile 
court and certification of youthful offenders.  To the best of our knowledge it has not yet been 
returned. 
 
The comments of the State Attorneys who have already responded include a wide variety of 
opinions about the juvenile court and certification of youthful offenders.  We think the results will 
be useful to practitioners and researchers. 
 
We are writing again because of the importance that your own views have for helping us to get 
accurate results.  Although we sent questionnaires to prosecutors throughout the state, it's only 
by hearing from nearly everyone in the sample that we can be sure the results truly represent 
Florida State Attorneys. 
 
A few prosecutors have contacted us to say that they should not have received the survey 
because they do not currently work in a position where they have any role in juvenile court or 
juvenile certification.  As we have told them, this survey hopes to collect the opinions of all types 
of prosecutors - experienced and newer prosecutors, male and female, felony and misdemeanor 
attorneys, and those who play a role in certification as well as those who do not. 
 
As we noted in our first letter, participation in this study is completely voluntary and greatly 
appreciated.   To assure your privacy is maintained, a code number is written on the enclosed 
return envelope so that we may remove your name from our mailing list when you send back your 
survey.  To protect your privacy, your name only appears on our mailing list and will not be 
associated with your answers in any way.  In other words, you can be assured that your 
responses will be completely confidential. 
 
Your views are very important to us.  We hope that you will fill out and return the questionnaire 
soon.  If you have any concerns or difficulties completing the survey, please call me at (407) 823-
3739.  If I am not in the office, please leave a message and I will return your call.  Thank you 
again for taking your time to participate in our survey. 
 
Sincerely, 
Robin King Davis, M.CJ. 
Project Director 
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FINALCONTACT POST CARD 
 
 
Recently, we mailed you the Statewide Survey of Florida State Attorneys, 
seeking your views about the juvenile court and certification of youthful offenders.  
We are getting close to ending our data collection efforts and have yet to receive 
your completed survey. 
 
We would greatly appreciate your participation in our research.  If you would like 
another copy of the survey, please call (407-823-3739) or e-mail 
(ro770882@pegasus.cc.ucf.edu) me, and I will get another survey to you in the 
mail immediately.  Thank you for your time and consideration. 
 
 
Sincerely, 
 
 
 
Robin King Davis 
Project Director 
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APPENDIX B:  SURVEY INSTRUMENT 
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Youthful Offenders in Court 
 
 
 
 
Statewide Survey of Florida 
State Attorneys 
 
 
 
 
 
 
by the 
 
University of Central Florida 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
______________________________________________________________________________________
____ 
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Please return completed surveys to: 
 
Robin King Davis, Director of Survey Projects 
University of Central Florida, Department of Criminal Justice and Legal Studies, PO Box 161600, Orlando, 
FL 32816 
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PART I.  We would like to begin by asking by asking for your thoughts about the role of the juvenile court.  
Below are several statements about the appropriate role and domain of the juvenile court.  Some state 
attorneys would agree with them.  Others would disagree.  We would like to know what you think about the 
juvenile court. 
 
 
Please indicate your response by 
circling your choice.     
 
 
1. All youthful offenders age 17 and under should be adjudicated 
 in a separate juvenile court, not in the adult court 1 2 3 4 5 
 
2. Most juvenile offenders should stay under the jurisdiction 
 of the juvenile court 1 2 3 4 5 
 
3. In general, I support certifying some youths to the adult court 1 2 3 4 5 
 
4. Serious, violent youthful offenders should be certified to the adult court 1 2 3 4 5 
 
5. Certain juvenile offenders' sentences should continue in the adult 
 criminal justice system after the youth reaches the age of majority 1 2 3 4 5 
 
6. The juvenile court should be abolished 1 2 3 4 5 
 
7. If a youth is tried in the adult court, his or her age should be used 
 as a mitigating factor in sentencing decisions 1 2 3 4 5 
 
8. Some youths are beyond the rehabilitation capacities of the 
       juvenile justice system 1 2 3 4 5 
 
9. For the protection of society, it is necessary to certify some youths 
 to the adult court 1 2 3 4 5 
 
10. Some offenses are serious enough to warrant certification 
 to the adult court 1 2 3 4 5 
 
11. Resources in the juvenile justice system are too scarce to warrant 
 spending them on youthful offenders who are chronically delinquent 1 2 3 4 5 
 
12. Certifying certain youths to the adult court will deter other 
 juveniles from committing crime 1 2 3 4 5 
 
13. Serious juvenile offenders have a significant negative influence on 
 other youth in the juvenile justice system 1 2 3 4 5 
 
14. Chronic juvenile offenders have a significant negative influence 
 on other youth in the juvenile justice system 1 2 3 4 5 
 
15. Protection of due process rights for juvenile offenders is more 
 certain in the adult court 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
 
please continue on the back of this page ° 
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16. Juvenile offenders get more individualized attention in the juvenile 
 court compared to the adult court 1 2 3 4 5 
  
17. Transferring youths to the adult court may jeopardize their futures 
 by having a criminal rather than a sealed record 1 2 3 4 5 
 
18. Juvenile offenders should not be exposed to adult offenders 1 2 3 4 5 
 
19. Juvenile offenders can not get the proper treatment and rehabilitative 
 services they need in the adult system 1 2 3 4 5 
 
20. Juvenile offenders can be influenced to change easier than 
 adult offenders 1 2 3 4 5 
 
21. Juvenile offenders do not need the same due process protections 
 as adult offenders because the juvenile justice system is not adversarial 1 2 3 4 5 
 
22. Juvenile offenders are less responsible for their actions than 
 adult offenders 1 2 3 4 5 
 
23. Juvenile offenders are less mature than adult offenders 1 2 3 4 5 
 
24. Judges alone should be responsible for making certification decisions 1 2 3 4 5 
 
25. Prosecutors alone should be responsible for making certification decisions 1 2 3 4 5 
 
26. Prosecutors should make the certification recommendation, but judges 
 should make the final certification decision 1 2 3 4 5 
 
27. Judicial waiver promotes protections of youths' due process rights 1 2 3 4 5 
 
28. Legislative certification takes away the subjective quality of certification 1 2 3 4 5 
 
29. Judges are inconsistent in their certification decisions 1 2 3 4 5 
 
30. Judicial waiver is too subjective 1 2 3 4 5 
 
31. Judges are too hesitant to waive appropriate candidates for certification 1 2 3 4 5 
 
32. Prosecutorial waiver is influenced by political decisions 1 2 3 4 5 
 
33. Prosecutorial waiver leads to abuse of power 1 2 3 4 5 
 
34. Statutory exclusions are too automatic 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
 
please continue on the next page Ö 
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PART II.  We are nearly at the end of this survey, but would like to get your views on a specific case.  
Please read the following offender and offense description and answer the questions below. 
 
OFFENDER-OFFENSE DESCRIPTION SHEET 428 
 
GENDER:  Male AGE:  16 ETHNICITY: Hispanic 
 
CURRENT OFFENSE: 
> The youth is accused of threatening to beat up a young girl unless she 
gave up her money.  The victim gave up $20 and was not physically harmed 
 
DELINQUENT HISTORY:   
> No prior adjudications in the juvenile court 
> No prior commitments to a state facility 
 
SOCIAL HISTORY:  
> No prior history of abuse by family members 
> Middle-income family 
> Family appears willing to participate in any special requirements imposed 
by the court 
> Youth is more mature than same-age peers 
 
Regardless of your current position or experience within the State Attorney's Office, we would like to know 
your opinion regarding the present offender and offense. 
 
Please indicate the degree to which you agree or disagree with 
the following  two statements. 
 
 
 
35. Given the proper care and treatment, this youth can change for the better 1 2 3 4 5 
  
36. This youth poses a significant threat to society 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
37. Regardless of what the law currently allows, we would like to know 
 your own views on the best way to handle this juvenile's case.   
 
Based on the information provided, what are the chances that you 
would want to certify this youth to the adult court? % 
 
0% means the youth would stay in 
the juvenile court, and 100% means 
the youth would go to the adult 
court.  You can also choose any 
number in between. 
 
 
38. What, if any, other information would help you decide whether this youth should be certified to the  
adult court? 
  
 
 
 
 
please continue on the back of this page ° 
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PART III.  Finally, we would like to ask you a few questions about yourself that will help us to interpret the 
results.  We will use this information only to group you with others who are like you to see whether your 
answers are similar.  This information will not be used to identify any individual respondent. 
 
 
39. How old are you? __________ 
 
 
40. What race are you?  (check one) 
 
 White  Asian or Pacific Islander 
 Black  American Indian 
 Hispanic  Other 
 
 
41. What is your gender? (check one) 
 
 Male 
 Female 
 
 
42. In what division of the State Attorney's Office do you currently work? (check one) 
 
 Felony 
 Misdemeanor 
 Other 
 
 
43. Have you ever been involved in making a decision to certify a youth to the adult court? (check one) 
 
 Yes 
 No 
 
 
44. To the best of your recollection, how many years and months have you been a prosecutor? 
 
Years ___________   Months ___________ 
 
 
45. To the best of your knowledge does your jurisdiction currently have a written policy that provides 
specific guidelines regarding which juveniles should be certified to the adult court? (check one) 
 
 Yes 
 No 
 I don’t know Do you believe your jurisdiction needs a written policy specifying which 
  juveniles should be certified to the adult court? (check one) 
 
 No 
 Yes, developed by the state attorney’s office 
 Yes, developed by the judiciary 
 Yes, developed by ______________________ 
 
 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Thank you for participating in this study. 
 
Should you have any additional comments that you feel are important to better understanding certification to the adult 
court, please detail them on the back of the cover page or on a separate sheet. 
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